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1. INTRODUCTION 
STEVEN BLOCKMANS 
A kaleidoscopic picture 
Accommodating ‘differentiation’ in EU law and policy is not a new phenomenon but 
rather is a concept that has been integral to European integration since the Treaty of 
Rome. The concept is to be generally understood as:  
… a model of integration strategies that try to reconcile heterogeneity within 
the European Union and allow different groupings of Member States to 
pursue an array of public policies with different procedural and institutional 
arrangements.1 
While ‘flexibility’ is considered a convenience to accommodate member states’ 
differing socio-economic and political interests in an expanding European Union, 
three manifestations of flexibility call into question the constitutional, institutional 
and instrumental boundaries of this differentiation in an organisation that is based 
on a special legal order with common institutions and common principles. They take 
the form of: 
 ‘opt-outs’, e.g. from the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) and the 
single currency, 
 ‘enhanced cooperation’, e.g. on divorce law and the EU patent and 
 cooperation between member states outside the EU legal framework, e.g. the 
Euro-plus Pact and the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance (TSCG). 
The sovereign debt crisis has led to a thorough re-assessment of European 
integration as a project.  For the political leaders of some member states the 
successive creation of a fiscal, economic and political union based on federal 
principles is the way forward.2 For others the time has come to renegotiate their 
                                               
 Senior Fellow and Head of the Foreign Policy Unit at CEPS; Professor of EU External 
Relations Law and Governance at the University of Amsterdam. Special thanks go to Dr. Bart 
Van Vooren, University of Copenhagen/Altius, for his contribution to the framing of the 
current study. 
1 A. Stubb (1996), “A Categorization of Differentiated Integration”, Journal of Common Market 
Studies 34: 283. 
2 See Final Report of the Future of Europe Group of the Foreign Ministers of Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, 
Spain, 17 September 2012 (www.auswaertiges-amt.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/626338/ 
publicationFile/171844/120918-Abschlussbericht-Zukunftsgruppe.pdf).  
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relationship to the European Union, either by moving further to the periphery of the 
‘concentric circles’ that define the level of European integration (e.g. the United 
Kingdom) or by contemplating to opt back into common policies (e.g. Denmark). In 
foro interno, i.e. with respect to the organisation of its internal common policies, the 
EU is thus expected to develop further along variable geometric lines. 
In foro externo, i.e. with respect to the EU’s external action, there are various kinds of 
differentiation, both of a structural and of an ad hoc nature, some of them the 
expression of the external dimension of internal differentiation, others of an external 
character per se. On the structural side, examples include the separation of the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) – formerly known as the ‘second pillar’ 
– from all the other external policies of the EU; opt-outs of the Common Security and 
Defence Policy (CSDP); the external dimension of the Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice (AFSJ), e.g. readmission and visa facilitation agreements; and the external 
representation of the EU (and the eurozone) in international financial institutions. On 
the ad-hoc side, one can point to the notion of ‘interested member states’ in external 
migration policy and the possibility for members to constructively abstain from CFSP 
and CSDP decision-making. As a consequence of the specificity of EU external action, 
this area is often approached from the perspective of ‘coherence’: joining up different 
strands of external policies and delivering a single message, in spite of the 
underlying differentiation. Similarly, there is a perceived need to preserve ‘legal 
homogeneity’ in a wider European legal sphere. 
Aims and structure of the study 
The dual objective of this compilation is to analyse the various ways and means by 
which differentiation is given form in the realm of EU external action and to discuss 
some constitutional, institutional and instrumental challenges of a multi-speed, 
multi-tier European Union in the field of foreign policy. 
Particular questions of a constitutional nature that will be addressed include how the 
differentiated ratification of foundational treaties impacts on the EU’s external 
relations; how variable geometry in foro interno impacts on the application of general 
principles of EU law such as coherence, the exclusive and shared nature of 
competences, increased complementarity of competences, the principle of conferral, 
legal homogeneity and the duty of sincere cooperation in foro externo; how 
constructive abstention and enhanced cooperation pan out in EU external action and 
whether these forms of differentiation could be taken further so as to create ad hoc 
and/or structural ‘avant garde’ groupings in ‘EU’ external relations. 
From an institutional perspective, a number of queries may be relevant: whether a 
new institutional balance is required to accommodate internal diversity; whether 
new inter-institutional agreements and arrangements are likely to emerge and 
whether treaty change is required to accommodate them; which procedural 
arrangements will have to be made in order to safeguard respect for the general 
principles of EU law; and which settings serve the interests of different groupings of 
EU member states in EU external action. 
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Finally, in instrumental terms, new forms of ‘mixity’ and ‘hybridity’ can be observed, 
depending on the policy area at issue. What legal consequences do they produce? 
Will the use of (internal or external) soft law arrangements become even more 
widespread in EU external relations and, if so, how would this impact its 
effectiveness? 
From the above it is clear that many questions arise from the many faces of 
differentiation3 and from the trend towards increased differentiation.4 This study 
does not claim to be able to answer all of them. As mentioned above, the focus here is 
very much on constitutional, institutional and instrumental differentiation in EU 
external action, an area that hitherto remained underexposed in literature.5 Yet, one 
can hardly embark on such a study without paying attention to differentiation within 
the European Union. Indeed, the international policies of the EU have traditionally 
been inspired by internal law and action. Hence the reference in the above to the 
famous Latin saying ‘in foro interno, in foro externo’ applied to the landmark ruling of 
the Court of Justice in the ERTA-case, in which the Court established that “where the 
Community implements a common internal policy, the member states are precluded 
from entering into any commitment in their external relations which might affect the 
common policy”; this ought to be left to the institutions.6 In view of increasingly 
contentious issues like labour migration, cyber security and the fight against 
terrorism, it is almost impossible to maintain the traditional division between 
internal and external policies of the EU. However, rather than trying to compose the 
mirror image of differentiation in internal policy areas in the external realm, this 
study will offer observations on the constitutional, institutional and instrumental 
challenges posed by new forms of economic governance in the EU, before discussing 
a variety of legal constructs and policy aspects of differentiation in EU external 
action.  
Richard Corbett (Member of the Cabinet of Herman Van Rompuy, President of the 
European Council) kicks off the discussion by arguing that, other than on eurozone 
matters, the several instances of variable integration that now exist fall short of 
creating a ‘two-tier Europe’: there is no institutional separation. Moreover, he posits 
that we do not have an avant garde group but rather several different arrières gardes, 
always consisting of a small number of states, often just one or two but in a different 
configuration (even if some countries appear frequently) and often seen as an 
                                               
3 See, e.g., G. De Búrca and J. Scott (eds) (2000), Constitutional Change in the EU: From 
Uniformity to Flexibility?, Oxford: Hart Publishing; B. de Witte, D. Hanf and E. Vos (eds) 
(2001), The Many Faces of Differentiation in EU Law, Antwerp: Intersentia. 
4 See, e.g., D. Curtin (1993), “The Constitutional Structure of the Union: A Europe of Bits and 
Pieces”, Common Market Law Review 30: 17; and N. Walker (1998), “Sovereignty and 
Differentiated Integration in the European Union”, European Law Journal 4: 355-388.  
5 For a few legal academic contributions, see, e.g., E. De Smijter (2001), “The External 
Relations of a Differentiated Community”, in B. de Witte, D. Hanf and E. Vos (eds), The Many 
Faces of Differentiation in EU Law, Antwerp: Intersentia, pp. 269-207; and M. Cremona (2008), 
“EU External Action in the JHA Domain: A Legal Perspective”, EUI Working Papers LAW 
No. 2008/24. 
6 Commission vs. Council (ERTA) [1971] ECR 263. 
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anomaly, exception or temporary situation. In this context, he touches upon the 
future of UK relations with the EU. When extrapolating his views on differentiation, 
he suggests that the outside world still sees the EU as a “single entity with some 
complications”. 
Vít Beneš and Mats Braun (Institute of International Relations, Prague) explore three 
scenarios of the future institutional development of the EU and the eurozone: i) a 
federal eurozone within an intergovernmental EU; ii) an intergovernmental eurozone 
within an intergovernmental EU; and iii) a consolidated EU. They argue that the 
original ethos that enabled the unprecedented EU enlargement, at a time when the 
original 12 member states were about to further deepen EU integration (EMU), has 
faded away. In their opinion, the conclusion of the intergovernmental treaties outside 
of the EU legal framework (e.g. the Fiscal Compact and the ESM Treaty) represents a 
serious blow to the original idea that both the deepening and widening of the EU can 
be reconciled. 
The study then turns to the application of the EU’s constitutional principles as 
‘housekeeping rules’ in external differentiation. Ester Herlin-Karnell (VU University 
Amsterdam) and Theodore Konstadinides (Surrey University) argue that although 
the EU’s heterogeneity as it emanates from differentiated integration can be 
manifested in various ways, the application of the principles of consistency, conferral 
and sincere cooperation offers an attractive solution to reconcile flexible 
arrangements in the EU with the basic constitutional framework of European 
integration. Adam Łazowski (Westminster University) explores the tension between 
‘flexibility’ and ‘homogeneity’ and asks whether the consistent drive to export the EU 
legal order to third countries comes at too high a price for the homogeneity of EU 
law. In search of answers, he analyses the best and worst practices offered by the 
models devised to structure the EU’s relations with the European Economic Area, 
Switzerland, and the EU enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy 
countries that have signed up to the Energy Community Treaty. 
The compilation subsequently addresses issues of variable geometry in the EU’s 
external policies. Steven Blockmans (CEPS and University of Amsterdam) analyses 
differentiation in the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), an area 
which, in spite of its name, is not generally known for a widespread ‘common’ 
approach by the member states. He finds that, indeed, “under certain conditions, the 
specialisation and division of labour among the member states can strengthen both 
the effectiveness and legitimacy of the foreign policy of the EU”.7 Blockmans argues 
that the loopholes in unanimous decision-making in CFSP, i.e. the constructive 
abstention mechanism, qualified majority voting and the principle of enhanced 
cooperation, could be extended to allow the EU to pull its weight as a foreign policy 
actor. Csaba Törő (Hungarian Institute of International Affairs) seconds that motion 
in his exploration of the possibilities for flexibility in the adoption and 
implementation of Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) decisions. Beyond 
                                               
7 The reference here is to an earlier CEPS publication by S. Keukeleire, “EU Core Groups – 
Specialisation and division of labour in EU foreign policy”, CEPS Working Document No. 
252, October 2006. 
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the potential and occasional instances of flexibility in the operational dimension of 
CSDP, permanent structured co-operation (PESCO) is explained as a standing 
platform for the accommodation of diverse aspirations and capabilities of member 
states. Törő assesses the significance of PESCO as an institutionalised solution for 
defence policy differentiation within the Union. 
Finally, attention is paid to differentiation in the external dimension of the Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ). Claudio Matera (Asser Institute) asks whether 
there is perhaps too much ado about the opt-outs obtained by the UK, Ireland and 
Denmark in this area. He argues that while variable geometry poses institutional 
challenges to the operation of the AFSJ, the legal implications of such differentiation 
do not create substantive obstacles for the EU to be a global security actor. This 
argument resonates with Juan Santos Vara (University of Salamanca) and Elaine 
Fahey (University of Amsterdam), who explore the issue through a case study of 
opting in and out in EU-US relations. Contrary to widespread belief, they find that 
this kind variable geometry does not in recent years appear to have complicated the 
negotiation of international agreements dealing with criminal justice and policing 
measures. Even though it is perhaps too early to establish a clear picture of the UK’s 
implication in the external dimension of the AFSJ, it seems clear that even the UK is 
committed to intensify international cooperation in these fields. 
Semantic clarifications 
It is fitting at this stage to map out the multiple ways in which ‘differentiation’ is 
expressed in EU law and policy. It is important to note that in spite of its appearance 
in many guises (‘flexibility’, ‘à la carte integration’, ‘variable geometry’, ‘multi-speed 
EU’ or ‘two-tier Europe’, to name but a few), differentiated integration manifested 
itself in overlapping conceptual schemes.8 In his seminal article in the Journal of 
Common Market Studies, Alexander Stubb has offered a classification of differentiated 
integration.9 However, the problem with classifications is that in reality the 
boundaries between several categories are often quite fuzzy. For instance, 
differentiation in EU law finds expression in several types of derogations granted to 
one or more member states. Such derogations can be found at the level of EU 
primary law in the highly visible abstentions of member states from the eurozone, 
the AFSJ and the Schengen acquis; the mini ‘opt out’ from snus (loose tobacco) for 
Sweden; ‘emergency brakes’ in the CFSP10 and the AFSJ vis-à-vis judicial cooperation 
in criminal matters;11 and the transitional (not permanent) arrangements in the EU 
Accession treaties accompanying the last three waves of enlargement (2004, 2007 and 
2013) with the aim to lessen the blow of the competitive pressures unleashed by free 
                                               
8 For a recent graphic presentation, see V. Kreilinger (2013), “Differentiated Integration in 
One Graphic”, Notre Europe, Paris, 25 July (www.eng.notre-europe.eu/011-16563-
Differentiated-Integration-in-one-graphic.html). 
9 Stubb, op. cit. 
10 See the contribution by Blockmans to this volume. 
11 For details, see the contributions by Matera and Santos Vara & Fahey to this volume. 
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movement rules upon acceding states.12 The Treaty-based derogations to the Treaty’s 
fundamental freedoms enshrined in Article 36 TFEU (moral, public policy and 
human rights justification of quantitative restrictions on imports, exports or goods in 
transit) and Article 52 TFEU (public policy exception to the right of establishment) 
also constitute a means of differentiation to the law of the internal market. As 
mentioned in the previous sections, differentiation is also closely related to the 
enhanced cooperation procedures provided for by Article 20 TEU and Articles 326-
334 TFEU. It is further manifest in the possibility of permanent structured 
cooperation in CSDP under Articles 42(6) and 46 TEU as well as Protocol 10 attached 
to the Treaty of Lisbon. Moreover, Article 44 TEU enables a group of member states 
to implement humanitarian and rescue missions, peacekeeping and combat 
operations.13 In other words, the list is almost endless with regard to the various 
possibilities for differentiated integration within the current framework of the 
treaties. 
Differentiation also occurs outside the framework of EU law, as recently evidenced 
by the so-called ‘Fiscal Compact’ (formally, the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and 
Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union; also referred to as TSCG). This is 
the kind of integration that Joshka Fischer and others endowed with the term ‘avant 
garde’, pointing to the limited chance for agreement within the current legal 
configuration.14 The term has, however, also been employed to denote higher forms 
of integration between member states within the framework of the treaties – a notion 
dismissed by others.15 
While Piris and other observers adhere to the concept of a ‘two-speed EU’, the 
various opt-outs and provisions of enhanced cooperation mentioned above do not 
expose a bipolar system operating at two speeds but rather the possibility to create a 
multipolar system operating at different speeds of cooperation or abstention.16 
Ireland, for instance, is a eurozone member but does not participate in Schengen, or 
in defence cooperation.17 The ‘multi-speed’ concept is therefore to be preferred. To be 
sure, this concept should not be confused with that of a ‘two-tier’ (or in the future 
possibly a ‘multi-tier’) EU; one that is defined by institutional separation and 
differentiated voting in the Council. As mentioned above, the sole instance of such 
                                               
12 See A. Łazowski (2012), “EU do not worry, Croatia is behind you: A Commentary on the 
Seventh Accession Treaty”, Croatian Yearbook of European Law and Policy 8: 1-39; A. Łazowski 
(2007), “And Then They Were Twenty-Seven...A Legal Appraisal of the Sixth Accession 
Treaty”, Common Market Law Review 44: 401-430; and K. Inglis (2004), “The Accession Treaty 
and its Transitional Arrangements: A twilight zone for the new members of the Union”, in C. 
Hillion (ed.), EU Enlargement: A Legal Approach, Oxford: Hart Publishing, pp. 77-109. 
13 See the contribution by Törő to this volume. 
14 See, e.g., T. Hildebrandt and H. Wefing (2011), “Vergesst diese EU”, Zeit Online, 11 
November (www.zeit.de/2011/46/Interview-Fischer); and J.-C. Piris (2012), The Future of 
Europe: Towards a Two-Speed EU?, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
15 See the contribution by Corbett to this volume. 
16 See P. Craig (2012), “Two-Speed, Multi-Speed and Europe’s Future: A Review of Jean-
Claude Piris on the Future of Europe”, European Law Review 37: 800. 
17 See the contribution by Herlin-Karnell and Theodore Konstadinides. 
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differentiation currently relates to eurozone matters, where there are separate 
meetings of the Eurogroup of finance ministers and Eurozone Summits at the level of 
heads of state or government, to the exclusion of representatives of non-euro member 
states. 
The proliferation of terms and concepts to qualify the subtle differences in forms and 
dimensions of the European integration process is further proof that the legal and 
policy aspects of ‘patchwork Europe’ merit attention and clarification. It also begs the 
question to what extent the EU is still ‘united in diversity’, to coin the Union’s own 
motto until it was dropped from the EU Treaty in the pre-Lisbon IGC. Can a divided 
EU be expected to speak with one voice externally? These and other questions will be 
addressed in the current compilation. 
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2. TWO-TIER EUROPE - REALLY? 
RICHARD CORBETT 
eople have been discussing a multi-tier Europe for decades: after all, the ECSC 
project in 1950 created what was then seen as a two-speed Europe, involving 
just six of the then 14 member states of the brand new Council of Europe. 
But within our current European Union, I would argue that the several instances of 
variable integration fall short of creating a two tier Europe.  
We do not have an avant garde group, but we have several different arrières gardes: 
 Ten member states not (or not yet) in the eurozone 
 Ireland, the UK, Cyprus, (and Romania and Bulgaria not yet) in Schengen 
 Denmark not in defence cooperation 
 The UK, Ireland and Denmark not participating in all AFSJ areas 
 Denmark with an exemption from the single market as regards secondary 
residencies 
 Spain and Italy not joining the unified EU patent 
 Twelve states not in divorce law cooperation 
 The UK and Poland protocol interpreting the Charter of Right’s effect on their 
domestic law 
 The UK and Czech Republic not in the Stability Treaty (fiscal compact) 
What is striking is that these arrières gardes always consist of a small number of states, 
often just one or two, always appear in a different configuration (even if some 
countries appear frequently), and are often seen as an anomaly, exception or 
temporary situation. For all areas where the EU acts, either all (usually), or the 
overwhelming majority of member states participate. 
Other than on eurozone matters, of which more below, there is also no institutional 
separation, no two-tier structures or separate institutions apart from, in the Council, 
differentiated voting, but with everyone around the table. In the European 
Commission, the Parliament and Court of Justice, there is no differentiated voting. 
On eurozone matters, there are separate (under the treaty, ‘informal’) meetings of the 
Eurogroup of finance ministers and eurozone summits at the level of heads of state 
                                               
 Member of the Cabinet of Herman Van Rompuy, President of the European Council. 
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or government (but even those have the same president as the European Council, 
and its meetings are normally held in conjunction with European Council meetings). 
And on eurozone matters too, Commission, Parliament and Court remain whole, 
with no differentiated voting. 
But what about further deepening of the eurozone? Clearly those sharing a common 
currency must do more together to manage their common currency. Does this 
potentially lead to two-tier Europe? It evidently does to a degree, and this has 
already happened in large part. But I see seven reasons why it will not lead to fully 
fledged two-speed Europe.  
o First, the group is clearly not avant garde on any other subject than those directly 
linked to the common currency (not foreign policy, justice, environment, 
transport, agriculture, fishing, consumer protection, or competition policy, etc.).  
o Second, it is not a fixed membership group, others will join (Latvia already 
intends to join next year); only two have legal opt-outs (and even they have a 
right to reconsider). It is not a fixed-boundary division.  
o Third, the deepening measures which have been taken as a response to economic 
crisis, have been in many cases been at the level of the whole Union, and only 
some at the level of the euro. For example, the three European Supervisory 
authorities for the financial sector (European Banking Authority, etc.), the 
European Systemic Risk Board, substantial legislation on the financial sector, the 
reinforced excessive deficit procedure, the EU Semester as a means of intensifying 
macroeconomic policy co-ordination, have all been carried out at the level of the 
whole Union.  
o Fourth, what has been done at eurozone level, has usually been done in a way that 
was deliberately open to others to participate, and attempts have been made to 
expressly minimise the institutional split between the 17 and the rest. For 
example: the Stability Treaty (‘Fiscal compact’), was done at the level of the 
eurozone because one member state objected to changing EU treaties, but almost 
all the others wanted to join and only two did not sign it. Furthermore, the 
architecture of that was designed to keep it as close as possible to the EU system. 
Another example, currently underway: the banking union, again not done at the 
level of the whole EU, (though one could argue that this is needed for the single 
financial market as much as for the single currency, but because of one member 
state in particular, it was done at the level of eurozone plus others that wanted to 
join. Every care was taken to ensure single market compatibility, including 
safeguards for the ‘outs’ in the voting procedure. A further example is the 
Eurozone Summit: these are being held in conjunction with European Council 
meetings, not on a stand-alone basis. So everyone can raise an issue before the 17 
meet separately. It has been given the same president to ensure institutional 
coherence. Also, at least one of the two annual meetings is open to all signatories 
of the Stability Treaty, not just the eurozone. 
o Fifth, the bulk of what the EU does, even economically, is at the level of the whole 
EU of 28. The single market is crucial in this respect; it is the glue that holds the 
EU together and generates the bulk of EU legislation. The common rules on 
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consumer protection, competition, state aids, standards, etc., is at level of the 
whole EU. So is trade policy, environment, R&D programmes and, of course, all 
the non-economic matters such as foreign policy, police and justice etc. 
o Sixth, no separate institutional structures have been set up, other than the ESM. 
The ESM is indeed intergovernmental at eurozone member state level. After all, it 
is financed by national money or guarantees (the EU budget is far too small) and 
the member states are the shareholders, so they sit on the board of governors. In 
practice, however, when it comes to using this instrument, they rely on the 
Commission for country-specific reports, to negotiate Memorandums of 
Understanding, etc.  
o Lastly, in the case of the Stability Treaty, its architecture has been designed to 
avoid divergence (it was not even originally intended to have a separate treaty – 
that resulted from UK non-cooperation in December 2011). Every care has been 
taken to hug the EU institutions closely: the role of Commission, the use of ECJ, 
etc. And not just eurozone member states, but all bar two Union member states 
joined in, so rather than being a separate construction, the correct analogy is that 
of my colleague Luuk Van Middelaar; that it is a buttress, supporting the main 
structure, not a separate building.  
There are different narratives about all of this of course, not just in academia, but also 
among member states. Nonetheless, the compromises reached do limit the two-tier 
divergence. 
So far, so good. But what of the future? Is there possible treaty change ahead? In 
general we find that much can be done within existing treaties, more than perhaps 
initially considered possible. And many of the things for which treaty change would 
be necessary are things for which there is anyway no consensus (like fully fledged 
Eurobonds). The procedure for treaty change is long and difficult. And now, the 
situation in the UK doesn't encourage others to go down the route of treaty change. 
What, indeed, about Cameron's January 2013 speech? That speech was made more as 
party leader than as government leader, and about what a future UK government 
would do, if the Conservatives win absolute majority in 2015. Up to now no other 
major party has matched that pledge. There is therefore no certainty yet that further 
opt-outs or renegotiation or devolution will be on the table in the way that Cameron 
seemed to envisage. If this eventuality does arise, it remains to be seen what 
emphasis will be given to multilateral reforms or to unilateral opt-outs, what other 
member states are willing to accept, and whether the focus will be primarily on 
treaty change or changes to legislation. 
How does all this affect the EU’s external relations? I think the outside world sees us 
the EU as a “single entity with some complications”. Notwithstanding monetary 
policy and the Schengen visa system, Europe’s main instrument for dealing with 
third countries is trade, and other aspects of economic relations, and there we do act 
as a single entity. We also do on foreign policy, when we have a common position. 
And third countries see us represented on such matters by entities (the Commission 
or the EEAS) that represent the whole Union. Many agreements they enter into with 
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the Union have to be approved by the European Parliament, to which third countries 
are paying increasing attention – again an institution of the whole Union.  
To conclude, expectations of an emerging two-tier system must be nuanced by a host 
of factors that limit the division into two tiers, blur the boundaries and maintain the 
primary importance of the whole Union. 
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3. AN EVER-CLOSER EUROZONE AND ITS 
CONSEQUENCES FOR DIFFERENTIATED 
INTEGRATION IN EUROPE 
VÍT BENEŠ AND MATS BRAUN 
here are several unknowns in the process of deepening the integration of the 
eurozone. Even if we observe a transfer of competences from member states to 
the eurozone level, we do not know where this process will end. Moreover, 
how eurozone decisions will be taken in the future is also an open question. 
Establishing euro summits and the institutionalisation of the Eurogroup have 
confirmed the intergovernmental decision-making of the eurozone, but we cannot 
discount a change in this in the future. In particular, an increased eurozone agenda 
might call for more democratic decision-making at a supranational level, including 
the use of the European Parliament, a eurozone parliament or, potentially, some 
directly elected representative of the area. Third, how will the deepening integration 
of the eurozone affect decision-making within the EU and what we call differentiated 
integration in the Union? If the assumption is that the different speeds of the EU are 
moving in the same direction, some suboptimal institutional solutions based on an 
ad hoc use of EU institutions for solely eurozone-related issues could be more 
acceptable. At the same time, we would have to find solutions that would enable a 
smooth passage for non-eurozone countries into the eurozone. But if we, on the other 
hand, accept that all parts of the EU are no longer moving in the same direction, then 
this analysis would suggest that we should think along the lines of 
inventing/restructuring the institutional framework of the EU and the eurozone.  
In the debates on the Genuine Economic and Monetary Union, four areas are often 
discussed: banking union, fiscal union, economic union and political union. The most 
relevant of these for differentiated integration is political union. Yet, so far little is 
known about political union, since, in accordance with the functionalist tradition of 
European integration, changes at this level are likely to be the result of more practical 
concerns at other levels of integration. In other words, the development of any 
political union is dependent on the measures that are introduced to solve the 
eurozone crisis.  
                                               
 Vít Beneš and Mats Braun are research fellows at the Institute of International Relations, 
Prague. This chapter was written as part of the project “The economic governance of the 
eurozone: scenarios of future development and implications for the Czech Republic” 
supported by the Technological Agency of the Czech Republic (grant number TD010198). 
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In this chapter we outline three scenarios for the future development of the EU. The 
first two scenarios follow the principle of a multitier EU; in other words they both 
envisage the continuation of the diversification of integration within the EU between 
the eurozone and non-eurozone member states. The third one assumes that the EU is 
moving in the direction of consolidation. As we see it, however, consolidation does 
not necessarily mean that the slower group in integration terms would catch up with 
the faster one. Instead, we presume that at least one version of consolidation could be 
based on a ‘return’ to a post-Maastricht arrangement.  
3.1 A federal eurozone in an intergovernmental EU 
3.1.1 Motivation: budgetary union and democratic approval 
The eurozone has so far made progress on the development of a fiscal union, 
primarily with regard to national budgetary rules through the Fiscal Compact and 
the so-called ‘two-pack’ and ‘six-pack’ regulations. Discussions on banking union 
have also moved on, even if the pre-launch project as it stands now consists of the 
surveillance parts (pillar 1) but lacks the budgetary capacity necessary for a bank 
recapitalisation fund (pillar 2) and a joint guarantee of investments (pillar 3). In both 
cases, though, the EU has advanced on its regulatory activities, which is perhaps 
unsurprising given the EU’s history as a regulatory power (Majone). Yet, what will 
be decisive for the further development of political union is how far the eurozone 
develops a common budget. This is because it is primarily development in this 
direction that would make increased democratic scrutiny of eurozone activities a 
must, and thus trigger movement towards political union. We argue that the 
establishment of a eurozone budget could be the driving force on the path towards 
political union – the federalised eurozone within an intergovernmental EU. Money is 
a scarce resource, especially at a time of crisis. We can thus assume that the 
establishment of the eurozone budget could lead to a drying up of the EU budget in 
the longer run. Most of the net contributors to the EU budget come from the 
eurozone; if and when the eurozone establishes its budget, their willingness to 
contribute to the EU budget will naturally decrease. Meanwhile, countries outside of 
the eurozone either lack the political will (the UK) or the economic capacity (the CEE 
countries) to keep the EU-wide budget afloat. 
There are two questions we need to ask regarding the possible development of a 
eurozone budget. First, how will the eurozone budget be financed? And second, 
what tasks will the budget serve to achieve? The two questions are, in fact, 
interrelated. If we assume that a separate eurozone budget would be financed in a 
similar way to the contemporary EU budget, in other words, with a high dependence 
on member state payments and only a few of the EU’s own resources, then it is 
highly unlikely that the budget would be big enough for interventions aiming to 
reverse negative economic cycles or to provide for the funding of a crisis mechanism 
that would be independent of member states’ national financing. The question is 
then: What tasks should such a budget fulfil? One could consider that it would be 
used in order to provide the banking union with its second and third pillar, which, so 
far, are missing. Yet, that would demand the creation of a rather large fund to be put 
in place for use in the event of a crisis.  
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However, it is more likely that such a fund, if created, is based on member states’ 
commitments rather than on a permanent eurozone budget. Why would member 
states give up the control of the resources at an earlier stage than necessary? The 
most likely answer is that the budget could be used as a second and improved 
version of the EU’s cohesion policy. It would be an improvement in that it would 
allow for greater coordination between the money invested and the economic and 
financial stability of the eurozone. The revision could also serve to introduce a 
broader and more systematic use of conditionality. However, the introduction of 
such a budget would meet resistance from non-eurozone countries, as these would 
be concerned about the consequences that such a doubling could have on the EU 
budget. Moreover, it is important to note that a budget which is based on national 
contributions would provide less of an incitement for institutional reform than one 
based on own resources. The national contribution model would give member states 
an excuse to favour less commitment to democratic input based on national 
parliaments instead of reforms on the supranational level. 
If the EU budget were to fulfil cycle-correcting tasks, then the budget would need a) 
a budget financed by own sources of sufficient size and b) true Eurobonds that could 
be used to cover gaps in the budget when counter-cyclical activities are necessary. 
The eurozone could obtain its own sources for the budget through value added taxes 
or, for instance, through a tax on fiscal transactions (see above). However, the 
introduction of own taxes and budget would have to include all the eurozone 
countries, unlike the enhanced co-operation to implement the financial transaction 
tax (as currently planned). The issue of taxation is controversial and unlikely to 
receive the support of all EU member states. Therefore, the only possible road for the 
realisation of this kind of eurozone budget would go through new eurozone treaties, 
or EU treaty revisions, where some member states accept the eurozone moving 
ahead in exchange for substantial derogation.  
The development or non-development of a eurozone budget is crucial since this is 
the issue that would make it necessary to provide the eurozone with greater 
democratic input. There are a few possibilities for future development in regard to 
this issue. On the one hand, it is rather likely that nothing will happen in the area of a 
budget, which also allows for a continuation of the status quo. On the other hand, a 
eurozone budget based on own resources would trigger the biggest changes at 
institutional level. This development could lead to the scenario we call ‘a federal 
eurozone in an intergovernmental EU’. This scenario would assume that the 
eurozone continues on its road to deeper integration, including having a budget 
partly based on own resources in the long run. The eurozone, however, then has to 
solve issues relating to how to provide for democratic legitimacy in its decision-
making for the eurozone. 
3.1.2 Institutional design 
In this scenario we talk of a ‘federal eurozone’ in the sense that decisions are made by 
the representatives of eurozone citizens. A federal eurozone thus stands in 
opposition to an intergovernmental eurozone. While in the federal model decisions 
are made by the representatives of the European citizens (the European demos), in 
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the intergovernmental model decisions are made by the representatives of European 
states (the nations of Europe). The decision-making model (federal vs. 
intergovernmental) does not predetermine the scope of the EU competences. The 
intergovernmental model actually allows for a rapid expansion of the EU / eurozone 
powers, and this is how the eurozone’s economic governance has emerged so far. A 
federalist eurozone, however, by definition would require a stronger direct 
democratic input into eurozone decision-making. There are three alternatives for 
how this could be done, each of them with its own disadvantages. 
The first solution: eurozone legislation can be passed through the European 
Parliament. However, eurozone polices are no longer EU-wide policies (compare this 
with the scenario of a ‘consolidated EU’, below). Therefore, such a system would not 
fulfil the intention of strengthening democratic legitimacy, because not only 
eurozone citizens would be represented. Moreover, such a solution would not be 
politically acceptable to the eurozone countries. 
The second solution is the formation of a Consultative Committee on eurozone issues 
within the European Parliament with regard to EMU affairs, with its members being 
selected from eurozone MEPs. Since primary law assumes the equality of MEPs, such 
an arrangement cannot rest on formalised law. The selection of the members of such 
a committee from eurozone MEPs can only rest on informal ‘gentlemen’s 
agreements’ between the political groups in the European Parliament. With regard to 
plenary sessions, one could consider that there could be an informal agreement that 
MEPs from non-eurozone countries would abstain from voting, and the discussion 
could be prepared in the planned Consultative Committee on Eurozone Issues. Such 
a solution is problematic, however, since it violates the equality principle of 
European citizens. Moreover, we can assume that the prominence of such a special 
committee for eurozone policies would grow quickly (remember the rising star of the 
Eurogroup within the Council). That would only further expose the division among 
MEPs and, by extension, among European citizens.  
The third solution would be the establishment of a new democratically elected 
institution through a new treaty. In order to solve the democratic deficit problem, 
either a treaty change or a solution based on separate intergovernmental treaties 
would be necessary. Article 13 in the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and 
Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union enables coordination between 
relevant committees of national parliaments and the European Parliament. However, 
the intention of Article 13 is rather to develop a forum for discussion than to create 
an institution that could deliver democratic scrutiny.  
This treaty falls outside of EU primary law, and its signatories can use this as a point 
of departure for further treaties and through them create the European institutions 
anew. That would give them the opportunity to meet the public demand for more 
effective, lightweight and democratically accountable institutions. This would open 
up the possibility of the foundation of a distinct eurozone parliament. The 
democratically elected institution can also take the form of a directly elected 
president of the Euro summit or the president of the Eurogroup. There are several 
problems associated with the establishment of new eurozone institutions through a 
separate treaty, though. First, it would be difficult to sell new or even duplicate 
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institutions to the electorate. From this point of view it is not politically feasible to 
have separate parliaments for the EU and the eurozone. The second problem lies in 
the fact that the separate eurozone institutions (established through a separate treaty) 
would solidify the division of the EU into eurozone member states and non-eurozone 
member states. The elections to the eurozone institutions would take place only in 
eurozone countries, which would divide European citizens into two groups with 
different political (voting) rights. Moreover, the establishment of a federal eurozone 
within an intergovernmental EU would sooner or later jeopardise the idea of the EU 
citizenship. While the ‘eurozone citizens’ would remain equal in their (political / 
voting) rights and obligations, the European citizens would be divided into two 
groups with different (political / voting) rights and obligations. A second class 
European citizenship would become a formalised reality. Some non-eurozone 
countries already tend to view the project of ‘European citizenship’ or the ‘European 
demos’ sceptically (e.g. the UK or the Czech Republic). They have already accepted 
(or even advocated) the ‘differentiated membership’, so it is fair to assume that they 
would analogously accept or even advocate the ‘differentiated EU citizenship’ 
(second class citizenship). 
To conclude, we assume that if and when the eurozone embraces the idea of 
eurozone-wide democratic legitimacy, the residual organisation (the EU) will move 
towards the intergovernmental model of decision-making, watering down the idea of 
EU-wide citizenship. On a more general level, we could argue that any model of 
differentiated integration (purposefully) does away with the principle of equality of 
member states. Analogously, differentiated integration in practice (purposefully) 
does away with the principle of equality of individuals (European citizens) since it 
grants special obligations, rights or even political rights to a narrow subset of 
European citizens. The federal eurozone would most probably be established 
through a separate (constitutional) intergovernmental treaty, and not through the 
revision of EU primary law.  
3.2 An intergovernmental eurozone in an intergovernmental EU 
3.2.1 Motivation: functionalist crisis-solving and intergovernmentalism 
The scenario of an intergovernmental eurozone in an intergovernmental EU is 
ideologically based on the combination of functionalist reasoning and an 
intergovernmental approach to integration. The (neo)functionalist approach sees the 
European integration as a technocratic process driven by the need to solve immediate 
economic problems and deliver tangible material benefits. The functionalist approach 
does not see the geographical, legal and institutional integrity as a goal and a value 
in itself. Economic imperatives (effective management of the existing EU) trump 
wider political and geopolitical objectives (unification of Europe / overcoming the 
divisions in Europe).  
Two-tier or multi-tier integration? On one side, the logic of ‘geographic spill-over’ 
and the intergovernmental nature of policy-making facilitate the adoption of a multi-
level model of European integration. The individual EU member states respond 
individually to the perceived benefits and costs of particular integration projects / 
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policies. European integration takes the form of Europe à la carte, multi-tier 
integration, or multispeed integration. Integration is ‘differentiated’ not only in terms 
of policy participation, but also in terms of institutions and primary law. But at the 
same time, the functional logic and the nature of intergovernmental bargaining 
pushes in an opposite direction towards the consolidation of an ‘inner core’ – two-
tier or two-speed integration (a consolidated eurozone in a two-tier EU) (see the 
contribution by Richard Corbett in this volume). 
First, in line with the functionalist ‘spillover’ logic, the functional links within the real 
economy and the interdependency between national economies lead toward a 
functional ‘clustering’ of policies and a geographical consolidation of membership in 
individual integration projects / policies. For example, the integration in the sphere 
of free movement of goods provides strong incentives for the integration in the 
capital market. Similarly, integration in monetary policy provides strong incentives 
for further integration in terms of coordination of national budgets and eventually a 
unique eurozone budget. Analogously, countries that do not participate in the 
monetary policy lack incentives to participate in other policies and integration 
projects initiated by the eurozone (fiscal coordination, banking supervision).  
Second, the intergovernmental eurozone is built on the principles of international 
law (integration through separate international treaties) and international bargaining 
(diplomacy). The European Union is still to a large extent an intergovernmental 
organisation. In this situation, individual states do not negotiate with ‘Brussels’ over 
their participation in particular policies as the model of ‘Europe à la carte’ assumes. 
In fact, states negotiate among themselves over their mutual commitments.  
While international law allows for flexible membership, international bargaining is 
based on the principle of reciprocity. In the anarchical system of international 
relations, cooperation is often established through a reciprocal exchange of 
concessions and commitments. Let us assume a situation where state A is interested 
in cooperation/integration in policy Y, while state B is interested in 
cooperation/integration in policy Z, and the overall game is a positive sum game. 
Since neither state can be forced into cooperation, the only solution to the game is a 
reciprocal exchange of commitments. States A and B end up committing themselves 
to both policy Y and policy Z.  
The reciprocal nature of international negotiations tends to produce arrangements 
where all (or most of) the participating states share all (or most of) the commitments 
in all (or most of) the agreed policy areas. While this principle seemed too weak to 
ensure the coherence of the EU27/28, we can still assume that the reciprocal nature 
of negotiations within the eurozone will produce a consolidated eurozone where all 
the participating states share equal rights and obligations in all eurozone-wide 
policies. Put simply, it is hard to imagine Spain negotiating an ‘opt-out’ from the 
Fiscal Compact while being a recipient of the ESM. The reality of the eurozone 
economic governance supports the idea that the integration project will lead to a 
two-tier integration rather than a multi-tier model. The bargaining within the 
eurozone revolves around mutual commitments, and the negotiating states strive for 
equal rights and obligations among the participating states. Issue linkage and 
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conditionality are a norm: participation in one policy (such as the Fiscal Compact) is 
a condition for participation in another area (rescue funds like the ESM). 
The intergovernmental nature of the collaboration in the eurozone could be 
challenged due to a lack of transparency and a lack of democratic input. Yet, if the 
eurozone returns to economic growth, it cannot be ruled out that the eurozone could 
receive its legitimacy through its performance, i.e. its output, just as throughout its 
history the EU’s legitimacy was derived from its output rather than its input. This is 
especially so now, when further reforms, including the budgetary union, are taking 
place. The intergovernmental structure of the eurozone would also stress that this 
tier could be one of many and not merely one of two within the EU. 
Intergovernmental cooperation would also make it rather flexible and open for 
countries moving from one tier to another. It is also conceivable that in the long run 
this type of multi-tier collaboration could facilitate enlargement, and it is possible 
that the EEA countries be viewed as one tier of the EU, and candidate countries 
could have access to this tier prior to their actual membership.  
The introduction of distinct institutions and a distinct primary law for the eurozone 
not only has legal implications, but also political and geopolitical implications in 
terms of the shift of negotiating power. We argue that through the establishment of 
separate institutions and a separate primary law for the eurozone, the non-eurozone 
countries lose some of their negotiating power. Simply said, the differentiated 
integration makes the non-eurozone countries more dispensable. While they can still 
draw on their material (economic) and symbolic power, the introduction of separate 
eurozone institutions and, notably, the separate eurozone primary law (represented 
by the Fiscal Compact Treaty and the Treaty Establishing the European Stability 
Mechanism) would clearly be detrimental to their bargaining position.  
3.2.2 Institutional aspects 
The EU as such is not changing as a consequence of the development described 
within this scenario. The member states remain sovereign under international law. It 
means that they can amend and revise the EU treaties, but it also means that any 
group of EU member states can conclude a separate treaty beyond and beside the EU 
treaties.  
Differentiated integration is often presented as the next step in the integration 
process. According to the official narrative, the eurozone deepens its integration 
while the integrity and coherence of the EU remains intact. However, the 
‘intergovernmental eurozone in an intergovernmental EU’ is a result of both the 
closer integration of the eurozone and the disintegration of (some of) the non-
eurozone countries from the eurozone. The disintegration is evident from the 
loosening of the attachment of non-eurozone countries to the eurozone policies and 
institutions. 
Under Maastricht, the EU and the eurozone were one in terms of both policies and 
institutions (see the scenario ‘consolidated EU’). Economic and monetary policy was 
established as an EU-wide policy shared by all EU member states, and was 
supplemented with temporary derogations and permanent opt-outs. The fact that the 
EMU was an EU-wide policy was reflected by the inclusive nature of the institutions. 
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All EU countries participated at the discussions in the ECOFIN Council. The fact that 
some countries had a permanent opt-out or temporary derogation from the third 
stage of the EMU was reflected in the distribution of voting rights. The voting rights 
of countries with a temporal derogation from the third stage of the EMU were 
derogated. 
In the post-Lisbon period, political discourse changed rapidly. Due to the ‘blame 
game’ that followed the sovereign debt, financial and economic crisis, the non-
eurozone countries to a greater or lesser degree refused to take their share of political 
responsibility for the fate of the EMU. In terms of political responsibility, it is widely 
acknowledged (both by the eurozone members and the non-eurozone states) that the 
eurozone policies are primarily owned by the eurozone countries (i.e. the countries 
that moved to the third stage of EMU) rather than by the EU as a whole. In reality, 
the status of the non-eurozone countries changed from ‘being in with a temporal 
derogation of rights and obligations’ to ‘being out with the possibility to enter’.  
In the post-Lisbon period, the eurozone gradually established its own institutions. 
The creation of dedicated eurozone institutions went hand in hand with i) the shift of 
the ownership of and responsibility for the eurozone policies from the EU members 
to the eurozone members; ii) the postponement of the transition to the third stage of 
the EMU in some EU countries (e.g. the Swedish referendum in 2003); and iii) the 
continuing EU enlargement (2004, 2007, 2013), which means that the adoption of the 
euro by all EU members is postponed ad infinitum.  
The institutions that have so far been established for the eurozone are 
intergovernmental in nature. The first of these institutions, the Eurogroup, received 
formal recognition through the Lisbon Treaty, and is dependent on the Council 
(ECOFIN) for its decision-making. The second, the euro summit, however, was 
established through the fiscal compact, in other words, through a separate 
intergovernmental treaty. The Commission has so far been used to provide the 
eurozone countries on an ad hoc basis with an institution that would facilitate the 
enforcement of any intergovernmental decisions that are taken. The Commission 
might continue to do this even if this could also be challenged by non-eurozone 
member states. Even if the role of the Commission is strengthened in its vertical 
scrutiny tasks towards the member states, this is not the case in its horizontal 
relations with other EU institutions, most notably in its relations with the Council 
and the European Council.  
Does the ‘intergovernmental eurozone in an intergovernmental EU’ require another 
treaty change? As history shows, new institutions or policies do not necessarily 
require a treaty change. The Eurogroup came into being as an informal platform long 
before its endorsement through primary law. If there is a political will to do so, 
eurozone members may establish a similar informal platforms in other policy areas. 
The eurozone policies can be established by using the mechanism of ‘enhanced 
cooperation’ under article 20 or another legal base. However, these changes in 
institutions and policies come at a cost of stretching the existing EU treaties to their 
limits. The existing EU treaties do not often provide a sufficiently solid basis for new 
eurozone policies (such as the banking union), new institutions or new tasks for old 
institutions (such as the banking supervision for the ECB). The allocation of new 
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tasks to the EU institutions (the Commission, the ECB and the Court) by separate 
intergovernmental treaties, though, is not unproblematic either. Even the most 
pragmatic actors (e.g. the Bundesbank) eventually start to speak about the need for 
further treaty change when it comes to such treaties. 
Will the new treaty take the form of an EU primary law revision or a separate 
intergovernmental treaty? We assume that the ‘intergovernmental eurozone in an 
intergovernmental EU’ is primarily driven by pragmatic, functionalist concerns. In 
this context, a separate intergovernmental treaty would be a better choice for the 
eurozone countries simply because the negotiation and ratification of an EU-wide 
treaty revision would be too risky. An EU-wide treaty revision would require a 
delicate balancing act between the priorities of a very diverse group of 28 member 
states. Since EU treaty revision requires a ratification by all the EU member states to 
come into force, treaty revision can easily be derailed through intentional 
blackmailing by a single state or by an unintended internal dispute between the 
representatives who negotiated and signed the treaty (the government) and those 
who ratify the treaty (the parliament, the president or the general public). 
Meanwhile, a separate international treaty is a very attractive option for the eurozone 
countries. First, it is easier to find a compromise between 18 (soon 19) states than 
between 28 states. Second, a separate intergovernmental treaty is a ‘tabula rasa’. In 
drafting such a treaty, the signatories are not adding new articles to the hundreds of 
pages of some historical treaties, but they have an opportunity to write a new, 
simpler, streamlined treaty that would reflect the contemporary priorities and 
concerns of the signatories and their constituencies. Third, the fact that a separate 
intergovernmental treaty does not require ratification by all the signatories 
minimises the risk of blackmailing or unanticipated delays during the ratification 
process. The fast ratification of the Fiscal Compact and the smooth Irish referendum 
provide strong evidence for that. Fourth, the conclusion of a separate 
intergovernmental treaty requires neither the blessing of the European Parliament 
nor a cumbersome convention. 
The conclusion of a separate intergovernmental treaty for the eurozone opens up the 
possibility for a revision of the EU treaties. As the eurozone integration deepens, EU 
integration will loosen. One can expect that as a result of a compromise between the 
eurozone states and the non-eurozone states, the statute of the ECB will no longer be 
part of an EU-wide treaty but will be included in the eurozone treaty. Similarly, 
economic and monetary policy will be appropriated by the eurozone treaty, and it 
will cease to exist as an EU-wide policy. The eurozone treaty would remain open for 
accession to any EU member state. But the very existence of two treaties and separate 
eurozone institutions will provide a final blow to the (post-)Maastricht idea of a 
consolidated EU with a single set of policies and institutions. 
Which policies will remain with the EU, and which will be appropriated by the 
eurozone? With regard to the scope of the eurozone-wide policies, it is the sovereign 
decision of the signatories to conclude agreements in their areas of competence. As 
long as they steer away from the EU’s exclusive competences (which are fairly 
limited), the eurozone member states are free to establish new common policies 
among themselves, using a separate intergovernmental treaty for the eurozone. The 
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separate intergovernmental treaties are not part of EU law and thus they, in 
principle, fall outside of the jurisdiction of the ECJ if the signatories do not decide 
otherwise. The scope of the EU-wide policies will more or less depend on the ability 
of the non-eurozone states to find a compromise among themselves. It will be 
interesting to see the UK, Sweden, the Czech Republic, Romania, Bulgaria and other 
non-euro countries negotiating about the scope of the EU-wide cohesion policy, the 
common agricultural policy, freedom of movement of labour or cooperation in 
criminal matters. Since all pro-integrationist countries will join the eurozone by then, 
we can assume that the scope of the EU-wide policies will reflect the lowest common 
denominator (the position of the UK).  
3.3 A consolidated EU 
3.3.1 Motivation: overcoming the division of Europe 
During the 1990s and early 2000s the idea of a consolidated (united) EU rested on the 
assumption that deepening and enlarging the EU are mutually compatible and not 
mutually exclusive. It is worth recalling that period since it allows us to identify the 
political background behind the notion of a ‘consolidated’ (united) EU. The idea of a 
consolidated (“united”) EU rested on the assumption that the EU can deepen and 
enlarge at the same time. The process of ‘deepening’ was associated with the 
establishment of the EMU and institutional reforms, which centred around the 
expansion of the QMV and the strengthening of the European Parliament. The 
deepening of the EC/EU was a continuous process that long preceded the end of the 
Cold War. The negotiations of the Maastricht Treaty and the creation of the EMU 
were a culmination of discussions and negotiations about internal market and 
economic integration that occurred during the 1980s and earlier. Despite disputes 
over the deepening of the European integration, most of the EC/EU12 member states 
were anxious to maintain the dynamics after the end of the Cold War and the legal 
and institutional integrity of the EC/EU. 
The process of ‘enlarging’ referred to the eastward expansion of the EU, which was, 
despite the previous rounds of EC enlargements, a novel and unexpected challenge. 
In European political discourse, motivations for the enlargement were largely 
(geo)political rather than purely economic. The supporters of the EU enlargement on 
both sides of the former Iron Curtain successfully portrayed EU enlargement as a 
way to overcome the division of Europe and support the newly democratic countries 
of CEE. For their part, the newcomers to the CEE saw EU membership (the ‘return to 
Europe’) as a return to normality and obtaining an equal status. They were very 
anxious to avoid a ‘second-class’ membership. At the time, the possibility of a 
‘second-class membership’ was rejected by both the ‘euro-optimists’ and the ‘euro-
pessimists’ in, for instance, the Czech Republic. Full membership was the ultimate 
goal, and even though not all Czech politicians embraced the idea of a ‘united’ (ever 
deepening) Europe, the notion of equal rights and obligations for all member states 
(‘fully-fledged membership’) was shared unanimously. All the new member states 
struggled to access the EU on an equal footing. 
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The conundrum rested in the fact that the new member states were not expected to 
fully participate in EMU policies at the time of their entry into the EU. While the new 
member states feared becoming second class member states, the old member states 
feared that a massive EU enlargement could bring the EU decision-making to a 
grinding halt and prevent further deepening of the European integration. The model 
of a ‘consolidated’ EU was enacted in order to tackle the above-mentioned fears and 
reach the political goal of overcoming the division of Europe. The EU would enlarge, 
the deepening towards the EMU would continue, the decision-making process 
would not collapse and the new member states would access the EU and all its 
institutions on an equal footing. 
3.3.2 Institutional aspects 
In contrast to the scenario of ‘an intergovernmental eurozone in an 
intergovernmental EU’, the idea of a ‘consolidated EU’ assumes that permanent opt-
outs from policies and institutions are formalised in a coherent and universally 
ratified legal framework. It means that permanent opt-outs for particular member 
states are agreed to (and ratified) by the rest of the member states. And vice versa. By 
ratifying a shared legal framework (such as the Maastricht Treaty), the countries with 
permanent opt-outs (e.g. the UK) give the remaining countries a formal blessing to 
push for further integration (such as introducing the euro) among themselves.  
The idea that widening and deepening can and should go together was also reflected 
in the accession criteria (the so-called Copenhagen criteria). The Copenhagen criteria 
presupposed the candidate's adherence to the aims of political, economic and 
monetary union. By entering the EU, the new member countries subscribed to the 
EMU. Even today, when the economic and monetary union in practice ceases to exist 
as a shared common policy, the new member states formally sign up to the EMU in 
their accession treaties. 
The scenario of a consolidated EU, formalised in the (post-)Maastricht EU primary 
law, asserts that as a matter of principle, all EU member states participate in the 
economic and monetary policy (some have a temporal derogation from the third 
stage of the EMU), and at the same time, as a matter of principle, all EU member 
states participate in the EMU decision-making (some have a temporal derogation 
from their voting rights in the EMU-related agenda). The principle of unity in terms 
of policy participation (as a matter of principle, all the new member countries 
entered the EMU and will adopt the euro) was matched by the principle of unity 
(coherence) of institutions (as a matter of principle, all the new member countries 
participated in decision-making through EU-wide institutions and will abrogate their 
derogation of voting rights). Without a single legal framework, we cannot conceive 
of common policies or common institutions. And vice versa. A common legal 
framework and common institutions are based on the consensus over the scope of 
more or less common policies. 
How can a consolidated EU be achieved? The necessary condition for a consolidated 
EU is a single legal framework. The consolidation of the EU would require the 
incorporation of the existing separate intergovernmental treaties (the ESM, the Fiscal 
Compact) into EU primary law, just like the Schengen treaty was incorporated into 
AN EVER-CLOSER EUROZONE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES FOR DIFFERENTIATED INTEGRATION IN EUROPE   23 
 
the EU treaties (Amsterdam 1997). The consolidation of the EU into a coherent entity 
would also require a merger of the two-track EU-eurozone institutions (ECOFIN and 
the Eurogroup, the European Council and the Euro Summits). The precedent could 
be the merger of the institutions of Euratom, the European Economic Community 
and the European Coal and Steel Community through the Merger Treaty signed in 
1965. However, the current trend is moving in the opposite direction, and a 
(re)merger of the EU and eurozone institutions seems a bridge too far. 
The prospect of a (re)merger of treaties and institutions stands and falls with the 
ability of all 28 EU members to find a compromise over the scope of the common 
policies. At a minimum, the ‘consolidated EU’ requires that the ‘outs’ are at least able 
to give the ‘ins’ a formal blessing by ratifying a treaty that would enable the ins to 
proceed with the more or less common policy. Exemptions for the outs would be 
needed in order to gain their assent, however. On the other hand, if the number of 
exemptions and derogations were too high (and the derogations were permanent 
rather than temporary), the ins would not agree to sharing institutions and decision-
making processes with the outs. In other words, the unity of the EU institutions rests 
on the assumption that the derogations from common policies (such as the 
derogation from the third stage of the EMU) are temporary, not permanent. 
There are three factors that may facilitate such consensus. First, a common 
(geo)political goal comparable with the post-Cold War reunification of a divided 
Europe would provide a strong incentive to hold the EU together policy-wise, treaty-
wise and institution-wise. Second, a freeze on the EU enlargement process or a 
stronger conditionality with regard to the candidate's adherence to the aims of 
political, economic and monetary union would make the EU-wide negotiations 
manageable. And last but not least, the exit of the unhappiest EU members would 
allow the rest of the EU to consolidate itself and reduce the demand for a 
differentiated integration. 
3.4 Conclusion 
In this paper we tried to identify three scenarios of the future institutional 
development of the EU and the eurozone. Each of them is linked to a particular 
driving force. The first scenario is a federal eurozone within an intergovernmental 
EU. The difference between a federal eurozone and an intergovernmental one does 
not rest in the scope of competences that are transferred to the eurozone level, but in 
the decision-making model. The federal model emerges as a result of a push towards 
a shared eurozone budget that would be at least partially financed through own 
resources. The eurozone’s own resources would create pressure for a stronger 
democratic legitimacy. The intergovernmental model which dominates the eurozone 
decision-making leads to the detachment of citizens from EU politics, as the citizens 
resent the fact that their voice does not count in the EU. However, the frustration 
arising from the current decision-making model does not necessarily translate into a 
demand for directly elected decision-makers on the EU level. 
The second scenario is an intergovernmental eurozone within an intergovernmental 
EU. This scenario is driven by a mix of functionalist and intergovernmentalist logic. 
The functionalist reasoning, which relies on output legitimacy, has been a major 
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driving force behind the European integration process since its inception. The 
outcome is a familiar combination of intergovernmental bargaining (treaty 
negotiations) and intergovernmental institutions (the Eurogroup, the Euro Summits) 
coupled with politically independent (i.e. democratically unaccountable) institutions 
(the Commission and the European Central Bank) as guardians of the commitments 
negotiated on the intergovernmental level. Especially in times of a crisis, the 
functionalist spillover creates an impetus for further deepening of the integration, 
but it cannot secure the legal and institutional integrity of the widened EU. As the 
current evolution of the eurozone suggests, the functionalist push for further 
deepening (spillover) and the intergovernmental model of decision-making can be 
easily combined. However, the functionalist deepening in the widened EU leads to a 
differentiated integration. The differentiated integration reaches a tipping point once 
the eurozone takes over the ownership of the supposedly common policies and 
creates its own primary law and its own institutions, which are separated from the 
EU’s treaties and institutions.  
And that is the case today. In reality, the euro is no longer the common currency of 
the EU. The ‘ownership’ of the euro was taken over by the eurozone states, which 
assumed the political responsibility for its fate. While the ‘outs’ express ‘support’ for 
the struggling eurozone and occasionally contribute to the eurozone’s rescue funds, 
they have largely refused to take political responsibility for the fate of the ‘common’ 
currency. Furthermore, the supposedly common economic and monetary policy is no 
longer governed by common EU institutions. The Eurogroup was established 
through the EU primary law (i.e. with the approval of all EU member states), and it 
can be called an ‘EU institution’ at least on paper. However, the Euro Summits were 
not established through an EU treaty, and thus they do not constitute an ‘EU 
institution’. Does such an unprecedented move herald the establishment of the 
eurozone as a separate international organisation, as was envisioned by the scenario 
‘an intergovernmental eurozone in an intergovernmental EU’? So far, the pragmatic 
functionalist logic driven by the need to solve the eurozone crisis pushes in that 
direction. The conclusion of separate intergovernmental treaties and the 
establishment of separate eurozone institutions radically changed the (geo)political 
status of the non-eurozone countries, reduced their negotiating power and severed 
their access to the institutions governing the (supposedly common) euro-related 
policies. Quite simply, they saw their status being degraded from ‘ins with 
suspended voting rights’ (ECOFIN under the Maastricht Treaty) to ‘outs’ (the Euro 
Summits under the Fiscal Compact). 
The third scenario is a consolidated EU. The consolidation of the EU is driven by the 
shared (geo)political goals, and is comparable to the task of ‘reunifying Europe after 
the Cold War division’. A consolidated EU is characterised by a unity of the legal 
base (the primary law) and the institutions. In this case, policies are, in principle, 
‘common’, i.e. their ownership is shared by all EU member states. The scenario of a 
consolidated EU can be illustrated on the (post-)Maastricht design of the European 
integration.  
As the Cold War and the division of Europe recedes into history, the original 
rationale for keeping Europe ‘consolidated’ slips from the minds of both the 
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decision-makers and the general public. The original ethos that enabled the 
unprecedented EU enlargement – at a time when the original EU12 was about to 
further deepen its integration (EMU) - faded away. Not all new EU member states 
any longer strive for a ‘fully-fledged membership’. At least in the Czech Republic 
and Hungary, the political elite wrote off the idea of equal rights and obligations for 
all EU member states. While for instance the Czech government initially protested 
against the fragmentation of the institution (the establishment of exclusive eurozone 
summits), Czech politicians in fact accept or even support the model of differentiated 
integration. The conclusion of the intergovernmental treaties outside of the 
framework of the EU primary law (the Fiscal Compact and the ESM Treaty) 
represents a serious blow to the original idea that the deepening and the enlarging 
do not exclude each other and that the enlarged EU can keep its legal and 
institutional integrity. 
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4. EU CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES AS 
HOUSEKEEPING RULES IN EU EXTERNAL 
VARIABLE GEOMETRY 
ESTER HERLIN-KARNELL AND THEODORE 
KONSTADINIDES 
his contribution discusses the vitality of a rigid constitutional structure within 
differentiation in the European integration process. As elucidated in the 
opening chapter to this volume, despite its very broad terminology, the notion 
of variable geometry or ‘differentiation’ is generally taken to mean the 
accomplishment of EU objectives in the framework of different grades of integration 
within the EU constitutional setting. This chapter will study the constitutional tenets 
of differentiation, including the differential validity of classic EU law 
principles/obligations across the member states. Its main focus will be on the 
application of the same constitutional principles that are prominent in classic EU law 
to differentiated integration initiatives in order to effectively delineate competence 
matters between the EU and the member states in both internal and external policies.  
A key argument presented in this contribution is that the EU needs a set of 
housekeeping rules to operate effectively, both internally and externally. Specifically, 
it is recognised that although the EU’s heterogeneity emanating from differentiated 
integration can be manifested in various ways, a set of housekeeping rules (including 
the principle of consistency, conferral and sincere cooperation) form an attractive 
solution to reconcile differentiated integration in the EU with the basic constitutional 
framework of European integration. There are at least two reasons for this. First, the 
uniformity and predictability of EU law would be strengthened if there is some 
parity in the way classic and differentiated integration are managed. To this end, it is 
argued that a proper level of housekeeping can be maintained through both the 
application of principles enshrined in the EU treaties and those that have been 
established by the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU). The chapter will emphasise, in 
particular, the importance of the CJEU’s adjudication on the authorisation, merits 
and procedural hurdles of such differentiation within the auspices of EU law. 
Second, the assumption that the EU needs a set of concrete legal rules to monitor 
differentiation is based on the fact that, even in the context of variable geometry, 
                                               
 Dr. Ester Herlin-Karnell is an Associate Professor in Law at VU University Amsterdam. Dr. 
Theodore Konstadinides is a Senior Lecturer in Law at the University of Surrey. Thanks go to 
Steven Blockmans, Filippa Chatzistavrou and Christophe Hillion for their useful comments. 
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member states still have to act in a spirit of sincere cooperation vis-à-vis EU 
objectives and values.  
The chapter will discuss how EU constitutional principles can be applied as a means 
of influencing the results of non-unitary action in a manner that is not offensive to 
the wider EU objectives and aspirations – especially those in the field of external 
action under Articles 3 (5) and 21 TEU. We begin our exploration by looking at the 
principle of consistency. We will then move on to consider the principle of sincere 
cooperation before we finally discuss the utility of the principle of conferral in the 
context of differentiation. Of course one could add the principles of primacy, 
subsidiarity, proportionality and national identity to the list of constitutional 
principles that have a place in the context of differentiated integration. However, for 
reasons of economy, we will focus here on the three main principles that are 
indicative of the way housekeeping rules can influence the conduct of member states 
when they decide to differentiate in EU law. 
It is argued that an effective application of the EU constitutional framework on 
differentiated integration serves to consolidate and enlarge what Dashwood once 
characterised as a “constitutional order of states”.1 Nonetheless, this chapter will not 
explore the thematic application of EU housekeeping rules in different areas of EU 
external action. In this sense any such discussion will constitute warm-up reading 
and will be incidental to the purpose of this chapter: namely to highlight a set of 
constitutional principles to achieve some element of certainty in differentiated 
integration. In any case, subsequent individual contributions in this volume will 
provide an in-depth analysis of flexibility in the setting of, for instance, the Common, 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP),2 the Common Security and Defence Policy 
(CSDP)3 and the external dimension of the Area of Freedom Security and Justice 
(AFSJ).4 As such, this contribution will provide a tour de horizon of variable 
geometry through the lenses of EU constitutional law offering a comprehensive 
introduction to major concepts involved in the development of substantive EU 
external relations law. 
4.1 Consistency  
The principle of consistency has a prominent place in EU law and appears especially 
important in managing the outcomes of differentiating integration. It constitutes an 
umbrella principle under which other legal principles of EU law follow as corollaries. 
For the sake of clarification, two notions of consistency in EU law are identified 
namely: formal consistency attributed to the Treaty structure and its insistence on 
institutional balance, and strategic consistency linked to judicial interpretation, in 
                                               
1 A. Dashwood, “States in the European Union”, Vol. 23, European Law Review, 1998, p. 201. 
2 See the contribution by Blockmans to this volume. 
3 See the contribution by Törő to this volume. 
4 See the contributions by Matera; Santos Vara and Fahey to this volume. 
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particular, the CJEU’s teleological reasoning.5 Textually, it is worth noting that apart 
from Art. 7 TFEU, which can be seen as a programmatic principle, all other Treaty 
provisions mentioning consistency provide a list of legal assignments for the EU 
institutions within specific policy areas. In that sense, consistency is a driving 
incentive for EU institutions and a rationale for the uniformity of application of EU 
law.  
The Treaty, however, is neither explicit about the degree of cooperation demanded 
by member states to achieve consistency nor transparent about the permissible 
degree of supranational pre-emption against inconsistent national rules. For instance, 
the search for consistency in various external affairs presents a very different picture 
to that which applies in internal EU policies. This is the case in particular with regard 
to the level of intensity of the role of the CJEU. Throughout its jurisprudence, the 
CJEU has attempted to give consistency some teeth via its teleology in order to strike 
a balance between national and collective EU interests. The present authors have 
previously argued that especially in the early stages of European integration, 
consistency helped the CJEU resolve ‘hard cases’ and establish the autonomous legal 
nature of the EU legal system. As such consistency is key to our understanding of the 
notions of effectiveness (effet utile) and uniformity in EU law. It constitutes a driving 
incentive and a leitmotif that coordinates the uniform application of EU law in the 
member states.  
With reference to EU external action, consistency is equally important (see Arts 18(4), 
21(3) and 26(2) TEU) and, in the absence of express reference to it, the CJEU’s role is 
instrumental in utilising it implicitly. For instance the application of consistency may 
be useful in the execution of opt-outs on the AFSJ that touch upon external matters. 
Such an implied use of consistency is significant, especially since it has been noted 
that external action in the AFSJ accounted in 2011 for over 19% of all texts adopted by 
the Justice and Home Affairs Council.6 Nevertheless, it should be recalled that the 
CJEU is altogether excluded from monitoring the CFSP which covers a substantial 
part of EU external relations. The rule of non-jurisdiction under Article 275 TFEU is 
subject to certain exceptions vis-à-vis the delimitation between CFSP and the TFEU 
exercise of competence under Article 40 TEU and the review of legality of CFSP acts 
imposing restrictive measures against natural or legal persons under Article 215 
TFEU.7 In particular, consistency will prove instrumental in policing the CFSP/non-
CFSP boundaries. This is not always easy given the common objectives of EU 
external action in Articles 21 and 23 TEU.  
In the context of variable geometry, the underlying question is the following: If we 
accept that consistency features a one-size-fits-all model, then one may ask whether it 
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European Legal Studies, Vol. 15 (2012-2013), pp. 139-167. 
6 J. Monar, “The EU’s growing role in the external AFSJ domain: Factors, framework and 
forms of action”, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 2013 (www.tandfonline.com/ 
doi/abs/10.1080/09557571.2012.710586). 
7 See Case 130/10 Parliament v. Council, 31/1/2012, not yet reported. 
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is weakened by the various forms of differentiation in which member states 
participate on an ad hoc basis. Indeed, it appears impossible to reconcile the 
orthodoxy of consistency with the heterodoxy of differentiation. This is because the 
latter appears adverse to the traditional view that perceives consistency as symmetry 
of the components of the EU legal system. Constitutional asymmetry, however, is a 
longstanding feature of European integration. Yet the question still stands: How can 
the principle of consistency be capable of transfusing the classic integrative values of 
unitary integration to newly established sub-systems, such as those created in the 
adoption and implementation of CSDP decisions?8 The answer lies on whether 
consistency is perceived by EU Institutions as a symbolic notion or as one with 
practical significance. As the latter, consistency is capable of forming a requirement 
mandating a certain pattern of behaviour vis-à-vis the conduct of EU Institutions and 
the uniformity of their activities with the wider policies of the EU. This is all the more 
important since under the Treaty of Lisbon, consistency has become a justiciable 
principle.9 Article 21 (3) TEU provides: 
The Union shall ensure consistency between the different areas of its external 
action and between these and its other policies. The Council and the 
Commission, assisted by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy, shall ensure that consistency and shall cooperate to 
that effect.10 
Such reference to consistency, absent prior to Lisbon qua loyalty under Article 4 (3) 
TEU, is based on setting common principles and unified objectives in EU foreign 
policy with the aim of eliminating contradiction.11 It is no paradox that such desire 
for consistency accompanies the several forms of ‘flexibility’ under the Treaties. To 
provide an example, consistency has a special place in Title III of Part VI TFEU, 
which contains in Articles 326-334 TFEU provisions on enhanced cooperation. In 
particular, Article 334 TFEU provides that the Council and the Commission shall 
ensure the consistency of activities undertaken in the context of enhanced 
cooperation and the consistency of such activities with the policies of the EU, and 
shall cooperate to that end. Yet, although Article 20 (1) TEU transmits consistency to 
enhanced cooperation taking place in all areas of EU external action, such 
requirement is absent in Title IV TEU vis-à-vis enhanced cooperation in the CFSP 
and CSDP. One has to turn to Articles 21 (3) and 26 (2) TEU where the obligation to 
ensure consistency rests on the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs 
                                               
8 For details, see Törő’s contribution to this volume. 
9 See C. Hillion, “Tous pour un, Un pour tous!  Coherence in the External relations of the 
European Union”, in M. Cremona (ed.), Developments in EU External Relations Law, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 10-36; and E. Herlin-Karnell and T. Konstadinides, “The 
Rise and Expressions of Consistency in EU Law: Legal and Strategic Implications for 
European Integration”, Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies, Vol. 15 (2012-2013), pp. 
139-167. 
10 See also Article 26 (2) TEU. 
11 G. De Baere, Constitutional Principles of EU External Relations, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2008, p. 251. 
30  BENEŠ & BRAUN 
 
and Security Policy, supporting the Council and the Commission, but where judicial 
enforcement by the CJEU is absent.  
Moreover, the notion of consistency appears inexorably linked to the axiom of 
loyalty. Both principles drive EU law forward by insisting on uniformity of outcomes 
from the perspective of EU law. 
4.2 Sincere cooperation/loyalty 
The principle of loyalty is vital in the context of vertical delimitation of EU 
competence between the EU and the member states. The express obligation of 
member states to always refrain from endangering the EU project has resulted in a 
cumulative but silent transfer of power from the intergovernmental to the 
supranational setting. The principle of loyalty, codified in Article 4 (3) TEU, has 
always played a crucial role in shaping the contours of the effectiveness of EU law.12 
For example, it has given birth to the doctrine of indirect effect and has always been a 
very powerful source of EU integration.13 Moreover, the notion of loyalty has been a 
useful buffer for EU Institutions to mandate a specific pattern of behaviour from 
member states in the absence of other competence available to rely on. In her 
prominent Pupino Opinion, which extended Community-based reasoning to the 
former Third Pillar, Advocate General Kokott stated that the principle of loyalty 
encompassed certain axiomatic principles, namely that “obligations must be fulfilled 
and damaging measures refrained from without needing to be expressly 
mentioned”.14 In light of this position, loyalty seems to go further than the general 
principle of pacta sunt servanda in international law because it purports to apply in 
new areas that were initially excluded from the original deal that member states 
signed onto.  
In addition, the principle of loyalty set out in Article 4 (3) TEU applies also in the 
whole field of EU external relations without exception to CFSP.15 It is long 
established that in the context of EU external relations, member states are under an 
obligation to refrain from an international obligation that may potentially jeopardise 
the full effectiveness of EU law. Ever since the CJEU’s ERTA dictum,16 the principle 
of loyalty has become a necessary component of the external dimension of EU law 
                                               
12 J. Temple Lang, “The developments of the Court of Justice on the Duties of Cooperation of 
National Authorities and Community Institutions under Article 10 EC”, 31 Fordham 
International Law Journal, 1483, 2008. For a recent analysis on loyalty see also E. Neframi, “The 
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Relations”, Common Market Law Review, Vol. 47, No. 2, 2010, pp. 323-359; C. Hillion, “Mixity 
and coherence in EU external relations: the significance of the ‘duty of cooperation’”, CLEER 
Working Paper No. 2, Centre for the Law of EU External Relations, T.M.C. Asser Institute, 
The Hague, 2009. 
13 See Case C-106/89 Marleasing [1990] ECR I-4135. 
14 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott delivered on 11 November 2004. Case C-105/03 
Pupino [2005] ECR I-5285. 
15 See C. Hillion, op. cit., p. 29 ff. 
16 Case C-22/70 Commission v. Council [1971] ECR 263. 
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and the development of EU implied competences.17 Indeed, the CJEU has gone so far 
as to find in the principle of loyalty an obligation of providing a designated result – a 
‘best endeavours’ obligation. For instance, in Commission v. Sweden,18 the CJEU 
held that where the subject matter of a convention falls partly within the competence 
of the EU and partly within that of the member states, it is imperative to ensure close 
cooperation between the member states and the EU institutions. Such cooperation 
should take place both in the process of negotiation and conclusion as well as in the 
fulfilment of the commitments entered into.  
Loyalty has, thus, a ‘pre-emptive’ effect upon the behaviour of member states in that 
it stops them from undertaking any action that could potentially undermine the 
objectives of the treaties. For this reason, it seems clear that the duty of loyalty can 
lead to a duty of abstention even if the competence at issue is neither a priori 
exclusive nor pre-emptive through the application of ERTA.19 Such a use of a ‘best 
endeavours obligation’ or an ‘obligation of result’ to discard any inconsistencies in 
the EU’s external relations approach seems to blur the procedural duties of member 
states under the principle of loyalty as an obligation of conduct.20 The Commission v. 
Sweden judgment illustrates that the obligation to cooperate derives from the 
requirement of unity in the international representation of the EU.21 By contrast it can 
be argued that it constitutes a one-off decision confined to the specific legal context 
set out by the exceptional Treaty provisions in question. If we were to follow this 
argument, then we should conclude that one judgment is not sufficient to generate 
broad conclusions about the coercive role of the CJEU imposing a general obligation 
of result upon the member states. We cannot overlook, however, that in this case 
loyalty barred member states from taking unilateral actions despite the fact that they 
could legitimately do so in the context of mixed agreements.  
Taken as a whole, the loyalty obligation implies that the member states are precluded 
from damaging the potential of the EU integrationist project. Yet in the context of 
differentiation, the notion of loyalty seems rather perplexing. A good example on 
which to ponder is in the context of the first authorisation of enhanced cooperation 
                                               
17 J.T. Lang, op. cit. See also E. Neframi, “The duty of loyalty: rethinking its scope through its 
application in the field of EU external relations”, Common Market Law Review, Vol. 47, 2010, p. 
323 and R. Schutze, EU Constitutional Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012, 
Chapter 10. 
18 Case C-246/07, Commission v. Sweden (PFOS) [2010] OJ C 161 3. The CJEU held that, by 
unilaterally proposing that a chemical substance (perfluoroctane sulfonate - PFOS) be listed 
in Annex A to the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (2001), Sweden 
failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 4 (3) TEU. See also the earlier judgment of the 
CJEU in Case C-459/03, Commission v Ireland (Mox Plant) [2006] ECR I-4635. 
19 G. De Baere, ‘“O, where is faith? O, where is loyalty?”, Some thoughts on the duty of loyal 
co-operation and the Union’s external environmental competences in the light of the PFOS 
case, European Law Review, Vol. 36, No. 3, 2011, p. 417. 
20 See to that effect C. Hillion, op. cit.  
21 See also Opinion of Advocate General Maduro in Case C-246/07, Commission v. Sweden 
(PFOS) [2010] OJ C 161 3, paras 36-38. 
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on the European patent. The recent judgment in Spain and Italy v Council22 
concerned a challenge against the decision of EU institutions to authorise the 
enhanced cooperation procedure on the grounds that the unitary EU patent 
concerned an area of EU exclusive competence and not shared competence. The latter 
constitutes one of the criteria for relying on Article 20 (2) TEU and Article 326 TFEU. 
In this instance, the CJEU upheld the decision of the majority of member states to 
establish closer cooperation in a matter that fell within the scope of the internal 
market – a shared competence.23 In doing so, the CJEU made it plain that by creating 
a unitary patent restricted to the participating member states (while being open to all 
their counterparts), the contested decision did not damage the internal market or the 
economic, social and territorial cohesion of the EU. There was no conflict with the 
principle of loyalty here as the enhanced cooperation in question was taking place 
within the framework of the treaty and did not jeopardise the wider objectives of the 
treaty.  
Furthermore, in the recent Pringle case, which concerned differentiation outside the 
treaties, the CJEU made a loyalty pronouncement.24 It stressed that the establishment 
of the ESM Treaty, which established a permanent European Stability Mechanism in 
the form of an intergovernmental agreement between euro area member states, did 
not infringe the provisions of the TFEU relating to economic and monetary policy. 
The CJEU pointed out that the ESM Treaty contains provisions that ensure that, in 
carrying out its tasks, the ESM will comply with EU law. The CJEU then argued that 
such an establishment was not contrary to EU competence and not inconsistent with 
the axiom of loyalty. The explanation here lies in the fact that according to the CJEU 
there was no competence in the first place to adopt the measure in question within 
the EU legal framework. As a result, loyalty was not relevant as the ESM Treaty was 
adopted outside the EU framework. As pointed out by the CJEU, member states have 
the power to conclude between themselves an agreement for the establishment of a 
stability mechanism such as the ESM Treaty provided that the commitments 
undertaken by the member states who are parties to such an agreement are 
consistent with EU law.25  
It appears as if the CJEU has had its way: while it allows a degree of flexibility to 
respond to the euro-crisis, at the same time it protects its own legal order from 
encroachment by differentiation occurring outside the aegis of EU law. Contrary to 
the above-mentioned case of Spain and Italy v Council, the Pringle case concerned a 
challenge against cooperation outside the Treaty framework. Therefore, stricto sensu 
there was no direct loyalty obligation at stake with regard to the establishment of a 
eurozone firewall since the strengthening of EU economic governance did not 
involve the conferral of new competences to the EU. Still, however, it can be argued 
that the CJEU’s treatise of loyalty in Pringle contradicts the stringent best endeavours 
                                               
22 Joined Cases C-274/11 and C-295/11 Spain and Italy v Council judgment of 16 April 2013 
nyr. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Case C-370/12 Pringle, judgment of 27 November 2012 nyr. 
25 Ibid., para 109. 
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notion established in the field of EU external relations. Perhaps this can be attributed 
to the recognition of the CJEU’s limits of EU competence, or as expressed in the 
words of a commentator, “the obsession with conferral”.26 
4.3 Fragments of conferral in a differentiated landscape 
As explained above, consistency manifests itself in several ways when member states 
decide to proceed at different speeds of integration. So the EU is striving for 
consistency throughout its policies and this very endeavour stems from the principle 
of conferral: it is a two-way street – not a one-way track. A lack of consistency, 
therefore, results in legal uncertainty, which in the context of CJEU case law would 
have an adverse effect on, for example, the rights of EU citizens and effective judicial 
protection.27 Thus, the notion of consistency is no carte blanche but rather, it needs to 
be reconciled with the conferral of powers.  
The starting point here is Article 7 TFEU which stipulates that “the Union shall 
ensure consistency between its policies and activities, taking all of its objectives into 
account and in accordance with the principle of conferral of powers”. In the same 
vein, Article 13 (1) TEU provides that the EU institutional framework “shall aim to 
promote its values, advance its objectives, serve its interests, those of its citizens and 
those of the member states, and ensure the consistency, effectiveness and continuity 
of its policies and actions”. A glance at Articles 7 and 13 TFEU therefore suggests that 
not only is consistency important as a way of ensuring that the EU is acting intra vires 
but it also forms a significant aid in the drafting and negotiation of EU legislative 
proposals. It follows that EU law is only consistent if it complies with the principles 
listed in Article 5 TFEU namely, conferral or attribution of powers, subsidiarity and 
proportionality.  
Moreover, conferral is eminent in the context of differentiation. According to Article 
20 (2) TEU and Article 326 TFEU, one of the criteria for establishing enhanced 
cooperation is that the cooperation at issue does not concern an exclusive 
competence and that it is the last resort. In Spain and Italy v Council, discussed 
earlier in the context of loyalty, the CJEU held that: 
It is apparent from the first paragraph of Article 326 TFEU that the exercise, 
within the ambit of enhanced cooperation, of any competence conferred on the 
Union must comply with, among other provisions of the Treaties, that which 
confers that competence. The enhanced cooperation to which these actions relate 
must, therefore, be consistent with Article 118 TFEU.28 
In the CJEU’s view, the correct interpretation of Article 118 TFEU did not imply a 
uniform interpretation throughout the whole EU but one that takes heed of Article 20 
                                               
26 L.S. Rossi (2012), “Does the Lisbon Treaty provide a clearer separation of Competences”, in 
A. Biondi et al. (eds), EU Law after Lisbon, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 93. 
27 In Joined Cases C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P and C-595/10 P Commission, Council and United 
Kingdom v Yassin Abdullah Kadi, 19 March 2013, Advocate General Bot opined that the 
principle of judicial review laid down by the CJEU in Kadi I requires further clarification. 
28 Joined Cases C-274/11 and C-295/11 Spain and Italy v Council judgment of 16 April 2013 
nyr, para 66. 
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(4) TEU, which states that acts adopted in the framework of enhanced cooperation 
shall only be binding on participating member states. As mentioned, the CJEU was 
explicit in Spain and Italy v Council that the rules established under the enhanced 
cooperation procedure on the European patent only bound its participants and were 
not damaging upon the internal market or the economic, social and territorial 
cohesion of the EU. This reasoning needs to be reconciled with the rather strict case 
law of the CJEU on the principle of loyalty, viz. the preclusion of any activity that 
could potentially threaten the consistency of EU law.  
It should perhaps be recalled that prior to the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, 
the rigorous legal criteria governing enhanced cooperation meant that the procedure 
was never effectively utilised.29 A lot of emphasis was placed on ensuring that 
member states would not establish enhanced cooperation in a way that would 
compromise the former Community’s interests.30 Today the picture looks different in 
that it has become much easier to establish enhanced cooperation if it concerns a 
shared competence, as demonstrated by the Italy and Spain v Council ruling. Future 
case law will clarify the relationship between the constraints set by the 
Treaty/conferral of powers and the desirability to allow for flexibility in EU policy-
making. This is an area where any potential ‘opt-outs’ from legal safeguards will be 
problematic with regard to due process guarantees. In addition, it is an area where 
the reach of the Charter of Fundamental Rights could become the turning point as 
regards the general application of fundamental rights beyond Title V of Part III of the 
TFEU.  
In a snapshot, with regard to the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) and 
the consequence of differentiation, suffice to say that the opt-outs offer a challenge to 
the feasibility of the harmony of EU law.31 The UK and Ireland have until next year 
to decide if they wish to opt into existing Third Pillar instruments when the 
transitional period (2009-14) will come to an end and these instruments will be fully 
‘Lisbonised’ in accordance with Protocol 36. Moreover, according to Protocol 21, the 
UK and Ireland may opt in or opt out from each new measure adopted under the 
criminal law provisions in Title V of the TFEU. In addition, Denmark offers a good 
example of real the limits to the benefits of differentiation. The extensive opt-out 
granted to Denmark in terms of Protocol 22, which affords it a special position to the 
whole AFSJ, is highly unfortunate from an integrationist perspective. This is because 
regardless of the merits from a sovereignty perspective, it could lead to 
fragmentation in fundamental rights protection as Denmark’s conduct in the matters 
covered by the AFSJ will remain outside the CJEU’s jurisdiction. Protocol 22 thus 
provides that Denmark participates in Schengen-related measures and Pre-Lisbon 
third pillar instruments on the basis of international law which continue to be 
                                               
29 Prior to the Lisbon Treaty, the rules on enhanced cooperation were set out in former 
Article 11 EC and Articles 40 and 43 TEU. 
30 S. Weatherill, “If I’d wanted you to understand I would have explained it better: What is 
the Purpose of the provisions on closer co-operation introduced by the Treaty of 
Amsterdam?”, in D. O’Keeffe and P. Twomey (eds), Legal Issues of the Amsterdam Treaty, 
Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1999, pp. 21-40.  
31 See the contributions by Matera and Santos Vara and Fahey to his volume. 
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binding and applicable to Denmark as before, even if these acts are amended (i.e. 
unlike acts under the Transitional protocol). At the end of the day, the question of 
how to best tackle EU flexibility goes to the core of the rule of law and citizens rights.  
4.4 Conclusion 
The Treaty is rich in instances of differentiation which not only indicate endorsement 
of multiple speeds but rather encourage differentiation where situation demands and 
the old ‘Communitarian’ consensus is in short supply. Differentiation in EU law as 
such is a well-travelled ground in literature with scholars, including the present 
authors, either taking a critical approach to the relevant Treaty provisions which 
authorise it,32 or exploring the impact of different speeds upon certain substantive 
areas of EU activity.33 Against this common trend in literature, the present authors 
endeavoured here to map certain general principles that apply in differentiated 
integration. These organising principles, applied in classic Communitarian 
integration were dubbed in this contribution as housekeeping rules.  
A set of housekeeping rules in the context of differentiation should allegedly guide 
the CJEU when balancing the varied geometry initiated by the Treaty and therefore 
help transform it into systematic geometry (rather than let it grow unprecedentedly 
into an avant garde34). Such a development includes building a rationale for 
resolving promptly any issues arising when, for instance, a proposal is in 
contradiction with the interests of some member states. Whether or not EU 
constitutional principles are fit for the purpose of regulating differentiation is a 
theoretical question which goes beyond the scope of this chapter. Suffice to mention 
here that adjudicating challenges to differentiation or policing national opt-outs and 
opt-ins will reveal a systemic problem of differentiation. This can be summarised in 
that although alternative routes to integration open new windows of opportunity for 
their participants, there are hardly any pointers in the treaty with regard to the 
application of organising principles to accommodate differentiation.  
It is worth mentioning that the treaties take a holistic approach to the application of 
the main principles that underpin the EU legal order in all fields of their application 
regardless of the method under which member states choose to cooperate. 
Nonetheless, the CJEU does not always have jurisdiction to adjudicate in all areas 
covered by the Treaties. To use one example, security and defence is an area where 
enhanced cooperation could potentially open in future. Member states which are 
reluctant to cede their autonomy in defence and wish to bring an action for 
                                               
32 E. Herlin-Karnell, “Enhanced Cooperation and Conflicting Values: Are new forms of 
governance the same as good governance?”, in M. Trybus et al., Treaty of Lisbon and the Future 
of European Law and Policy, Cheltenham: Edward Edgar, 2012, p. 146; T. Konstadinides, 
Division of Powers in EU law: The Delimitation of Internal Competence between the EU and the 
Member States, The Hague: Kluwer, 2009, Chapter 8. 
33 See for instance in the context of Justice and Home Affairs: S. Peers, EU Justice and Home 
Affairs, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 93. 
34 See C. Joerges and J.H.H. Weiler (eds), “What Kind of Constitution for what kind of 
Polity?”, Symposium: Responses to Joschka Fischer, Florence, EUI, 2000.  
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annulment under Article 263 TFEU against the offspring of enhanced cooperation 
would, however, be confronted with the specificity of the CFSP. This specificity 
includes, most prominently, the lack of CJEU jurisdiction as confirmed in Article 
275(1) TFEU and the decision of the Court in Grau Gomis.35   
The picture that has emerged from this chapter is, inevitably, a patchy one. Whilst 
hardly anyone would disagree that the EU should be a consistent project, reconciling 
the principle of consistency with that of loyalty and conferral remains an arduous yet 
vital task. The somewhat asymmetric constitutional arrangements, such as the 
enhanced cooperation procedure and the AFSJ opt-outs demonstrate that the 
application of housekeeping rules, as a means of retaining predictability in EU law, is 
not only relevant where organising constitutional principles enjoy an express/textual 
reference in the treaty. Their application could equally comprise an implied concern 
in all EU policy areas because they could assist EU Institutions (the CJEU in 
particular) countering fragmentation. Yet, it is crucial to call to mind that the 
constitutional fencing of asymmetry emanating from differentiation has to be 
counterbalanced against its political nature and its irregular justiciability.36 The latter 
remains a recurrent problem since it is of vital importance to the CJEU whether 
differentiation is taking place under the TFEU or the TEU. In this sense one can feel 
haunted by the relevance of the former EU pillar leftovers. It follows that, however 
desirable it may be, the application of EU constitutional principles in the often 
fragmented landscape of differentiated integration remains an ongoing and rather 
tortuous task.  
 
                                               
35 Case C-167/94 Grau Gomis and Others [1995] ECR I-1023. 
36 F. Amtenbrink and D. Kochenov, “Towards a more flexible approach to enhanced 
cooperation”, in A. Ott and E. Vos (eds), 50 years of European Integration: Foundations and 
Perspectives, The Hague: TMC Asser Press, 2009. 
 37 
 
 
5. FLEXIBILITY AND HOMOGENEITY: 
TWO UNEASY BEDFELLOWS 
ADAM ŁAZOWSKI* 
5.1 Introduction 
Flexibility and homogeneity are two uneasy bedfellows of European integration. The 
key question is whether flexibility is a good way forward or whether is it a threat to 
integration, leading to erosion of coherence of policy-making and homogeneity of EU 
law. Experience proves that with 28 member states in the EU, flexibility is no longer a 
rarely used cushion on which an avant garde group of states may theoretically sit, 
but rather is an indispensable tool to keep the EU together. Indeed, flexibility may be 
considered as remedy for political stalemates but at the same time it guarantees that 
the majority may move forward. Nevertheless, the risks to homogeneity of the EU 
legal order resulting from flexible integration are rather obvious. It leads to deep 
fragmentation of the legal framework and makes it look like a chaotically designed 
spider web. To complicate matters even further, Europe of different speeds is not 
only a domestic affair for the EU. Various models of economic and legal integration 
without EU membership have been developed in the last 20 years. EU law has 
become an exportable commodity in its own right. Furthermore, in some cases EU 
law is applicable in relations to third countries. To achieve this, a degree of flexibility 
was required from both – the EU and its neighbours. At the same time numerous 
mechanisms to secure the homogeneity were required. This contribution argues that 
flexible integration is neither easy to design nor to handle in the EU’s external 
relations. With the exception of the EEA (European Economic Area), the existing 
institutional and procedural frameworks are not particularly supportive of 
homogeneity. Arguably, during the negotiations with the neighbouring countries too 
much emphasis was put on flexibility. Alas, this was to the detriment of the uniform 
application and interpretation of the EU acquis. The question this contribution aims to 
answer is whether this drive to export the EU legal order to third countries comes at 
too high a price for the homogeneity of EU law.  
5.2 The external face of flexibility 
The external face of flexibility is equally puzzling and complex. The European Union, 
despite all its drawbacks so gladly criticised by ever more knowledgeable euro-
sceptics, is an attractive economic and legal endeavour not only for the current and 
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potential candidates1 for membership but also for those countries that wish to benefit 
from the internal market but shy away from deeper political integration. As is well 
known, there is a group of neighbouring countries which, on the one hand treasure 
free trade, but, on the other hand, do not wish to be part of the ever-closer Union. 
Achievement of those objectives served as the raison d’être behind the creation of the 
European Free Trade Association (EFTA) in 1960. Although in hindsight it may be 
hard to believe but during its first years EFTA was considered as a competitor of the 
European Economic Community (EEC). As soon as some EFTA countries were 
allowed to try their luck in the EEC, the remaining EFTA states pursued closer links 
with the European Communities by means of free trade agreements.2 This eventually 
led to the creation of the European Economic Area in the early 1990s.3 The objective 
was to expand the internal market to the EFTA countries without their accession to 
the European Union. This approach required flexibility on both sides. 
For the EU the question was how to accommodate new participants in the internal 
market without taking a risk that this would come at a price of homogeneity of the 
EU legal order. For the EFTA countries one of the main concerns was to guarantee 
their participation in the EU decision-making. Although full participation was out of 
the question, a modus vivendi was reached. As the EFTA and EEC member states were 
getting ready to launch the European Economic Area, the Swiss voters, by a narrow 
margin, opted out of that newly emerging framework. After a short pause for 
reflection, it led to deepening of the bilateral relations and creation of an 
idiosyncratic bilateral model. Alas, it is far from perfect and its deficiencies are more 
visible now than ever.4  
One should also mention deeper integration frameworks that are evolving in 
relations with the neighbours in the Western Balkans and some former Soviet Union 
countries covered by the European Neighbourhood Policy. One of those frameworks 
– the Energy Community – has been operational for a while now, while the 
Transport Community Treaty and the European Common Aviation Area Treaty are 
still being negotiated.5  
What makes all those models unique is an obligation imposed on the third countries 
to apply EU law. By this means some elements of the internal market and carefully 
selected flanking policies are extended to the neighbouring states. The level of 
commitment goes beyond mere approximation of laws, which is a well-established 
                                               
1 As of 1 September 2013, the list of candidate countries includes Turkey, Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia. Potential candidates are Albania, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina as well as Kosovo. 
2 See further E.P. Wellenstein, “The free trade agreements between the enlarged European 
Communities and the EFTA countries”, Common Market Law Review, Vol. 10, 1973, p. 137. 
3 Agreement on the European Economic Area, OJ 1994 L 1/1. 
4 See Council Conclusions on EU relations with EFTA countries, Brussels, 20 December 2012. 
5 See further, inter alia, S. Blockmans and B. Van Vooren, “Revitalizing the European 
‘Neighbourhood Economic Community’: The case for legally binding sectoral 
multilateralism”, European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 17, 2012, pp. 577-604. 
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concept in countless agreements the EU has with third countries.6 The latter leads to 
the creation of legal transplants, without, however, an underpinning obligation to 
apply EU law in relations with the European Union. In the cases at hand, however, 
the obligation to apply EU acquis leads to the creation of a wider European Legal 
Space.7 The third countries have a fair degree of flexibility although not absolute 
freedom to choose what they are bound by. This flexibility has an impact on the 
European Union and its decision-making. It affects the homogeneity of the EU legal 
order and also, in broader terms, of the European Legal Space created with the 
neighbouring countries.  
Before we look at different mechanisms of securing the homogeneity of the European 
Legal Space, it is worth exploring the interaction between the internal and external 
dimension of flexibility. No other framework is more suitable for this exercise than 
the Schengen acquis. As is well known, several member states of the European Union 
do not participate fully in the Schengen cooperation. This is either because they 
express no desire to do so (the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark) or as a 
consequence of not meeting the required criteria (Bulgaria, Romania, Cyprus and 
Croatia). At the same time Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Switzerland are 
associated with Schengen acquis. The paradox then is that non-EU countries are far 
more integrated with the EU core than some of its own member states. The entire 
institutional and procedural set-up is filled with complexities. As explained below, 
this has consequences not only for the homogeneity of the European Legal Space, but 
it also directly affects citizens’ rights. Needless to say that such a legal regime is 
difficult to navigate and it is largely incomprehensible not only to members of the 
public but also to practitioners.  
5.3 How to marry flexibility with homogeneity? 
Arguably, the higher the levels of flexibility, the bigger are the challenges to 
homogeneity. The sections that follow explore the relationship between these notions 
further. In order to prove this argument I will take into account the following points. 
Firstly, EU law is very dynamic and subject to constant evolution. When it is 
exported to third countries as part of the European Legal Space, the difficult question 
that has to be answered is to what extent are these countries, which participate in 
such deep integration frameworks with the EU, bound by the new EU acquis (both 
written and case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union – CJEU). 
Secondly, such frameworks require guarantees that EU law will be interpreted in a 
uniform way not only in national courts of EU member states, but also by judges in 
the neighbouring countries. Both aspects of homogeneity have been discussed 
thoroughly ever since the European Economic Area was created over 20 years ago. In 
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fact, both of these issues had been extensively dealt with during years of 
brainstorming and negotiations that led to the establishment of the EEA. Although 
these discussions focused solely on the EEA, the issues that were raised and a variety 
of arguments that were employed are more universal and apply mutatis mutandis to 
all frameworks discussed in this chapter. Both the legislative homogeneity and 
implementation homogeneity are presented in turn. 
5.3.1 Flexibility vs. homogeneity: a law book perspective 
The first crucial issue is how to guarantee that the third countries benefiting from 
flexible integration with the European Union do not undermine too much the 
homogeneity of the EU legal order. As mentioned above, the latter is constantly 
developing. Despite all the conceptual and practical deficiencies of the decision-
making process, the European Union remains a prolific legislator. The question is to 
what extent such third countries should be bound by new EU acquis and how to 
secure their access to the EU decision-making. When it comes to the former, 
seemingly there is only a binary choice available, that is either to make them bound 
by the new legislation or not. This translates into two models: dynamic and static. No 
doubt it is the dynamic model that is usually preferred by the European Union as it 
serves homogeneity better. At the same time it may not be the third countries’ cup of 
tea as it takes away the desired flexibility. Arguably the model chosen for the 
European Economic Area serves both objectives. To start with, it is a good example 
of a dynamic model whereby the three EEA-EFTA countries are bound by any new 
EU legislation falling within the scope of the EEA Agreement. It is notable that 
annexes to the EEA Agreement contain lists of EU acquis that apply to the entire 
European Economic Area and they include hundreds of pieces of EU secondary 
legislation. It is the task of the EEA Joint Committee to secure the homogeneity of the 
EEA legal space and amend the annexes as fast as possible in order to allow 
simultaneous entry into force of the legislation in the entire EEA. 
To offset negative consequences it may have for the EEA-EFTA countries and to 
bring flexibility into the equation, the EEA Agreement provides for a tailor-made 
procedure giving Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein as well as the EEA Joint Committee 
some leeway.8 Furthermore, these countries do not participate in the EU decision-
making per se, but they do contribute to the process of decision-shaping. Their 
representatives are invited to sit in countless EU committees/working groups, which 
allows them to exercise the power of persuasion and to shape the EU secondary 
legislation at the early stages of the EU decision-making process. Practice proves that 
this modus operandi is generally satisfactory, although delays affecting the 
homogeneity of the EU legal order are inevitable.9 The reality is, however, that the 
member states themselves are frequently late with transposition of EU secondary 
legislation, hence similar risks to homogeneity of the European Union legal order 
stem from the inside as they do from the outside. One should also add that the fields 
                                               
8 See Articles 102-104 EEA Agreement.  
9 See pt. 28 of Council Conclusions on EU relations with EFTA countries, Brussels 20 
December 2012. See also Jacques Pelkmans and Philipp Böhler, The EEA Review and 
Liechtenstein’s Integration Strategy, CEPS Paperback, CEPS, Brussels, 2012. 
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of cooperation between the European Union and the EFTA countries now spread 
well beyond the internal market. Seemingly a political decision was taken to move 
ahead without amendment to the EEA Agreement but rather through parallel 
bilateral/trilateral treaties. Each of those has own institutional framework and, if 
necessary, an adaptation mechanism. 
The EU-Swiss bilateral framework is a different kettle of fish. Without a shadow of a 
doubt, the centre of gravity is on flexibility, not on homogeneity. The dynamic 
character of the model employed in the European Economic Area was one of the 
reasons why the Swiss voters rejected participation in this endeavour in 1992. Hence 
when two packages of bilateral treaties were negotiated in the wake of the EEA 
fiasco, it was clear that an alternative solution would have to be developed. Several 
agreements forming the Bilateral I and II packages require Switzerland to apply EU 
acquis listed in the Agreements and their annexes.10 However, in most of the cases the 
agreements are static,11 and hence Switzerland has no obligation to follow 
developments in EU secondary legislation. This is proving particularly tricky when it 
comes to the EU-Swiss Agreement on Free Movement of Persons. So far Switzerland 
has refused to accept Directive 2004/38/EC, which constitutes a backbone of EU 'free 
movement of persons' acquis.12 As a result the EU-Swiss legal framework is 
composed of several directives and regulations, which were adopted as late as in 
1964 and are no longer in force in the European Union.13 It is crucial that there are a 
number of differences between the old and the new legislation. For instance Directive 
2004/38/EC extends the derived residence rights to a larger number of family 
members; it also abolishes residence permits and introduces a general right of 
permanent residence. Last but not least, it provides a regulatory framework on 
restrictions to residence rights that is far more elaborate than the previous legislation. 
However, the static character of the EU-Swiss Free Movement of Persons Agreement 
is not the only problem. In 2012 Switzerland unilaterally re-introduced residence 
permits for citizens of eight EU member states, which allegedly is contrary to the 
Agreement. All of this makes the bilateral framework patchy and incoherent, not to 
mention that homogeneity is becoming a mirage in the desert. Not surprisingly the 
                                               
10 See, for instance, Agreement between the European Community and its Member States, of 
the one part, and the Swiss Confederation, of the other, on the free movement of persons, OJ 
2002, L 114/6.  
11 The EU-Swiss Agreement on Schengen is one of very few exceptions. It provides for a 
dynamic adaptation mechanism. Furthermore, if Switzerland does not accept new acquis, the 
Agreement may be eventually terminated.  
12 Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on 
the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within 
the territory of the member states (amending Regulation (EEC) No. 1612/68 and repealing 
Directives 64/221/ EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 
90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/36/EEC), OJ 2004, L 158/77. 
13 For instance Council Directive 64/221/EEC of 25 February 1964 on the coordination of 
special measures concerning the movement and residence of foreign nationals which are 
justified on grounds of public policy, public security or public health, OJ 1963-64 English 
Special Edition, p. 117. 
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Council of the European Union in its EFTA Conclusions of December 2012 expressed 
deep concern about the functioning of the current arrangement and questioned 
whether it is still fit for purpose. It is also notable that the contemporary EU-Swiss 
institutional framework is very complex with dozens of different committees based 
on the bilateral agreements. This is far from ideal. 
Last but not least, one should also mention the Energy Community created between 
the European Union, the countries of the Western Balkans and some of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) countries.14 Its aim is two-fold: to create the common 
energy market in the region and also to prepare the candidate and potential 
candidate countries for accession to the European Union. Seen from that perspective 
the Energy Community is one of the pre-accession instruments. The Energy 
Community Treaty imposes two kinds of obligations when it comes to the applicable 
acquis. First, there is an exhaustive list of EU legal acts to which the parties have an 
obligation to adhere. Second, there are parts of the acquis covered by best-endeavours 
clauses. A threat to the homogeneity of the legal regime comes from the necessary 
adaptations procedure set forth in Article 24 Energy Community Treaty. It vests the 
Energy Community with powers to adapt the relevant acquis, bearing in mind the 
framework of the Treaty and specific situations of the parties. Hence, the procedure 
of adapting the legal framework to subsequent developments in EU law is of a static 
character. It gives ample flexibility to the Energy Community institutions and the 
non-EU countries participating in this endeavour. As specified in Article 25 of the 
Energy Community Treaty, measures may be adopted to take such changes on 
board. It may also be decided to implement other parts of the acquis related to 
network energy. A contrario, there is no obligation to do so. This guarantees 
flexibility, yet at the same time it may lead to the fragmentation of the applicable 
legal regime, hence it is likely to affect the homogeneity within the European Legal 
Space. 
5.3.2 Flexibility vs. homogeneity: a court room perspective 
A law book perspective is just one side of the coin. The other is what happens when 
the importers of EU law are in breach of their commitments and how such exported 
EU law is applied in everyday practice. The only framework that provides sufficient 
guarantees for compliance with EU law is the European Economic Area, with the 
Surveillance Authority and the EFTA Court serving as guardians of effectiveness of 
EEA law, and, by the same token, acting as guarantors of homogeneity. The 
enforcement design is quite similar to the internal EU arrangement with the 
infraction procedure15 and the advisory opinion procedure.16 The first allows the 
EFTA Surveillance Authority to be the EEA guardian; the second equips the national 
                                               
14 Current membership includes the European Union, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Kosovo, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro and Ukraine. 
15 Article 31 of the Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a 
Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice, OJ 1994 L 344/1 (similar to Articles 258-260 
TFEU). 
16 Article 34 of the Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a 
Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice (similar to Article 267 TFEU). 
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courts in the EEA-EFTA countries with the possibility to engage in the judicial 
dialogue with the EFTA Court. Although the EEA Agreement limits the obligation to 
follow the case law of the Court of Justice to pre-EEA Agreement case law, this 
caveat has never been a particular problem in everyday practice. Post-EEA 
Agreement jurisprudence of the Court of Justice is duly followed by the EFTA Court.  
On a critical note, it should be emphasised that the jurisdiction of the EFTA Court 
extends neither to the Free Trade Agreements between the EU and the EFTA 
countries17 nor to other flanking agreements extending the scope of cooperation to 
new areas.18 This may potentially have far-reaching implications, as demonstrated by 
the judgment of the Court of Justice in the case of Van Esbroeck.19 It was a reference 
for preliminary ruling from a Belgian court on interpretation of Article 54 of the 
Schengen Implementing Convention.20 It provides that a person whose trial has been 
finally disposed of in one state may not be prosecuted in another state for the same 
acts provided that, if a penalty has been imposed, it has been enforced, is actually in 
the process of being enforced or can no longer be enforced. This provision applies to 
the EU member states that participate in the Schengen acquis and also to EEA-EFTA 
countries and Switzerland on the basis of bilateral/trilateral treaties with the 
European Union. 
In the case at hand, the facts were rather straightforward, but the legal issues were 
quite profound. Van Esbroeck was involved in trafficking of drugs from Belgium to 
Norway. He was caught, prosecuted and sentenced for importing drugs by the 
Norwegian authorities. Upon his release from a Norwegian prison, Van Esbroeck 
returned to Belgium where, much to his surprise, he was prosecuted for exporting 
drugs. Since both prosecutions dealt with the same set of acts, the question was 
whether it was a ne bis in idem scenario. The Court of Justice held that the divergent 
legal classifications of the same acts (export and import) were not decisive and it was 
the identity of the material acts that mattered. Hence, Van Esbroeck successfully 
challenged the legality of the second prosecution. In this case the Court of Justice had 
jurisdiction to deal with the preliminary ruling from the Belgian court. 
                                               
17 Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Republic of Iceland, OJ 
1972, L 301/2; Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Kingdom of 
Norway, OJ 1973, L 171/2. 
18 For instance: Agreement between the European Community and the Republic of Iceland 
and the Kingdom of Norway concerning the criteria and mechanisms for establishing the 
State responsible for examining a request for asylum lodged in a member state or in Iceland 
or Norway, OJ 2001, L 93/40; Agreement concluded by the Council of the European Union 
and the Republic of Iceland and the Kingdom of Norway concerning the latter’s association 
with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis, OJ 1999, L 
176/36. 
19 Case C-436/04 Criminal proceedings against Leopold Henri Van Esbroeck, ECR [2006] I-
2333. 
20 Convention signed in Schengen on 19 June 1990 between the Kingdom of Belgium, the 
Federal Republic of Germany, the French Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg and 
the Kingdom of the Netherlands, implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985, OJ 
2000, L 239/19. 
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However, the question is what would have happened had Van Esbroeck been 
prosecuted in the reverse order – first in Belgium and then in Norway. Since the EU-
Iceland/Norway Schengen Agreement falls outside of the scope of the EEA 
Agreement, the EFTA Court would have had no jurisdiction to assist a Norwegian 
court. In purely speculative terms one could imagine Van Esbroeck serving the second 
sentence in Norway had the interpretation of Article 54 of the Schengen 
Implementing Convention been left solely to the Norwegian courts. The same 
argument is applicable internally to the European Union. Until 1 December 2014, 
only courts from the member states which recognised the jurisdiction of the Court of 
Justice as per Article 35 TEU have the jurisdiction to refer. This demonstrates another 
internal dimension of flexibility. Not only are some member states not fully covered 
by the Schengen acquis but also in some cases national courts may not engage in 
dialogue with the CJEU. This case is definitely a good laboratory for analysis of the 
impact of flexibility on homogeneity of the EU legal order and the European Legal 
Space.  
The lack of judicial-enforcement machinery in the EU-Swiss framework is yet 
another drawback of the existing treaty arrangement. Swiss courts, even when in 
doubt about the interpretation of EU-Swiss acquis, have to venture into a DIY (do-it-
yourself) exercise. Although technically they are bound by some case law of the 
CJEU, but when a case at hand raises novel legal issues, the Swiss judges are left on 
their own. Furthermore, when Switzerland is in breach of the bilateral agreements, 
there is no judicial enforcement machinery. Only the traditional dispute settlement 
arrangements laid down in the bilateral agreements are available and they are not 
robust enough. It does not come as a surprise that the Council of the European Union 
has called for an “international mechanism for surveillance and judicial control”.21 
This is yet another example that more emphasis was put on the flexibility in the EU-
Swiss framework, which affects the homogeneity of the legal space provided therein.  
The Energy Community provides for a special enforcement procedure, although it is 
not of a judicial nature. Detailed rules are set out in Title VII of the Energy 
Community Treaty; they partly echo the infringement procedure known from the EU 
framework. According to Article 90 Energy Community Treaty, a failure to comply 
with an obligation set forth in the Treaty or to implement a decision of the Energy 
Community may be brought to the attention of the Ministerial Council by any Party 
to the Treaty, the Secretariat of the Energy Community, the Regulatory Board and 
private parties. The Ministerial Council has the authority to determine a breach of 
obligations and, should the breach be of a serious and persistent nature, the 
Ministerial Council is vested with powers to suspend certain rights stemming from 
the Energy Community Treaty, including the voting rights. The effectiveness of this 
mechanism is yet to be verified.  
                                               
21 See pt. 33 of Council Conclusions on EU relations with EFTA countries, Brussels, 20 
December 2012. 
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5.4 Conclusions 
This contribution demonstrates that flexibility and homogeneity are two uneasy 
bedfellows of European integration. Both have advantages and disadvantages, but 
the key to success is to find an equilibrium between the two. This applies to both – 
the internal and the external dimension, although in this analysis the centre of 
gravity was on the latter. As argued above, the closest to this equilibrium is the 
European Economic Area. On the one hand, it gives some flexibility to the EEA-
EFTA countries; on the other hand, it provides for a number of institutions and 
procedural mechanisms which serve as guarantors of the homogeneity of the EEA 
legal order. However, the equilibrium is lost when one steps outside the EEA 
framework. To start with, all other agreements with the EEA-EFTA countries do not 
provide for adequate mechanisms to secure the homogeneity of the legal space. The 
case Van Esbroeck discussed above is a very good example to prove this point. 
Furthermore, the EU-Swiss framework is not satisfactory either.  
As argued by the Council of the European Union, the current framework needs to be 
replaced by a coherent mechanism that will guarantee homogeneity of the legal 
space between the European Union and Switzerland. To reach consensus will 
undoubtedly require flexibility on both sides. An equilibrium will have to be found 
to remedy the existing arrangement which puts too much emphasis on flexibility and 
not enough on homogeneity. Two options might be considered. The first is the 
extension of the competence of the EFTA Surveillance Authority and the EFTA Court 
to both – the flanking agreements with the EEA countries and EU-Swiss framework. 
The second and less-likely one is the extension of the competences of the European 
Commission and the Court of Justice. Finally the functioning of the Energy 
Community needs to be thoroughly evaluated. The experience of the first years of its 
operation proves that the implementation of the EU acquis for the participating 
countries is a major challenge, and henceforth also a threat to the homogeneity of the 
legal space.22 This should be taken into account not only for the sake of the Energy 
Community itself but also the emerging two legal frameworks for closer sectoral 
rapprochement (the Transport Community and the European Common Aviation 
Area).  
                                               
22 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, under Article 7 
of Decision 2006/500/EC (Energy Community Treaty), COM(2011) 105 final of 10 March 
2011, Brussels. 
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6. DIFFERENTIATION IN CFSP 
STEVEN BLOCKMANS 
6.1 Introduction 
The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is an area of EU external action that 
is notoriously difficult to forge. The general rule of unanimity in CFSP decision-
making often holds the European Union back in its attempts to protect its interests 
and pursue its global objectives. In an enlarging Union, differences in (geo)strategic 
and political interests, socio-economic realities and historical trajectories all 
potentially contribute to the creation of ever-more fissures in the image of the EU as 
an actor on the international stage. Arguably, a common commitment to values and 
norms is an insufficient basis for policy consensus on what are still largely perceived 
to be the foreign policy interests of individual member states.  
The member states’ most notable public failure to reach a common position within 
the EU on a foreign and security policy issue arose out of the 2002-3 transatlantic 
crisis over military intervention in Iraq.1 Internal disunity led to extensive soul-
searching. In an effort to paper over the cracks, the European Security Strategy was 
adopted,2 but it did not detract from the fact that, more often than not, the EU fails to 
co-ordinate a common policy response to external crises, even when the means to 
address them are at hand. For instance, judgments about the EU’s reaction to the 
flare-up of conflict over the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, 
Russia’s incursion into Georgia, and Moscow’s unilateral recognition of the two de 
facto states, have varied. In a rare display of unity, at their emergency summit on 1 
September 2008 − only the third in its history − the EU member states were united in 
their condemnation of Russian aggression.3 Moscow − otherwise used to a 
squabbling and uncritical EU − will have taken note of the Union’s strong reaction, 
and of the swift intervention by the French EU Presidency to broker a ceasefire 
                                               
 Senior Research Fellow and the Head of the EU foreign policy unit at CEPS; Professor of EU 
External Relations Law and Governance at the University of Amsterdam. 
1 See, e.g. U. Puetter and A. Wiener, “Accommodating Normative Divergence in European 
Foreign Policy Co-ordination: The Example of the Iraq Crisis”, Journal of Common Market 
Studies, Vol. 45, 2007, pp. 1065–1088; and A. Toje, “The Consensus-Expectations Gap: 
Explaining Europe's Ineffective Foreign Policy”, Security Dialogue, Vol. 39, 2008, pp. 121-141. 
2 European Council (2003), “A Secure Europe in a Better World, European Security Strategy”, 
Brussels, 12 December. 
3 Presidency Conclusions, Extraordinary European Council, Brussels, 1 September 2008, doc. 
12594/08, 11. 
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agreement with Tbilisi. However, when the sense of urgency over the Georgian crisis 
dissipated, the classic divisions between EU member states over how to deal with 
Russia reappeared − ranging from the ‘new cold warriors’ (e.g. Lithuania and 
Poland), to the ‘friendly pragmatists’ (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Slovakia, Slovenia and Portugal), to Russia’s ‘strategic partners’ 
(Germany, France, Italy and Spain) and ‘Trojan horses’ in the EU (e.g. Bulgaria and 
Cyprus).4  
Whereas it is true that the success of the CFSP largely hinges on the ability of the 
member states to find consensus on issues that touch upon the core of their 
sovereignty as independent actors on the international stage; a process that often 
results in a race to the bottom in search of the lowest common denominator, over 
time a certain flexibility has been introduced into the CFSP to keep the member states 
“united in diversity” (as the old maxim of the EU goes). Arguably, this is the way 
forward.  
[U]nder certain conditions, the specialisation and division of labour among EU 
member states [big and small] can strengthen both the effectiveness and 
legitimacy of the foreign policy of the EU (…).5  
This is especially so in cases where there is a lack of interest or political will among 
all member states. As long as such more or less structured coalitions of member 
states work towards the attainment of the Union’s external action objectives, this may 
assist in the operationalisation of EU foreign policy and increase the visibility and 
credibility of the EU as an international actor.  
This contribution will first focus on the legal space which has gradually been 
introduced into the constituent treaties to accommodate differences between member 
states in CFSP. In particular, the chapter will analyse the departures from unanimity 
decision-making, i.e. the constructive abstention mechanism and the introduction of 
qualified majority voting, the extension of enhanced cooperation to CFSP and other 
procedural peculiarities introduced by the Lisbon Treaty. The analysis will then turn 
to the practice and functions of different types of coalitions of member states that 
coordinate matters of foreign policy more closely and the constitutional limitations to 
differentiation in CFSP, i.e. the duty of loyal cooperation and the principle of vertical 
consistency in policy-making − which aim to put the C back into CFSP. 
6.2 Treaty departures from unanimity decision-making 
6.2.1 Introduction 
The European Union’s competence in CFSP remains formulated as broadly as before, 
covering 
                                               
4 For the conceptualisation and categorisation of EU member states’ positions on Russia-
related topics, see M. Leonard and N. Popescu, “A Power Audit of EU-Russia Relations”, 
ECFR Policy Paper, 2007, p. 2. 
5 See S. Keukeleire (2006), “EU Core Groups – Specialisation and division of labour in EU 
foreign policy”, CEPS Working Document No. 252, Centre for European Policy Studies, 
Brussels, October. 
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all areas of foreign policy and all questions relating to the Union’s security, including 
the progressive framing of a common defence policy that might lead to a 
common defence’ (Article 24(1) TEU (emphasis added).  
CFSP is a non-exclusive EU competence running concurrently with national 
competences in the realm of foreign affairs.6 An a contrario reading of the principle of 
conferral in Articles 4(1) and 5 TEU suggests that the CFSP does not extend to those 
external competences attributed to the Union under the TFEU (e.g. trade, financial 
and technical assistance). Such a reading is confirmed by Article 40 TEU, which 
determines, inter alia, that the implementation of the CFSP may not affect the 
application of procedures and the respective scope of powers held by EU institutions 
for the implementation of non-CSFP competences referred to in Articles 3-6 TFEU.7 It 
is up to the European Council to identify the Union’s strategic interests, determine 
the objectives of and define general guidelines for the CFSP, including for matters 
with defence implications (Article 26(1) TEU) and to the Council to frame the CFSP 
accordingly and take the decisions necessary for defining and implementing it 
(Article 26(2) TEU). 
The Lisbon Treaty confirms that CFSP remains a policy area separate from the 
Union’s other activities. Article 24(1) second subparagraph TEU clearly states that  
[t]he common foreign and security policy is subject to specific rules and 
procedures. It shall be defined and implemented by the European Council and 
the Council acting unanimously, except where the Treaties provide otherwise. 
As before, CFSP remains largely in the hands of the Council and of the 
representatives of member states' governments. It is put into effect by the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR) and by the 
member states. Article 24(1) also states that “[t]he specific role of the European 
Parliament and of the Commission in this area is defined by the Treaties.” The Court 
of Justice only has jurisdiction to monitor compliance with Article 40 TEU and to 
review the legality of certain sanctions decisions taken on the basis of Article 275(2) 
TFEU. 
Article 31 TEU establishes the modalities in Council decision-making in CFSP 
matters. Article 31(1) TEU lays down the general rule for decision-making in CFSP, 
i.e. unanimity. However, there is one qualification to the rule, the so-called 
“constructive abstention”. Moreover, Article 31(2) TEU packs three exceptions where 
                                               
6 See, in this respect, Declarations Nos. 13 and 14, which member states attached to the 
Lisbon Treaty. In nearly identical terms, these declarations stress that the CFSP does not 
affect national competences in the field. See further M. Cremona, “Defining Competence in 
EU External Relations: Lessons from the Treaty Reform Process”, in A. Dashwood and M. 
Maresceau (eds), Law and Practice of EU External Relations: Salient Features of a Changing 
Landscape, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 34. 
7 See A. Rosas and L. Amati, EU Constitutional Law: An Introduction, 2nd ed., Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2010, p. 243; P. Eeckhout, EU External Relations Law, 2nd ed., Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012, pp. 167-171 and S. Blockmans and M. Spernbauer, “Legal Obstacles to 
Comprehensive EU External Security Action”, European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 18, 2013, 
Special Issue, pp. 7-24. 
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the Council decides by qualified majority. The legal space that has thereby been 
created offers some room to accommodate differentiation in CFSP. 
6.2.2 Constructive abstention 
In a mechanism which is unique under the Treaties, Article 31(1) leaves room for a 
member state to abstain from Council decision-making in the field of CFSP. The 
second subparagraph clarifies that, “[w]hen abstaining in a vote, any member of the 
Council may qualify its abstention by making a formal declaration”. The latter is not 
an obligation but rather offers each member state with a discretionary power to offer 
an explanation for its position. The provision further states that, in the case of an 
abstention, the member in question  
shall not be obliged to apply the decision, but shall accept that the decision 
commits the Union. In a spirit of mutual solidarity, [that] Member State shall 
refrain from any action likely to conflict with or impede Union action based on 
that decision, and the other Member States shall respect its position.  
Although not giving support to the adopted decision, the abstaining member state 
can therefore not be relieved of the general duty of loyal cooperation in CFSP 
matters: it “shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the 
Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international 
relations” (Article 24(3) TEU). The rules of CFSP decision-making leave no doubt 
about the prevalence of external solidarity over internal divisions. The Treaty does 
not permit that the member state abstaining from the implementation of a properly 
adopted CFSP decision disregards its binding consequences. All EU member states, 
whether giving or withholding their support, need to respect the resulting 
commitments for the EU as a whole and must therefore refrain from any action that 
goes against that decision.8 
In general terms, the mechanism of constructive abstention aims at reconciling the 
position held by the majority of member states with the reservations and concerns of 
some. It has been observed that while the possibility of keeping a ‘constructive 
distance’ from certain decisions − as, indeed, the possibility of their obstruction − 
facilitates the formation of common positions on CFSP matters, it also drains the 
CFSP’s potential impact when the adopted decisions require active implementation 
by as many member states as possible.9 In fact, Article 31(1) second subparagraph 
TEU determines that if such constructive abstentions “represent at least one third of 
the member states comprising at least one third of the population of the Union, 
[then] the decision shall not be adopted.” Under the pre-Lisbon Treaty regime, 
Council members representing one third of the weighted vote used for calculating 
QMV could block a CFSP decision (cf. Article 23(1) second subparagraph former 
TEU). Now, a double threshold is required for a blocking minority: one third of the 
member states, representing at least one third of the EU population. The Lisbon 
                                               
8 Second subparagraph of Article 31(1) TEU. 
9 See C. Törő, “The Latest Example of Enhanced Cooperation in the Constitutional Treaty: 
The benefits of flexibility and differentiation in European Security and Defence Policy 
decisions and their implementation”, European Law Journal, Vol. 11, 2005, pp. 641-656. 
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Treaty has therefore widened the legal space to accommodate member states’ 
interests in abstaining from CFSP decision-making by unanimity. It is unclear, 
however, whether the mechanism of constructive abstention carries much practical 
relevance. It appears that this instrument for flexibility in CFSP decision-making still 
has to gain in popularity. So far, the mechanism has only been used once, in 
February 2008, when Cyprus abstained when the Council adopted the Decision 
establishing the EULEX Kosovo mission.10 Cyprus argued “for an explicit decision of 
the UN Security Council [to mandate] the EU mission in Kosovo”,11 an entity it does 
not recognise as a sovereign and independent state. This significant case shows that 
the constructive abstention mechanism provides a form of flexibility that can prevent 
the type of decision-making impasse in the CFSP that QMV and enhanced 
cooperation are designed to avoid.12 
6.2.3 Qualified Majority Voting  
Since its inception, intergovernmentalism has been the governance mode par 
excellence in CFSP. Yet, limited but significant exceptions to the unanimity rule have 
slowly ‘spilled over’ from adjacent fields of EU external action into CFSP. As 
Eeckhout explains, the Treaty of Nice13 introduced three types of decisions which the 
Council adopts by QMV, pursuant to the current Article 31(2) TEU: i) when adopting 
a decision defining a Union action or position on the basis of a European Council 
decision relating to the Union’s strategic interests and objectives (cf. Article 22(1) 
TEU); ii) when adopting any decision implementing a decision defining a Union 
action or position; and iii) when appointing an EU Special Representative in 
accordance with Article 33 TEU.14 To be sure, these QMV constellations did not and 
do not undermine the continued centrality of unanimity for the adoption of CFSP 
decisions, because they represent clearly stated ‘derogation[s]’ from the general 
unanimity requirement laid down in Article 31(1) TEU.15 In each of these cases, any 
member state is entitled to pull the ‘emergency brake’ and block a CFSP proposal ‘for 
vital and stated reasons of national policy’ (see below). The Treaty of Lisbon has 
inserted a fourth instance of QMV in CFSP decision-making by the Council, i.e. when 
                                               
10 Council Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP of 4 February 2008 on the European Union Rule of 
Law Mission in Kosovo, EULEX KOSOVO, OJ 2008 L 42/92. 
11 See Council Secretariat, Council doc. CM 448/08 of 4 February 2008, point 2, on file with 
author. 
12 See M. Cremona, “Enhanced Cooperation and the European Foreign and Security and 
Defence Policy”, in J.M. Beneyto (ed.), Unity and Flexibility in the Future of the European Union: 
the Challenge of Enhanced Cooperation, Madrid: CEU Ediciones, 2009, No. 75, p. 87, who also 
points to Jaeger’s argument that enhanced cooperation is ‘less negative’ than constructive 
abstention. See T. Jaeger, “Enhanced Cooperation in the Treaty of Nice and Flexibility in the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy”, European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 7, 2002, No. 297, 
p. 302. 
13 See Article 23(2) former TEU. 
14 See Eeckhout, op. cit., pp. 488-489. 
15 As before the Lisbon Treaty, procedural decisions are to be taken by a simple majority. See 
Article 31(5) TEU. 
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adopting any decision defining a Union action or position, on a proposal which the 
High Representative has presented “following a specific request from the European 
Council, made on its own initiative or that of the High Representative”.  
The opportunity of opening up more avenues for QMV was also enshrined in a new 
passerelle clause: Article 31(3) TEU enables the European Council to extend the cases 
of QMV by unanimously adopting a decision stipulating that the Council shall act by 
qualified majority in other cases, with the exception of decisions having military or 
defence implications (Article 31(4) TEU). This new and generous licence for 
extending the QMV mechanism enables the European Council to adjust the CFSP 
decision-making order in response to future needs and considerations of member 
states. Törő has observed that this passerelle clause might well be the “thin edge of the 
wedge which leads to the erosion of intergovernmental foreign policy-making in the 
Union”.16 However, the condition of full concurrence of national positions among the 
heads of state and government guarantees that the doors to the passage from 
unanimity to QMV will be firmly guarded and remain shut when contrary to the 
vital national interests or opposition of any member state.17 Moreover, in some 
member states (e.g. the UK and Germany), the government will not be able to agree 
to use this passerelle without prior approval by its parliament.18 
As already noted, there are two exceptions to the use of QMV in CFSP matters. First, 
it does not extend to decisions having military or defence implications (Article 31(4) 
TEU). Secondly, every member state has a veto right and can pull the so-called 
‘emergency brake’ (Article 31(2) TEU): 
If a member of the Council declares that, for vital and stated reasons of national 
policy, it intends to oppose the adoption of a decision to be taken by qualified 
majority, a vote shall not be taken. The High Representative will, in close 
consultation with the Member State involved, search for a solution acceptable to 
it. If he does not succeed, the Council may, acting by a qualified majority, request 
that the matter be referred to the European Council for a decision by unanimity. 
On the basis of the foregoing, one may conclude that the general rule of unanimity 
makes it difficult for the EU to forge common foreign and security policies on 
matters of both general and specific interest. Especially on questions about the use of 
force or interference in the internal matters of third states (e.g. Iraq 2003, Syria 2013), 
a ‘common’ foreign and security policy is unlikely to emerge from the divisions that 
separate the member states. Yet, it is unlikely that EU member states are ready to 
give up their veto power in return for more extended use of QMV in highly sensitive 
areas of international relations. QMV in CFSP will realistically work only in 
situations in which either none of the member states have particularly strong 
preferences or when there are no major divisions within the Council. In these cases it 
is reasonable to assume that the Heads of State and Government could reach the 
                                               
16 Contribution by Csaba Törő to the EPIN Conference devoted to “The External Dimension 
of EU Variable Geometry”, held in Brussels on 6 May 2013. 
17 Ibid. 
18 See J.-C. Piris, The Lisbon Treaty: A Legal and Political Analysis, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010, p. 262. 
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consensus needed to request a proposal from the High Representative and that no 
member state would consider its interests vital enough to justify hitting the 
emergency brakes. In general, though, the reality will remain that consensus among 
member states is sought, even where QMV is possible. 
6.3 Extension of enhanced cooperation to CFSP  
Enhanced cooperation, which was designed in the pre-Amsterdam IGC to allow 
some member states, using the EU framework and institutions, to cooperate further 
between themselves in cases where the others do not wish to do so, has been 
extended by the Lisbon Treaty to cover the entire realm of CFSP (Article 331(2) 
TFEU), including defence.19 The Lisbon Treaty also removed the ‘emergency brake’ 
procedure, albeit not completely. Furthermore, the Treaty provided for a new 
passerelle which allows participants in an enhanced cooperation to decide in the 
Council to switch from unanimity to QMV and from a special legislative procedure 
to the ordinary legislative procedure (Article 333(2) TFEU), except in defence matters 
(Article 333(1) TFEU). 
Yet, these innovations might not provide the flexibility that several member states 
had hoped for. After all, enhanced cooperation in CSFP is characterised by its narrow 
scope, cumbersome procedures and strict establishment requirements. As Piris has 
pointed out,  
the effect of these slight improvements will be somewhat reduced by the increase 
in the minimum number of participants from eight to nine member states […]; 
the requirement of unanimity in the Council for authorising any kind of 
enhanced cooperation in CFSP, without any exception for an enhanced co-
operation that would aim at implementing CFSP decisions which have already 
been adopted (whereas until the Lisbon Treaty there had been QMV in such a 
case); [and] the requirement of the consent of the European Parliament (where 
MEPs from all member states have a right to vote) for launching an enhanced co-
operation, even for cases where the codecision procedure does not apply 
(whereas, until the Lisbon Treaty, in cases where codecision did not apply the 
European Parliament was only to be consulted) […].20 
Moreover, some of the pre-conditions for the launch of an enhanced cooperation in 
CFSP continue to apply: it is a ‘last resort’ mechanism (Article 20(2) TEU) and there is 
no undermining the internal market (Article 326 TFEU). Taken together, these factors 
explain why the mechanism has not been used in practice in the area of CFSP. 
Instead, member states, in particular the smaller ones, have sought refuge in 
alternative forms of closer cooperation, created in a more flexible and informal way 
outside the framework of the treaties, i.e. without the burdensome decision-making 
procedures and without the exacting requirements for ‘enhanced cooperation’, 
helped by the fact that the CFSP − and thus the determination where the limits of the 
powers shared with the EU precisely lie − falls outside of the jurisdiction of the Court 
of Justice. 
                                               
19 Pre-Lisbon, it only covered the implementation of a CFSP action which had already been 
decided upon. Compare Articles 27A to 27E former TEU. 
20 Piris, op. cit., pp. 89-90. 
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6.4 Coalitions of member states 
Close foreign policy cooperation among a limited number of EU member states is 
generally looked upon with suspicion as it is associated with directoires of large 
member states (e.g. the UK, France and Germany in the context of the E3+3 
negotiations with Iran).21 However, under certain conditions, the specialisation and 
division of labour among EU member states, big and small, can strengthen the 
effectiveness and legitimacy of EU foreign policy, especially in cases where there is a 
lack of interest or political will among all member states.22 Indeed, as long as such 
more or less structured coalitions of member states work towards the attainment of 
the Union’s external action objectives (cf. Article 21 TEU) and policies, the extra 
efforts, money and other national resources devoted by ‘core groups’ to specific 
foreign policy matters (regional or thematic) can help to i) alleviate the stress on an 
understaffed and cash-strapped European External Action Service (EEAS),23 ii) assist 
in the operationalisation of EU foreign policy, and iii) increase the visibility and 
credibility of the EU as an international actor.  
In practice, several types of coalitions of member states have been formed:  
 permanent (e.g. Benelux24) and ad hoc (e.g. the UK and France pushing the EU on 
lifting the ban on arming opposition forces in Syria25); 
 institutionalised (e.g. Visegrad Group26) and loosely organised (e.g. the EU Core 
Group on Somalia, created early 2004, consisted primarily of the UK, Italy, 
Sweden and the European Commission, and was endorsed by the Council27); 
                                               
21 See, e.g., C. Gégout, “The Quint: Acknowledging the existence of a big four-US directoire 
at the heart of the European Union’s foreign policy decision-making process”, Journal of 
Common Market Studies, Vol. 40, 2002, pp. 331-344. See further, S. Lehne, “The Big Three in 
EU Foreign Policy”, Carnegie Paper, July 2012 and S. Blockmans, “Beyond Entrenchment 
over Iran: Can the EU offer a framework for regional security?”, CEPS Commentary, Centre 
for European Policy Studies, Brussels, 3 September 2012. 
22 Keukeleire, op. cit. 
23 See S. Blockmans, “EEAS Reloaded: Recommendations for the 2013 Review”, CEPS 
Commentary, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, 12 December 2012. 
24 Article 3(2) sub d and Articles 24-27 of the 2008 Benelux Treaty attribute an external 
relations competence to the institutions of the Benelux. See also Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
the Netherlands, Press release, “Verhagen: new impetus for Benelux foreign policy”, 9 April 
2008 and A. Rettman, “Benelux countries urge EU unity on Syria”, EU Observer, 15 March 
2013. 
25 See C. McDonald-Gibson, “Syria arms embargo lifted: Britain and France force EU to relax 
ban on supplying weapons to rebels”, The Independent, 28 May 2013. 
26 See (http://www.visegradgroup.eu), the collaborative framework consisting of Poland, 
Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary intent joining up on, inter alia, foreign policy 
towards the Western Balkans. See Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Visegrad Group (V4) 
and Western Balkans, “Joint Statement of the Visegrad Group on the Western Balkans”, 
Warsaw, 25 October 2012. 
27 See GAERC, “Somalia – Council conclusions””, Press release 7033/06 (Presse 68), Brussels, 
20 March 2006. 
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 regional (e.g. Baltic Council of Ministers28), inter-regional (e.g. the partnership 
framework of the Baltic and Benelux countries29 and that of Nordic, Baltic and 
Visegrad countries30), and thematic (e.g. mediation or reconciliation efforts31). 
From this overview it becomes clear that these types of coalitions of member states 
have the potential to reinforce the CFSP. The challenge, however, is to make sure that 
these groupings do not obstruct but rather buttress the structures (in particular the 
HR, EU Special Representatives and the EEAS), procedures, policies and actions of 
the EU in the foreign and security field by: 
 pooling more intensively the coalition members’ views, efforts, measures and 
policies to support a more coherent and effective CFSP; 
 adopting new measures to further the external action objectives of the EU, 
particularly through measures by member states in policy domains where the EU 
as such has few or no competences or capabilities, but where some coordination 
with the EU is useful or essential; 
 preparing the ground for new EU initiatives and decisions in CFSP; 
 concretising, implementing and assuring the follow-up of CFSP decisions; 
 initiating, broadening or deepening the dialogue, mediation or negotiation with 
third parties (in particular those not recognised by the EU, e.g. de facto states, 
terrorist groups), allowing less formal and more frequent, flexible and purposive 
interaction, in addition to the efforts conducted by the EU; 
 strengthening the coordination with external actors (e.g. third states, other 
regional organisations, UN agencies, NGOs), in a systematic way compatible with 
that by the EEAS; and 
 implementing any other tasks that the Council or the High Representative may 
assign to a particular coalition of EU Member states.32 
In short, the existence of core groups of EU member states should not be seen as a 
problem for the development of CFSP per se. As shown above, it could rather be part 
of the solution in overcoming the constraints in CFSP decision-making. There are, 
however, two other ‘constitutional’ obligations that should guide such core groups’ 
activities: i) the fact that member states are under a legal obligation to loyally 
                                               
28 See http://www.mfa.gov.lv/en/policy/4595/cooperation-among-the-baltic-states/, also 
for a link to the “Terms of Reference” of the Baltic Council. 
29 See P. Vaida, “Baltic and Benelux formins [foreign ministers] discuss EU foreign policy in 
Estonia”, The Baltic Course, Vilnius, 12 September 2011. 
30 See Co-Chair's Statement, “Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the Visegrad, Nordic and Baltic 
states”, Gdańsk, 20 February, 2013 (http://www.visegradgroup.eu/documents/official-
statements/meeting-of-foreign). 
31 E.g. the Swedish-Finnish initiative to set up a European Institute of Peace. See J. Claes, 
“Toward a European Institute of Peace”, Peacebrief, No. 141, 21 February 2013. 
32 This list of tasks and functions is inspired on the longer one developed by Keukeleire, op. 
cit. 
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cooperate with the EU institutions (European Council, Council and Commission, 
supported by the EEAS acting under the authority of the High Representative); and, 
in the slipstream thereof, ii) the duty to ensure the (vertical) consistency of EU 
external action (arguably the latter requires consultation and coordination with HR + 
EEAS). Respect for these principles should prevent EU external policies and actions 
from being diluted, undermined, rendered less visible, and re-nationalised by core 
groups’ activities. 
6.5 Putting the C back into the CFSP 
Whereas the scope of the EU’s specific competences in the realm of the Common 
Security and Defence Policy is more or less clearly defined (Articles 42-46 TEU), the 
open-ended notion of “all areas of foreign policy” in Article 24 TEU is misleading. 
Given that EU competence in this field is neither exclusive nor unlimited, 
differentiation may trigger problems of vertical consistency between the EU’s CFSP 
and member states’ foreign policies, as indeed problems of horizontal consistency 
among the different national foreign policies. This begs the question how to reconcile 
the general principles of consistency and loyal cooperation with the reality of 
differentiation.33 
As to the former, the principle of consistency has been ascribed great constitutional 
value.34 A general principle of EU law codified in the Treaties (in, e.g., Articles 13(1) 
and 18(4) TEU), it is perceived, first and foremost, as an organising principle at the 
policy-making level aimed at creating synergies between different strands of EU 
policy. As such, the notion of ‘consistency’ comes closer to the formulation used in 
the French language version of the Treaty, i.e. “coherence” (Article 21(3), second 
subparagraph TEU).35  
Member states are under the obligation to support the Union’s external and security 
policy “actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity and 
shall comply with the Union’s action” in the specific area of CFSP (Article 24(3) first 
subparagraph TEU). This not only means that the member states are held to work 
together to enhance and develop their mutual political solidarity (coherence), it also 
means that they are required to “refrain from any action which is contrary to the 
interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in 
international relations” (Article 24(3) second subparagraph TEU).36 The latter chimes 
                                               
33 See E. Herlin-Karnell and T. Konstadinides, “The Rise and Expressions of Consistency in 
EU Law: Legal and Strategic Implications for European Integration”, Cambridge Yearbook of 
European Legal Studies, Vol. 15 (2012-2013), pp. 139-167. 
34 See, e.g. C. Hillion, op. cit. and M. Cremona, “Coherence in European Union Foreign 
Relations Law”, in P. Koutrakos (ed.), European Foreign Policy: Legal and Political Perspectives, 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2011, pp. 55-92. 
35 According to the rules of Section 6 of Chapter I, Title I, Part VI of the TFEU, Article 21(3) 
TEU falls under the jurisdiction of the Court. With the Treaty of Lisbon, this particular notion 
has therefore become a justiciable principle in the realm of EU external action. 
36 Pursuant to Article 275(1) TFEU, these principles are not justiciable. Compare also ECJ, 
Case C-167/94 Grau Gromis [1995] ECR 1-1023. Hence, only political enforcement is foreseen: 
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with the second − and better – interpretation of the principle of consistency, where 
the notion is perceived as setting common interests and unified objectives with the 
aim of eliminating contradictions in EU external action. The emphasis thus shifts 
from coherence at the policy-making level to consistency in implementation, 
whereby the latter imposes on the member states a negatively formulated 
behavioural duty geared towards the maintenance of a uniform pattern of outputs. 
Seen in this light, it is no wonder that the principle of consistency (coherence) 
occupies a special place in the set of provisions on enhanced cooperation in Title III 
of Part VI TFEU. In particular, Article 334 TFEU provides that “the Council and the 
Commission shall ensure the consistency of activities undertaken in the context of 
enhanced cooperation and the consistency of such activities with the policies of the 
EU, and shall cooperate to that end.” Even if a lex specialis is absent from Title V TEU 
on EU external action (writ large), Article 20(1) TEU absorbs the principle of 
consistency of Article 334 TFEU and applies it indirectly to enhanced cooperation in 
all areas of non-exclusive EU competences, including CFSP.37 Tied to the principle of 
loyalty, the notion of consistency thus guides different coalitions of member states in 
observing the Union’s interests, objectives, policies and actions under the CFSP. 
When these constitutional requirements are fulfilled, the CFSP sets to gain from the 
support of differentiated sub-structures, be that in terms of visibility, legitimacy and 
effectiveness of the European Union as an international actor.  
Ultimately, what counts in reality is proper consultation and coordination between 
the member states and the central EU actors. With the creation of hybrid positions 
and bodies (High Representative and EEAS), the Lisbon Treaty has provided the 
necessary mechanisms to guarantee and foster this vertical consistency between the 
EU and partial numbers and varying sets of its member states. All that remains to be 
added is trust and goodwill on both sides. 
                                                                                                                                                   
“The Council and the High Representative shall ensure compliance with these principles”, 
(Article 24(3) third subparagraph TEU). Conversely, the principle of loyal cooperation is 
derived from the lex generalis laid down in Article 4(3) TEU, which does fall under the 
jurisdiction of the Court. 
37 See Herlin-Karnell and Konstadinides, op. cit. 
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7. ACCOMMODATING DIFFERENCES WITHIN THE 
CSDP: LEEWAY IN THE TREATY FRAMEWORK? 
CSABA TÖRŐ 
7.1 Preliminary remarks 
The frequently varying interests of member states render the formulation and 
conduct of Common Foreign and Security Policy a complex and challenging exercise 
of accommodating persistent differences. Within CFSP, CSDP as its operational 
component often presents particularly difficult dilemmas with costly choices, 
revealing significantly divergent aspirations, expectations and capabilities among EU 
countries. The depth and breadth of the differences depend on a range of 
circumstances, from geopolitical considerations to budgetary concerns. Although 
these differences may prove difficult to overcome for international political or 
domestic economic reasons, the CSDP treaty framework does not raise 
insurmountable obstacles to their accommodation. Even if the rules applicable to the 
adoption and implementation of CSDP decisions admittedly hold limited 
possibilities for flexibility, in both phases – decision-making and execution – of the 
EU crisis management procedure the respective treaty provisions offer enough room 
for resilience and recognition to accommodate divisions among member states, if 
politically possible. 
In spite of the seemingly straightforward limitation imposed by the requirement of 
unanimity in CSDP decision-making, the existing possibilities should be identified 
and examined under the current treaty framework. Particular attention will be paid 
to the accommodation of differences in CSDP within the limits of unanimity: 
flexibility through constructive abstention. 
With respect to flexibility in the implementation of adopted decisions, the feasible 
modalities for the execution of CSDP operations by groups of member states will be 
explored, either in the form of ad hoc coalitions or designated formations from inside 
the Union.  
At last, permanent structured cooperation will come under consideration as a 
standing platform for the accommodation of diverse commitments and capabilities in 
CSDP, together with its significance for defence policy differentiation within the 
Union. 
                                               
 Csaba Törő, Ph.D. Senior Research Fellow, Hungarian Institute of International Affairs. 
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7.2 Accommodating differences in the course of CSDP decision-making 
7.2.1 CSDP firmly within the realm of unanimity 
The adoption of CSDP decisions is embedded in the broader context of rules defining 
decision-making in CFSP, which fall under Chapter 2 of Title V of the TEU.1 
Nevertheless, the enlarged scope of the permissible application of qualified majority 
voting and the perspective of its future expansion into further terrains of CFSP did 
not alter the place of CSDP within the order of decision-making on the external 
actions and security policy of the Union. Its military dimension continued to 
represent an unreformed exception to the possibility of differentiated modes of 
decision-making within Common Foreign and Security Policy. 
Since the insertion of QMV into the 2nd pillar of the EU, the decision-making rules of 
CFSP have always contained some special provisions of assurances for the 
preservation of military or, more precisely, defence issues within the realm of 
unanimity. Matters relating to national armed forces and defence resources have 
been treated as being politically too sensitive to be decided in any other fashion than 
by overarching compromise. Accordingly, the respective treaty provisions on the 
general rules of CFSP decision-making explicitly rules out the possibility of recourse 
to qualified majority voting (QMV) with respect to “decisions having military or 
defence implications”.2 These implications include any question that is related to 
operational or organisational decisions, and decisions on capability developments 
that give rise to obligations of a military nature. The exclusion of “military or 
defence” issues from the scope of QMV in decision-making corresponds to particular 
EU treaty provisions on the “non-interference” and compatibility of CSDP with the 
defence policy obligations of member states outside the Union.3 If a decision with 
consequences for defence commitments beyond the EU framework were permitted to 
pass by QMV, it could bring about major conflicts of duty for certain member states 
without their agreement. Sustained unanimity in military and defence matters 
provides assurance for every potentially affected EU member to avert any resulting 
conflict by withholding its approval of a decision having contradictory implications 
for its defence policy commitments inside and/or outside the Union. 
In the specific section on CSDP within the CFSP chapter, TEU provisions plainly 
stipulate that all sorts of decisions, either operational or organisational, in relation to 
any aspect of the Common Security and Defence Policy must be unanimously 
adopted by the Council.4 No exception is permitted, regardless of subject matter, 
scope or character. In the general provisions of CFSP decision-making (Article 31) 
only decisions with “military or defence implications” are explicitly not exempted 
from the principal rule of unanimity. The related specification on CSDP acts seems to 
leave no room for manoeuvre as to the extent of necessary agreement among EU 
members.  
                                               
1 See the contribution by Blockmans to this volume. 
2 Article 31(4), TEU. 
3 Article 42(2), TEU. 
4 Article 42(4), TEU. 
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The EU treaty expressly allows diversion from the requirement of unanimity in the 
field of CSDP only in the case of a Council act on the approval of closer and 
sustained form of defence cooperation for a number of EU member states. Besides 
this particular type of act of authorisation, no other formal permission is granted for 
the adoption of decision by less than unanimity. Therefore, the sole exception to 
unanimity is confined to the formation and operation of permanent structured 
cooperation. 
 More importantly, the absence of QMV does not exclude every opportunity for 
flexibility in the course of the adoption of CSDP acts. The general rules of decision-
making in Common Foreign and Security Policy offer some, though fairly limited, 
space for divergence and discord among member states without the prevention of a 
unanimous conclusion, as long as the disagreements are not manifested in the 
explicit rejection of the given proposal for decision. 
7.2.2 Narrow exception to the rule of unanimity: instances of QMV in CSDP 
However clear and categorical it may seem, the exemption of CSDP from the use of 
QMV in CFSP should not be understood to cover all aspects of the Common Defence 
and Security Policy. One remarkable exception allowed by the TEU to the use of 
QMV in decision-making on matters of a military nature is related to the operation of 
closer defence collaboration among EU countries. Upon completion of the prescribed 
process of notification and consultation, the Council may take a decision on the 
establishment of permanent structured co-operation (PESCO) by ready and capable 
member states with stated commitments to advanced and closely coordinated 
defence capability development. The authorising act to launch PESCO can be 
adopted by qualified majority with the participation of all member states in the 
Council.5 Although it certainly serves as a platform for functional association of EU 
countries within the scope of treaty provisions regarding CSDP (including Protocol 
No. 10), it was deemed permissible to proceed with the formation of closer 
cooperation in military matters below the level of the Union without the unanimous 
accord of all member states.  
In the course of its operation, decisions on the acceptance of new partners in PESCO,6 
and their suspension,7 may also be taken without unanimity in the Council. Only the 
qualified majority of votes from participating member states would be necessary for 
the admission or temporary exclusion of a given country. Every other decision with 
regard to permanent structured cooperation may require unanimity in the Council, 
but only among the participating member states.8  
                                               
5 Article 46(2), TEU. 
6 Article 46(3), TEU. 
7 Article 46(4), TEU. 
8 Article 46(6), TEU. 
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7.2.3 Accommodating differences in CSDP within the limits of unanimity: flexibility 
through constructive abstention 
In the case of divergent national positions among member states on international 
situations, the requirement of unanimity for CSDP decisions may seem to lead either 
to deadlock and inaction or to the adoption of the lowest common denominator of 
diverging national opinions. Due to the prescription of agreement among members 
in the Council, it is probable that none other than completely non-contentious cases 
would offer the chance of initiation to any EU security action with a defence 
component. Despite the need for unanimous decisions on CSDP military missions, 
certain CFSP decision-making rules have the required amount of resilience to 
overcome the inherent constraints of plenary accord among EU member states. 
Although unanimity is prescribed, it is important to note that full consensus is not 
required. In other words, the Council cannot take decisions on any organisational or 
operational (military or civilian missions) aspect of the common security and defence 
policy unless and until all formal and open disagreement has been overcome by 
mutually acceptable compromise, even in the absence of full consensus.  
Even the foundations of the normative contours of CSDP in the TEU permit, with 
some qualifications, the application of certain flexibility through a clear 
differentiation between the absence of concurrence preventing the adoption of a 
common stance on possible collective EU action and the recourse to an agreeable 
compromise with (a limited number of) national reservations. This is to avoid the 
unnecessary obstruction of decision-making without full consensus among the 
member states. Consequently, those members of the Union with no intention of 
participating in a proposed CSDP mission do not have to block the entire decision-
making process in order to avoid unwanted entanglement in a prospective EU crisis-
management enterprise. 
Although the initiation of an operation is to be decided unanimously, the rules on 
constructive abstention could be applied to ensure the flexibility and efficiency of 
institutional deliberations and conclusions. The provisions on constructive abstention 
in the TEU offer flexibility in the considerations of CFSP positions and soften the 
rigidity of the general requirement of unanimity for taking decisions on foreign 
policy and security issues at EU level.9  
The optional flexibility by recourse to constructive abstention has been enshrined in the 
rules governing CFSP decision-making. In the event of political compromise among 
member states, it may be a truly useful instrument in the adoption of decisions on 
CSDP actions that divide EU countries. If these divisions could be reduced and 
reconciled to the extent of rejection of participation in a decision instead of rejection of a 
complete initiative for an EU undertaking in a given crisis or country, abstention rather 
than obstruction offers the exit route from potential stalemate in the Council. This 
solution would permit member state governments potentially or actually facing 
political difficulties, or having specific interests in the area of suggested CSDP 
                                               
9 Article 31(1), TEU. 
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operation (or close by) to sustain their position and, at the same time, avoid conflict 
with other members eager to see more EU action on particular matters.    
In the case of failure to reach a collective decision by having resort to constructive 
abstention, willing and capable member states would still be able to orchestrate 
military or civilian (e.g., police) action outside the institutional framework of the EU. 
Such situations demonstrate that reaching a common position and approach by the 
Union was impossible, in spite of its system of foreign and security policy 
coordination among member states. However, in the case of persistent and deep 
divisions in the political considerations and perceptions of the desirability or utility 
of a CSDP mission, the identifiable differences between the governments of member 
states would probably prevent the admission of the proposed EU mission for formal 
deliberations and decision-making in the Council. 
When differences of opinion or judgment from the majority position are maintained 
without the intent of derailing it, the dissenting minority (one or more states) may 
choose to announce (in a specific statement) its/their abstention from a decision on a 
proposed military or civilian operation.10 In the previous version of the treaty, the 
possibility of abstention was explicitly determined as an eventuality that should not 
prevent the adoption of decisions by itself.11   
 With respect to the CSDP missions, the “formal declaration” of the abstention of any 
EU member carries practical relevance, because it relieves the country of the 
obligations of contribution and participation in any form stemming from the decision 
adopted by the majority. The possibility to keep “constructive distance” from 
particular decisions – and also from the prevention of their adoption – facilitates, to a 
remarkable extent, the formation of compromise positions on international security 
undertakings as operational instances of CSDP, but curtails the range of potential 
resources available for implementation measures through a coordinated EU 
response.  
The general limits of flexibility in CFSP decision-making on behalf of all but without the 
explicit accord of every MS equally apply to decisions on EU crisis-management 
enterprises by either military or civilian means. Consequently, the same threshold 
defines the ‘critical mass’ of legitimacy for the adoption of a collective stance on 
CSDP-related matters with stated reservations from member states. With the 
amendment of previous rules on “one third of the votes weighted” as the blocking 
minority quota in the TEU,12 the Lisbon Treaty increased the room for flexibility in 
decision-making on the issues of Common Security and Defence Policy by the 
introduction of another requirement besides the size of the group of member states 
seeking exemption from taking position and part in the process. In addition to the 
already existing condition of one-third of EU member states qualifying their abstention 
by making formal declarations, at least one-third of the population of the Union was 
determined as another crucial quantitative indicator of insufficient support for any 
                                               
10 Article 31(1), TEU. 
11 The second sentence of ex Article 23(1), TEU. 
12 Second subparagraph of ex Article 23(1), TEU. 
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position or action to be taken on behalf of the Union. At this point, the flexibility and 
legitimacy of decisions on CSDP undertakings adopted without full consensus, but 
also in the absence of express rejection reaches its outer limits.13 
Although not giving express support to the adopted decision, the abstaining state(s) 
cannot be relieved of the general CFSP duty of loyalty and solidarity. The 
unambiguous requirement of “mutual solidarity” aims at reconciling the actions 
launched by the majority with the reservations and concerns of individual states.14 
As the overarching rule of conduct in the TEU prescribes, member states must refrain 
from any action that may “impair the effectiveness” of the Union as “a cohesive force 
in international relations”.15 Representing one of the key norms of required conduct 
by member states in pursuit of CFSP, external solidarity must prevail over any 
lingering divisions, doubts or disagreements within the EU once the decision has 
been taken to launch a military or civilian mission under the banner of the Union. 
Abstention allows the adoption of a common denominator in exchange for 
exemption from the implementation of, or participation in, the execution of the 
approved joint CSDP enterprise. It nevertheless does not permit that member state(s) 
distancing themselves from an EU engagement to disregard the binding 
consequences of a properly adopted CFSP decision. All members, either giving or 
withholding their support for any particular EU mission, need to respect the 
resulting commitments for the European Union as a whole and refrain from any 
action in conflict with the underlying collective decision.16 
In this way, any member state refraining from a military, civilian or financial 
contribution to an operation does not have to oppose, only to abstain from the 
executive measures. In order for a state to relieve itself of the burden of 
implementation, it needs to make a formal declaration of its position to avoid the 
application of the adopted decision. A preventive formal declaration could be 
particularly meaningful for an abstaining state if it – quite understandably – intends 
to extricate itself from the costs of an operation for which it did not vote. Under the 
general rules of the allocation of expenditures incurred during the conduct of EU 
undertakings, the administrative and operational expenses can be charged to the 
Union budget,17 but all costs resulting from EU military missions are covered by the 
member states collectively, though proportionately with their GNP. Only those 
member states that distance themselves from the common enterprise by virtue of a 
formal declaration of abstention in the Council can be saved from paying their share 
of operational expenditures (regardless of their participation).18 
                                               
13 Article 31(1), TEU. 
14 The duty of “mutual solidarity” under the CFSP was already contained in the second 
subparagraph of Article 23(1) TEU (Nice). It was redubbed “mutual political solidarity” in 
Article 24(2) TEU (Lisbon).  
15 Article 24(3), TEU. 
16 Second subparagraph of Article 31(1), TEU. 
17 Article 41(1)-(2), TEU. 
18 Article 41(2), TEU. 
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Once a CSDP operation is under way, abstaining states do not participate in 
operational management (conducted within the Committee of Contributors), but 
remain involved in the exercise of political and strategic oversight through the 
Political and Security Committee. Thereby, all EU member states, whether abstaining 
or supporting a given CSDP mission, could take part in the formation and adoption 
of decisions of political significance, such as fundamental changes in the concept, 
scope or means of operation.  
 In conclusion, constructive abstention offers a flexible solution in times of looming 
deadlock in the Council. Particularly, when most of the member states may be 
expected to reach political consensus on the necessity or propriety of a collective 
move on an issue or region, but the adoption of decisions leading to actions is 
hindered by the reluctance of some participants in the Council to get directly 
engaged in specific “security enterprises”. The extension of flexibility - inherent in 
the modality of constructive abstention - from the phase of deliberations and voting 
to the stage of action and implementation outlines the possible solution to otherwise 
insurmountable disagreements between the intentions of some EU countries to take a 
stance and the anxieties of others about the (un)foreseeable implications of possible 
collective action. Another frequent contradiction emerges between the ambitions and 
the actual capacity of member states to act once they have concluded their 
deliberations.  
7.3 Room for the accommodation of differences in the implementation of 
CSDP decisions 
7.3.1 Flexibility in execution: collective decision by all, but implementation only by 
some of the member states 
In order to reconcile various foreign policy traditions and considerations, inevitable 
compromises often constrain the difference and impact which CFSP actions (with or 
without CSDP operations) may otherwise make. Since the operationalisation of the 
European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in 2003, practice has spurred several 
solutions for the accommodation of differences among member states as to their 
intentions and means of participation in expeditionary EU undertakings.  
The origins of the need for differentiation in the involvement of EU members into 
implementation can be traced back to the divergence in their positions with regard to 
the military aspects of CFSP, in particular  
Reliance on such coalitions was partly influenced by historical reservations when 
it came to defence related issues from Denmark (with its opt-out on all defence-
related provisions of the TEU), as well as the political or constitutional concerns 
of the neutral or non-aligned EU member states (Austria, Finland, Ireland and 
Sweden).19  
                                               
19 Simon Duke, “The Convention, the draft Constitution and External Relations: Effects and 
Implications for the EU and its international role”, EIPA, Working Paper No. 2003/W/2, 
European Institute of Public Administration, Maastricht, the Netherlands.  
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Besides the constitutional constraints and policy reservations of these member states, 
pragmatic reasons and political caution also figure prominently in the considerations 
of other countries wishing to avoid unwanted responsibilities and expenses resulting 
from joint CSDP enterprises. 
The restraints on collective EU action due to the varying ‘appetites’ and/or capacity 
for engagement of member states can be eased by a pragmatic approach already 
practised from the early stages of ESDP, but which received recognition in the 
aborted Constitutional Treaty and later confirmation in the Lisbon Treaty. The 
solution lies in the differentiation between participation in taking decisions and 
involvement in their implementation. In other words, it calls for the separation of the 
adoption of authoritative CFSP decisions (permissions to act) by the consent of all states 
in the Council from the execution of decisions (operational performance) by a smaller or 
larger cluster of EU members. This crucial and pragmatic distinction holds the 
perspective of flexibility and separation of policy formation from implementation.  
The possibility for differentiation between the adoption and the execution of a decision 
in the case of CSDP undertakings is laid out in the TEU.  In line with a specific 
enabling clause, the Council is permitted to delegate the operational implementation 
of an EU action to an identifiable cluster of member states. By an act of authorisation, 
the Council in its decision may “entrust the execution of a task, within the Union 
framework,” to a certain group of EU countries in order to protect its values and 
serve its interests.20 This provision offers an applicable and pragmatic modality for 
the delegation of CSDP enterprises to a designated combination of EU countries 
acting with the authorisation of the Union as a whole. Already, the prospect of the 
inclusion of this provision was deemed “a major step in the direction of increased 
flexibility”.21 The insertion of this option certainly opened a window of opportunity 
for flexibility in the implementation of operative CFSP decisions.  
The availability of this solution underlines the conceptual and practical feasibility of 
distinction between the approval of an action in the plenary of the Council and the 
discharge of operational measures by a subset of EU members invested with the 
responsibility for an operation in the name of the European Union. The explicit 
reference to a practical and legally permissible example of differentiation between 
decision-making and implementation indicates the two distinct phases of EU crisis 
management procedures that may be accomplished with two different levels and 
forms of involvement of member states.   
In the first phase, the debate and adoption of the underlying political decision in the 
Council have to determine the parameters and conditions of an EU engagement 
agreeable to all member states. The emerging consensus reflects the compromise 
acceptable to all members. Even in the absence of complete and equal endorsement 
by every government within the Union, without express rejection the unanimity 
                                               
20 Article 42(5), TEU. 
21 Stephan Keukeleire, “EU Core Groups – Specialisation and division of labour in EU foreign 
policy”, CEPS Working Document No. 252, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, 
October 2006, p. 12. 
ACCOMMODATION DIFFERENCES WITHIN THE CSDP: LEEWAY IN THE TREATY FRAMEWORK?   65 
 
requirement of the approval of CSDP decisions22 can be fulfilled with the same legal 
effect and meaning as in the case of full concurrence of national positions. Thereby, 
the legality and the international legitimacy of any collective action as an EU operation 
– signalling the common stance of the entire Union – are duly founded on the accord 
of all member states. 
As to the second phase, the more delicate and demanding task of implementation 
can be carried out by “the coalition of the willing and able” (e.g., a collection of EU 
member states usually in a consortium with various non-EU countries). 
Differentiation between plenary decisions and voluntary collective actions has a direct 
bearing on the occasional formation of viable coalitions of sufficient political 
commitment and operational capabilities. The decisions taken by the entirety of EU 
members in the Council could be translated into operational security and defence 
policy measures by ready and capable member states acting as an occasional cluster or 
relying on their permanent formations within or outside the EU framework.   
7.3.2 Implementation by casual and variable combinations of EU members 
In the event of occasional clusters, a temporary “action group” could be assembled 
around the jointly pursued aims of a mission without specification or reference to 
any set of EU members willing to carry out the implied tasks. In line with the 
collectively defined mission objectives, the intentions and available capabilities of the 
participants will determine the composition of an initial (possibly extended later by 
other member states or external partners) coalition within the EU framework.  
In light of the experience of the first decade of CSDP missions, the implementation of 
EU crisis-management undertakings by ad hoc groups is very likely to remain the 
permanent feature of the Common Security and Defence Policy. CSDP operations 
can be executed either through NATO structures (using NATO assets and command 
structures under the direction of its Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe-
DSACEUR)23 or carried out as autonomous EU missions24 (under military direction 
from a national command centre serving as the EU Operation HQ) with the 
contribution of EU countries and, most of the time, external partners. In either case, 
plenary participation and contributions from all member states cannot be presumed 
as the defining characteristic of CSDP operations.  
                                               
22 Article 42(4), TEU. 
23 Since the launch of EU military operations in 2003, two CSDP missions in the Western 
Balkans – Operation Concordia in Macedonia (in 2003) and Operation Althea in Bosnia-
Herzegovina (since 2004) – have demonstrated the activation of the Berlin Plus option in 
practice.  
24 Most EU undertakings of a military nature have been accomplished or still discharged as 
autonomous CSDP missions. Examples of this kind of land or naval operations include 
deployments in Congo (Operation Artemis, 2003 and EUFOR DRC, 2006), in Chad and the 
Central African Republic (EUFOR TCHAD/CAR, 2008-2009), off the coasts of Somalia (EU 
NAVFOR, 2008- ), in Uganda (EUTM Somalia, 2011-2012), in Niger (EUCAP SAHEL Niger, 
2012- ) and latest in Mali (EUTM, 2013- ). 
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The repeated examples of Common Security and Defence Policy missions by variable 
combinations of states from inside and outside the Union illustrate a consolidated 
pattern of practice. Acting in coalition by some or many of the member states 
representing the entire EU continues to define the prevailing mode of execution of 
CSDP missions. The rate of participation of EU members varies case by case from full 
representation (EUMM in Georgia25) through two-thirds majority (Operation EUFOR 
ALTHEA in Bosnia with the contribution of 18 EU countries26) to one third (EUCAP 
SAHEL Niger with ten countries from the Union27) of EU membership. Multinational 
configurations assembled for the implementation of undertakings within the 
Common Security and Defence Policy are normally composed of casual 
combinations of acting EU countries and third states as external contributing 
partners. The variety of potential partners from outside the Union envelops 
European NATO members (Norway,28 Turkey29 or Albania30), EU candidates 
(Croatia,31 FYROM32 or Montenegro33), other states from Europe (Switzerland34) or 
partners from other continents (the US,35 Brazil, Canada and South Africa36) 
                                               
25 EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia, Factsheet, 2 May 2013. 
26 EU military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Operation EUFOR ALTHEA), Factsheet 
Althea/28, 13 February 2013. 
27 EUCAP SAHEL Niger, Factsheet, 2 May 2013. 
28 EU Maritime Operation against piracy (EU NAVFOR Somalia - Operation ATALANTA), 
Factsheet EUNAVFOR/40, 30 May 2012. 
29 EU military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Operation EUFOR ALTHEA), Factsheet 
Althea/28, 13 February 2013. For more on Turkey and CSDP operations, see S. Blockmans, 
“Participation of Turkey in European Security and Defence Policy: Kingmaker or Trojan 
horse?”, GGS Working Paper No. 41, 04/2010. 
30 EU Military Operation in Eastern Chad and North Eastern Central African Republic 
(EUFOR Tchad/RCA), Factsheet, March 2009. 
31 Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Croatia on the participation 
of the Republic of Croatia in the European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL 
AFGHANISTAN), Official Journal of the European Union, L 270/28, 13 October 2007. 
32 EU military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Operation EUFOR ALTHEA), Factsheet 
Althea/28, 13 February 2013. 
33 Council Decision 2010/199/CFSP of 22 March 2010 on the signing and conclusion of the 
Agreement between the European Union and Montenegro on the participation of 
Montenegro in the European Union military operation to contribute to the deterrence, 
prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast 
(Operation Atalanta), Official Journal of the European Union, L 88/1, 8 April 2010. 
34 European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM), Factsheet, June 2012. 
35 Agreement between the European Union and the United States of America on the 
participation of the United States of America in the European Union Rule of Law Mission in 
Kosovo, EULEX KOSOVO, Official Journal of the European Union, L 282/33, 25 October 2008. 
36 Political and Security Committee Decision DRC 2/2003 of 11 July 2003 on the setting up of 
the Committee of Contributors for the European Union military operation in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (2003/529/CFSP). 
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interested in, and capable of contributions to a given joint security enterprise under 
the EU’ banner and direction. 
The composition and number of additional participants varies from case to case 
depending on the nature, location and timing of EU security undertakings. The 
practical and functional form of cooperation with third states contributing to 
concerted security endeavours evolved as a response to the demands of civilian as 
well as military CSDP missions of diverse length and complexity.37 The rise of an 
occasional coalition of states (manifested by their participation in the Committee of 
Contributors as their platform of operational coordination) for a particular civilian or 
military undertaking signals their readiness to combine elements of their capabilities 
and commit sufficient resources to assemble the necessary means for the conduct of 
tasks (within the “Petersberg Plus” repertoire38) on behalf of the Union.  
7.3.3 Implementation of CSDP tasks by a designated group  
As mentioned above, an acting occasional coalition may also be identified and 
empowered as a distinct subset of EU countries for the purpose of the 
implementation of a certain CSDP mission. On the ground of a preliminary 
indication of intentions to commit the necessary capabilities, a designated 
combination of member states can be determined by a Council decision as the “EU 
task force” entrusted with the execution of a joint security enterprise in the name of 
the Union.  
Although the objectives and the general conditions for implementation of a civilian 
or military mission are defined in the relevant CFSP decision that provides the 
identified subset of members with the license to act, the operational decisions are left 
to the consideration and choices of the participants. In the pertinent provisions, the 
TEU explicitly confers the responsibility for implementation on the group of member 
states identified and authorised for that particular CSDP engagement.39 When a 
coalition of “willing and able” members of the Union is mandated to carry out an 
assignment expressly entrusted to their group, the contributing states are entitled to 
enjoy the benefits of autonomy in executive decisions because their acting cluster is 
allowed to “agree among themselves on the management of tasks”.40  
Even if not all EU countries are directly involved, it remains an EU mission sustained 
by the underlying mandate and the “association” of the High Representative of the 
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy with the execution of the operation. 
Consultations must be conducted not only with the High Representative, but also 
with the non-participating section of member states at their request or on the 
initiative of the acting coalition.41 The legal basis for their action, or its revision, is 
                                               
37 More details of the establishment, composition and operation of these coalitions may be 
found in C. Törő, “External state partners in ESDP missions: third country participation in 
EU crisis management”, European of Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 15, 2010, pp. 325–345. 
38 Article 43, TEU. 
39 Article 42(5), TEU. 
40 Article 44(1), TEU. 
41 Article 44(2), TEU. 
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contained in decisions subject to unanimous approval in the Council. If the 
completion of the tasks undertaken by the acting coalition requires change to the 
objectives, scope or conditions of the mission, the necessary adjustment must be 
authorised in another decision of the Council adopted in accordance with the 
prescriptions of CDSP decision-making.42  
The designation of a certain cluster of states for a particular mission may be based on 
the initiative and indication of willingness to act by one of the member states that 
stands ready to mobilise its resources and lead the given CSDP operation as its 
“framework nation”.43 With the help and contribution of other EU countries and 
possible external partners (third states), an occasional association of partners can 
coalesce around the framework nation to form a joint security enterprise for the 
purpose and duration of a particular mission. The lead member of the group 
entrusted with the discharge of the mission mandate performs the role of the 
gravitational centre of the occasional coalition by orchestrating the execution of tasks 
and exercising the command and control responsibilities of the operation. In the past 
decade of CSDP missions, an early example of an express identification of a member 
state as the framework nation of a CSDP mission emerged in the instance of the first 
ESDP military undertaking in Africa (in Eastern Congo) when France was entrusted 
to lead the implementation of Operation Artemis in 2003.44  
Although it may seem that the Lisbon Treaty merely formalised an already rehearsed 
option of designation of tasks to an occasional, but distinct set of EU members45, the 
provisions holding the possibility to expressly invest a cluster of member states with 
the execution of specified assignments should be read in combination with the 
reference to jointly established “multinational forces” of EU countries.46 Besides their 
willingness, the other reason for the designation of a particular combination of 
member states can be drawn from their capabilities adequate and available for the 
envisaged mission in the name of the Union. The necessary means of action could be 
either assembled to discharge a particular operation or assigned to tasks to be carried 
out collectively through recourse to a standing framework of operation. Existing 
frameworks of cooperation, preparation and operation among EU members could 
demarcate conceivable circles of participants as identifiable groups presenting 
possible options to be chosen and entrusted with suitable tasks. Accordingly, the EU 
treaty invites the connection of standing military formations of certain member states 
to the aims and tasks of the entire Union in its international security enterprises. 
Regardless of their origin, whether established inside or outside the Union, these 
                                               
42 Ibid. 
43 EU Framework Nation Concept, Council Doc. 11278/02, 25 July 2002. 
44 Article 2, Council Joint Action 2003/423/CFSP of 5 June 2003 on the European Union 
military operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo. 
45 Marise Cremona, “Enhanced cooperation and the European Foreign and Security and 
Defence Policy”, in Jose Maria Beneyto (ed.), Unity and flexiblity in the future of the European 
Union: the challenge of enhanced cooperation, Madrid: CEU Ediciones, 2009, p. 85. 
46 Article 42(3), TEU. 
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multinational forces may be made “available to the common security and defence 
policy.”47  
Combined or joint military capabilities outside the Union have long been maintained 
by various groups of EU MS that created multinational formations for specific 
purposes under different command arrangement. The Franco-German Brigade as the 
core element, with units from Spain, Belgium and Luxembourg as national 
contributions to the EUROCORPS is the most prominent example of a permanent 
European multinational military co-operation outside both EU and NATO structures. 
Deployment in the course of an EU crisis-management mission was declared among 
the conceivable aims of its operational uses.48 
In addition to the EUROCORPS, several other initiatives exemplify the variety of 
multinational military force configurations within select groups of EU members 
outside the Union, such as the EUROMARFOR (naval forces bringing together 
France, Italy, Spain, Portugal),49 the European Air Group (Germany, Belgium, Spain, 
France, Italy, the UK)50 and the German-Netherlands First Corps (Germany, the 
Netherlands, the UK)51. 
Besides these instances of military force packages of EU members in small groups 
outside the Union, certain other European formations could also be mentioned as 
combined multinational forces, but without joint headquarters (HQ). The Spanish-
Italian Amphibious Force52 stands out as an illustration of units composed of forces 
from different European countries without multinational command capability. 
The military skills and the capability potential inherent in the abovementioned 
multinational force configurations represent attractive and valuable external 
operational means to be requested for objectives defined and set out on a broader 
political basis within the Union.  
However, “multinational forces” established and maintained by some EU members, 
which could be usefully deployed in operations of the entire Union, are not confined 
to military units and equipment. Another potentially valuable and efficient set of 
capabilities may be provided by constabulary (gendarmerie) forces equally useful in 
military or civilian (police) operations. These forces are available only in some EU 
member states that already set up a framework for possible joint deployment and 
operation of their units.53 Although created and sustained outside the Union, the 
                                               
47 Ibid. 
48 EUROCORPS – A force for the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance, 2009 
(www.eurocorps.org).  
49 http://www.euromarfor.org/euromarfor  
50 http://www.euroairgroup.org  
51 http://www.1gnc.org  
52 http://www.marina.difesa.it/attivita/operativa/Pagine/SIAF.aspx  
53 Treaty between the Kingdom of Spain, the French Republic, the Italian Republic, the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Portuguese Republic, establishing the European 
Gendarmerie Force (EUROGENDFOR), 18 October 2007 (http://www.eurogendfor.org/ 
eurogendfor-library/download-area/official-texts/establishing-the-eurogendfor-treaty).  
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EUROGENDFOR (EGF)54 represents the multinational formation that may be 
mobilised to supply the necessary specific contribution to an EU mission where these 
kinds of skills and operational capacity are required. 
7.4 Beyond ad hoc flexibility: permanent structured co-operation 
7.4.1 PESCO as standing platform for the accommodation of diverse commitments 
and capabilities in CSDP 
In addition to the frequently chosen solution of occasional coalitions, the Lisbon 
Treaty introduced the perspective for consolidation of acting coalitions of ready and 
capable member states into permanent formations of closer co-operation in security 
and defence matters within the Union. The two rounds (in 2004 and in 2007) of 
“constitutional revision” of treaty foundations for political integration in the external 
dimension of the EU presented an opportunity for the definition of an 
institutionalised form for closer and enduring co-operation  in the realm of Common 
Security and Defence Policy.  
The advent of the era of ESDP missions in 2003 understandably directed significant 
attention to the utility and admissibility of possible modalities of enhanced co-operation 
in foreign and security policy actions, even for the purposes of more effective military 
operations. As the most recent evolutionary stage in the introduction of co-operation 
in the military aspects of common security policy among EU MS, the limitations 
placed on this particular dimension of closer and voluntary integration were 
removed. The possibility of deeper and differentiated co-operation finally reached every 
aspect of the CFSP spectrum, eventually including the delicate and complex matter 
of military coordination and integration. The Lisbon Treaty incorporated military 
and defence issues into the body of policy areas open to closer integration in 
accordance with the common objectives and the legal framework of the Union. 
In order to facilitate collective actions on behalf of the EU, the current treaty 
framework expressly encourages member states endowed with suitably advanced 
military capabilities to set up (“shall establish”) standing organisational edifices for 
the coordination of the development and preparation of their military means with a 
view to the “most demanding missions”.55 The relevant provision confers the right 
onto those member states whose “military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and made 
more binding commitments to one another in this area” to create “permanent 
structured co-operation within the Union framework”. The reference to the 
conditions and the foundations – criteria and commitments – of admissible initiatives 
highlights that military co-operation of EU MS is expected to rest on verifiable 
qualities and demonstrated intentions necessary to form standing structures of closer 
defence cooperation.  
The requirements of participation are elaborated in more detail in Protocol No. 10 
attached to the Lisbon Treaty on the applicable template for the possible formation of 
                                               
54 http://www.eurogendfor.org  
55 Article 42(6), TEU.  
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vanguard groups in defence cooperation among select member states.56 This specific 
supplement to the treaty defines the agreeable objectives of closer forms of defence 
and security policy integration. Their scope covers the development of defence 
capabilities through national contributions to, and participation in, the composition 
of multinational forces and the main European armament programmes. The possible 
recourse to the novel avenue for institutionalised differentiation among EU MS with 
diverse military capabilities and commitments was conceived as an instrument to 
facilitate collective preparations for even the most complex tasks of crisis 
management undertakings. Therefore, EU MS participating in a permanent 
structured co-operation (PESCO) were expected to assemble the capacity to furnish 
their respective contributions to formations in the shape and size of battlegroups57 
“either at national level or as a component of multinational force groups” capable of 
the discharge of any kind of engagement within the agreed range of conceivable 
CSDP missions. (Originally, potential participants should have reached completion 
by 2010.58) Even if a battlegroup is defined in the Protocol as the preferred and 
suggested template for the possible formation of “targeted combat units” within a 
standing and institutionalised closer military cooperation of some member states, the 
creation of a battlegroup may imply, but in itself does not necessarily amount to the 
establishment of permanent structured cooperation in CSDP. Any sustained form of 
combined military capabilities of EU members, either at battlegroup or a different 
level, could qualify as PESCO only if it “fulfils higher criteria” and the participants 
make “binding commitments to one another” in order to generate joint capabilities to 
meet the needs of “most demanding missions”.59  
These concrete commitments enshrined in the institutionalised and purposefully 
developed bonds of a permanent structured cooperation can be expected to provide 
a standing framework and prepared formation that the participating member states 
are more likely to deploy than formations (of the same size and declared purpose), 
which exist mainly in concept with announced but never really integrated joint 
capabilities. The French military intervention in the escalating security crisis of Mali 
in January 2013 demonstrated the limited use of an EU battlegroup in times of rapid 
response60 even if it stands ready (the French-German-Polish, “Weimar” battlegroup 
                                               
56 Protocol (No. 10) on permanent structured co-operation established by Article 42 of the 
Treaty on European Union. 
57 Battlegroups are multinational formations which could be formed by an EU framework 
nation or by a multinational coalition of member states. Interoperability and military 
effectiveness are the main expected benefits of these force packages organized in the size of a 
battalion and reinforced with combat-support and combat service elements. Generally, 
battlegroups are about 1 500 personnel strong. EU Battlegroups, Factsheet, April 2013. 
58 Article 1, Protocol on permanent structured co-operation. 
59 Willem F. van Eekelen and Sebastian Kurpas, “The evolution of flexible integration in 
European Defence Policy: is permanent structured cooperation a leap forward for the 
Common Security and Defence Policy?”, CEPS Working Document No. 296, Centre for 
European Policy Studies, Brussels, June 2008, p. 8. 
60 Andrew Rettman, “French colonel: France better off alone in Mali”, EUObserver.com, 25 
January 2013 (http://euobserver.com/defence/118858).  
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was activated on 1 January 201361) in principle but without the structures, capacity 
and preparation to be deployed as a multinational contingent for the most 
demanding tasks of conceivable CSDP missions. 
In order to collectively achieve the necessary level of capabilities and organisation 
matching even those challenging objectives, EU members intent on participating in 
PESCO must undertake to: 
 co-ordinate their defence expenditure on equipment 
 harmonise the identification of their military needs by pooling and/or 
specialising their defence means and capabilities 
 take concrete measures to enhance the availability, interoperability, flexibility and 
deployability of  their forces 
 ensure to correct the shortfalls of previous capability development programmes 
 take part in major joint or European equipment programmes in the framework of 
the European Defence Agency.62   
The conditions for participation are also defined by the criteria contained in the 
Protocol. The procedures for the commencement and suspension of participation in a 
“standing defence co-operative” are laid down in details in the relevant treaty 
provisions. The elaboration of objective requirements and expectations towards 
potential partners in closer military collaboration was meant to mitigate the concerns 
about the arbitrary rejection of smaller states or late-comers from permanent and 
institutionalised co-operation. Participation in extensive and durable “defence policy 
joint ventures” is predicated upon the acquisition of certain military capabilities 
identified as necessary tools of complex security engagements. The conditionality of 
active involvement is determined in terms of actual commitments and palpable 
achievements instead of rhetorical association with declared aspirations and its 
subjective assessment by other participants.  
7.4.2 The significance of PESCO as an institutionalised solution for defence policy 
differentiation within the Union 
Prior to the latest revision of the TEU, the evolution of enhanced co-operation 
stopped short of the politically most delicate, but indispensable military aspects of 
CFSP. The applicable solution for the accommodation of divergent defence policy 
preferences, means and ambitions eventually was laid out in the introduction of a 
specific version of enhanced cooperation designed for CSDP. The eventual 
incorporation of the Common Security and Defence Policy into the spheres of closer 
co-operative configurations – based on capacities and binding pledges – reflected the 
shared position of EU members already agreed at the “constitutional moment” in 
                                               
61 Chairman EUMC’s visit to Poland, 21-23 November 2012, EUMC Activities 
(http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/csdp-structures-and-
instruments/eu-military-committee-%28eumc%29/chairman-eumc/eumc-activities/eumc-
24-november-2012).  
62 Article 2, Protocol on permanent structured co-operation. 
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2004. Maintained and confirmed in 2007 at Lisbon, the outstanding limitation on the 
possible creation of vanguard groups of EU countries even in the realm of military 
affairs was removed in order to open an avenue for closer and sustained 
collaboration in defence matters inside the Union.  
The latest comprehensive revision of the treaty foundations of CFSP brought closer 
cooperation in military policies and defence programmes of EU members into the 
range of functional associations for specific common policy purposes within the 
European Union. To this end, the Lisbon Treaty rendered the possibility for 
voluntary focused and increased coordination in security and defence issues into 
another accepted “domestic matter” for the Union as a whole. The insertion of the 
prospect for permanent security and defence structures not shared by all members, 
but kept “within the Union framework” marked the ultimate stage in the evolution 
of flexibility and enhanced co-operation within CFSP. The extension of closer and 
differentiated co-operation in a specific format to the realm of military affairs 
signalled the completion of the gradual acceptance of more advanced integration by 
smaller groups of MS in all areas of EU foreign and security policy. 
The adopted treaty provisions underlined the recognition of the need for modalities 
to accommodate inevitable differences and accept flexibility as the modus operandi 
of effective mobilisation and engagement of capable and willing member states even 
in the external security functions of the Union. With the insertion of PESCO into the 
legal fabric of CFSP, closer cooperation, even on military issues through composite 
clusters of EU MS within the juridical framework of the Union, earned general 
recognition and institutionalisation as an applicable design for the accommodation of 
differences among member states across the full range of policy areas. 
7.5 Concluding remarks 
The legal contours of the operational capacity of the Union within its CFSP 
dimension in the treaty provide some useful space for the accommodation of 
divergent interests and uneven motivations among member states in the adoption of 
CSDP decisions and their implementation. Even if unanimity prevails in CSDP 
decision-making, the inherent possibility of constructive abstention sustains a 
narrow, but nevertheless available path to circumvent the pitfall of a missing full 
accord on the way to an emerging consensus with regard to a deliberated EU action. 
The formal declaration of distance from the majority position could carry practical 
significance for member states because their express dissociation from an adopted 
CSDP decision exonerates them from practical and financial contributions to the 
resulting measures.  
Abstention (with or without express statement) instead of obstruction offers a 
cooperative and flexible solution in the face of disagreements during CFSP decision-
making, as long as the divergent positions of member states can be maintained and 
national interests preserved without the need to halt an entire process. Since recourse 
to constructive abstention in any CSDP decision has not yet been revealed, it remains 
only a possibility prepared in the treaty as an instrument of facilitation to be 
deployed in case of reconcilable differences. 
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Similar to abstention as a flexible mode of operation to accommodate differences in 
decision-making, the recently introduced modality of permanent structured 
cooperation as a standing framework still has to prove its worth in practice. 
Although not tested so far, the extension of the possibility of enhanced cooperation 
into CSDP, previously excluded from deeper and closer integration within the legal 
and institutional parameters of the Union, opened a potentially and conceptually 
significant area for differentiated integration within the realm of CFSP. 
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8. MUCH ADO ABOUT OPT-OUTS? THE IMPACT OF 
VARIABLE GEOMETRY IN THE AFSJ ON THE EU AS 
A GLOBAL SECURITY ACTOR 
CLAUDIO MATERA 
8.1 Introduction 
The development of the EU as an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) has 
always been characterised by differentiation and, since the Lisbon Treaty, the AFSJ 
comprises two main models of ‘variable geometry’. While the model chosen by the 
UK and Ireland differs formally from that in Denmark, the result is the same: the 
three countries abstain from the policies that make up the AFSJ by way of opt-out. 
The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 has solidified the position of 
Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom in relation to their non-participation to 
AFSJ initiatives.1 The relationship of these three countries to the AFSJ is thus 
characterised by a complex system of rules contained in four different protocols that 
have expanded the scope of differentiation, but have failed to clarify the substantive 
and procedural effects of the opt-out regimes.2 The current status of the opt-out 
regimes thus leaves unanswered questions of coherence, consistency and 
compatibility between national prerogatives and EU integration. These questions are 
particularly sensitive because of the impact that AFSJ measures may have on human 
rights. Yet, while variable geometry within the AFSJ has posed constitutional3 and 
substantive questions,4 the impact of variable geometry has not been detrimental to 
the substantive development of the AFSJ as a whole: the AFSJ is the first objective 
mentioned in Article 3 (2) TEU and its development is marked by the adoption of 
ambitious legislative plans. 
                                               
 Researcher in EU Law, Asser Institute (The Hague) and Lecturer, University of Twente. 
1 On this topic, but with a focus on EU-US relations, see the contribution by Santos Vara and 
Fahey to this volume. 
2 S. Peers, “In a world of their own? Justice and Home Affairs Opt-Outs and the Treaty of 
Lisbon”, Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies, Vol. 10, pp. 383-412. 
3 For an analysis of differentiated integration in relation to variable geometry in relation to 
the AFSJ, see C. Billet, “Cohérence et Differentiation dans le Cadre de l’Espace de Liberté, 
Securité et de Justice”, Revue du Marché Commun et de l’Union Européenne, No. 523, 2008, pp. 
680-684 and S. Peers, EU Justice and Home Affairs Law, 3rd ed., Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2011, pp. 136 ff. 
4 Suffice here to remind two cases decided by the Court of Justice in relation to the UK opt-
out regime: C-77/05 UK v Council ECR 2007 p. I-11459 and C-482/08, ECR 2010 p. I-10413. 
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Parallel to the internal developments concerning the EU as an AFSJ and its rules on 
variable geometry, the EU has also developed an external dimension to the AFSJ. 
While the exact definition of this development has not yet been agreed upon, it can 
be said that this type of external action emerged as a corollary to internal AFSJ 
developments.5 For instance, the doctrine on the parallelism of competences now 
codified in Article 216(1) TFEU explains the conclusion by the EU of Mutual Legal 
Assistance Agreements (MLA) as well as extradition agreements as a corollary to 
internal measures on judicial cooperation in criminal matters. However, the external 
dimension of the AFSJ goes beyond mere parallelism and presents a plurality of links 
with external action so as to cover the whole spectrum of EU external relations 
instruments; and indeed the latter aspect emerges from the relevant policy 
documents adopted by EU institutions such as the European Security Strategy6 and 
the Stockholm Progamme.7 Indeed, if one had to identify two characteristics of the 
AFSJ after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, these could be the consolidation 
of variable geometry on the one side and the growing emphasis on external relations 
on the other.  
The extent to which the regional and global security ambitions of the EU can be 
reconciled with the legal constraints affecting the AFSJ from institutional and 
substantial perspectives is open to question, however.8 While others have addressed 
the institutional aspects of combining variable geometry with external action in 
detail,9 this paper will consider the extent to which the global AFSJ ambitions of the 
                                               
5 For the debate concerning the definition of the external dimension of the AFSJ, see, inter 
alia, M. Cremona, “EU External Action in the JHA Domain. A Legal Perspective”, in M. 
Cremona, J. Monar and S. Poli (eds), The External Dimension of the European Union’s Area of 
Freedom Security and Justice, Brussels: Peter Lang, 2011, pp. 77-115; R.A. Wessel, L. Marin and 
C. Matera, “The External Dimension of the EU’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice”, in C. 
Eckes and T. Konstadinides (eds), Crime within the Area of Freedom, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2011, pp. 272-300; J. Monar, “The EU’s growing external role in the AFSJ domain: 
factors, framework and forms of action”, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 2013, pp. 1-
20; and J. Monar, The External Dimension of the EU’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. 
Progress, potential and limitations after the Treaty of Lisbon, SIEPS, 2012 
(http://www.sieps.se/en/category/f%C3%B6rfattare-redakt%C3%B6rer/ 
monar-j%C3%B6rg). 
6 A secure Europe in a better World. European Security Strategy, 12 December 2003 
(www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf). 
7 The Stockholm Programme – An Open and Secure Europe Serving and Protecting Citizens, 
in OJ C 115/1, 4.5.2010. 
8 The constitutional challenges that the EU as a global security actor in the fields of the AFSJ 
must face are many; see P. van Elsuwege, “EU External Action After the Collapse of the 
Pillar Structure: In Search of a New balance Between Delimitation and Consistency”, 
Common Market Law Review, Vol. 47, pp. 987-1019 and C. Matera, “The European Union Area 
of Freedom, Security and Justice and the Fight Against New Security threats. New trends 
and old Constitutional Challenges”, in M. Arcari and L. Balmond (eds), La Gouvernance 
globale face aux défis de la securité collective- Global Governance and the Challenges of Collective 
Security, Napoli : Editoriale Scientifica, 2012, pp. 69-87. 
9 P. Garcia Andrade, “La Geometría variable y la dimensión exterior del espacio de libertad, 
seguridad y justicia, in justicia”, in J. Martín y Pérez de Nanclares (ed.), La dimensión exterior 
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EU can be reconciled with the Area’s variable geometry. This paper is structured in 
the following manner: section ii) discusses the external implication of variable 
geometry for the AFSJ and section iii) looks at the role that the AFSJ is expected to 
play in the fight against security threats. In this way the first two sections should 
build the framework for the subsequent part of the paper. Sections iv) and v) will 
bring together the discussions on the external AFSJ and variable geometry by 
mapping-out the ways in which the external dimension of the AFSJ and variable 
geometry coexist. Thus, section iv) analyses the impact of variable geometry on the 
conclusion of AFSJ-based agreements while section v) looks at the impact of variable 
geometry on the use of AFSJ clauses and elements in other external instruments. The 
final part of the paper assesses the findings and the different sections to draw some 
conclusions. 
8.2 The external implications of variable geometry within the AFSJ 
The development of the EU as an Area of Freedom Security and Justice (AFSJ) has 
always been characterised by fragmentation and differentiation. AFSJ differentiation 
‘avant la lettre’ took place at the time of adopting the Schengen convention in 1985. 
The system setting up common rules on external border checks as well as the 
abolishment of internal border controls was developed by some member states 
outside the framework of the EEC treaty; thus leaving behind the other members of 
the Community.10 With the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty, differentiation 
in relation to the policies now belonging to the AFSJ came with the very introduction 
of the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) pillar under the TEU treaty and, as a 
consequence of this, belonged to a separate governance method but under a common 
institutional framework.11   
The subsequent entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty brought divergent 
elements in this respect: while some of the policies falling within the AFSJ were 
finally communitarised – thus ending differentiation from a governance perspective; 
the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty also brought differentiation in relation 
to the territorial applicability of AFSJ law. In relation to the latter issue, the 
Amsterdam Treaty meant in the first place that the division between Schengen 
members and non-Schengen members became an internal differentiation for the EU 
legal system12 and, secondly, it also introduced the op-out regime of Denmark in 
relation to non-Schengen policies such as judicial cooperation in civil matters, thus 
representing the country’s opposition to the supranational method. In relation to the 
former issue, the outcome of Amsterdam was more nuanced: while some policies 
                                                                                                                                                   
del espacio de libertad, seguridad y justicia de la Unión Europea, Madrid: Iustel, 2012, pp. 85-120 
and G. Vernimmen-Van Tiggelen, “Exercice et conséquences des ‘opt-outs’”, in M. Dony 
(ed.), L’Espace de liberté, sécurité et justice dans les accords extérieures de l’Union Europeenne, 
Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 2012, pp. 223-251. 
10 For an institutional and substantive analysis see Peers, op. cit., note 3, pp. 136 ff. 
11 See Articles A and C of the Treaty on European Union, OJ C 191, 290 July 1992. 
12 See E. Wagner, “The integration of Schengen into the framework of the European Union”, 
Legal Issues of Economic integration, Vol. 25, No. 2, pp. 1-60. 
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were brought under the realm of the EC Treaty, this translation came with a number 
of rules that sought to preserve some intergovernmental features, either by means of 
temporal regimes or by the use of the unanimity rule.13 All in all, it is at this moment 
in time that differentiation within the AFSJ became synonymous with the positions 
of Denmark, Ireland and the UK; this is because while the AFSJ is confronted with a 
number of institutional settings that can be considered elements of differentiation, 
such as the participation in the Schengen system of three countries that are not EU 
member states, only the position of Denmark, Ireland and the UK constitute 
examples of variable geometry in the sense of structural derogations established by 
the treaties, pertaining to certain policies and for an indeterminate period of time.14 
As noted above and elsewhere more in detail,15 the first and main innovation that the 
Lisbon Treaty brought about is the extension of the opt-out regimes to cover to cover 
the whole of the AFSJ, i.e. including police and criminal law. In this perspective the 
assumption that the main factor leading to differentiation is the supranational 
method of governance seems to be reinforced. However, while this innovation could 
have brought clarity and uniformity to the relationships between policies, measures 
and non-participation, the implications of the opt-out regimes remain problematic 
and difficult to interpret. Thus, while in essence the three member states in question 
do not participate in the AFSJ, the reality is more nuanced and fragmented and the 
regulation of these member states’ participation in the AFSJ is to be found in four 
distinct protocols: Protocol No. 19 on the Schengen acquis; Protocol No. 20 on the 
relationship between the common travel area of Ireland and the UK and their right to 
conduct border checks; Protocol No. 21 on the position of Ireland and the UK in 
respect of the AFSJ and, lastly, Protocol No. 22 on the position of Denmark in respect 
of the AFSJ. This part of the paper will give a brief account of the main features of the 
opt-out regimes to pinpoint the external repercussions that these may have. It does 
not aim to provide a sound analysis of the variable geometry within the AFSJ.16 
Protocol 19 to the treaties contains the rules pertaining to the integration of the 
Schengen acquis in the framework of the EU. Articles 3 and 4 of this Protocol govern 
the relationship between the Schengen acquis and Denmark, Ireland and the UK. 
However, while Article 3 on Denmark refers to the discipline contained in the ad hoc 
                                               
13 Moreover, restrictions also occurred in relation to some specific powers of the 
Commission, the COREPER and the ECJ. For an analysis, H. Labayle, “Un espace de libérté, 
sécurité et de justice”, Revue trimestrielle de droit européen, Vol. 33, No. 4, 1997, pp. 151 ff and 
Peers, op.  cit., note 3, pp. 73 ff. 
14 For an overview of the different acceptations of variable geometry/differentiation, see B. 
de Witte, D. Hanf and E. Vos (eds), The Many Faces of Differentiation in EU Law, Antwerp: 
Intersentia, 2001; in relation to the AFSJ, see B. Martenczuk, “Variable geometry and the 
External Relations of the EU: The Experience of Justice and Home Affairs”, in B. Martenczuk 
and S. van Thiel (eds), Justice, Liberty, Security : New Challenges for EU External Relations, 
Brussels: VUB Press, 2008, pp. 465 ff and Vernimmen-Van Tiggelen, op. cit., note 9, pp. 223-
251. 
15 See Peers, op. cit., note 3. 
16 For an in-depth analysis of the UK and Irish regimes, see the contribution by Santos Vara 
and Fahey to this volume. 
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Danish protocol, Articles 4 and 5 contain the discipline in relation to the UK and 
Ireland. Article 4 of Protocol 19 on the Schengen acquis maintains the opportunity for 
the UK and Ireland to take part in some, or all, of the measures of the Schengen 
acquis. In this respect, the position of the two countries was clarified with the 
adoption of two decisions by the Council: the first in relation to the UK in 2000 and 
the second in relation to Ireland in 2002.17 Article 5, for its part, deals with the 
participation of the two countries in measures building upon the Schengen acquis and 
in this respect this provision contains the thorny paragraph that allows any of the 
two countries in question to step back, i.e. opt-out from the acquis they had 
previously adhered to. 
In relation to the other policies falling within the AFSJ, the position of Ireland and the 
UK is regulated in Protocol 21. Here, Article 3 regulates the participation of the two 
countries to the adoption or the simple ‘accession’ to measures of the AFSJ, i.e. the 
right to opt in. Moreover, as in the case of the Schengen Protocol, the two countries in 
question are given the right to choose whether they wish to participate in the 
amendments of existing measures by which they are bound. Thus, in case one of the 
two member states wishes to opt out; a procedure has been created to ensure legal 
consistency within the EU legal order. Finally, whereas Ireland is given the faculty to 
abandon the protocol system and join the other member states, the protocol does not 
envisage such a faculty for the UK; moreover, according to Article 9 of Protocol 21 on 
the AFSJ, the opt-out/opt-in regime does not apply to Ireland in relation to counter-
terrorism measures based on Article 75, TFEU. Thus, Ireland takes full part in the 
adoption and execution of administrative measures (smart sanctions system) that are 
not linked to CFSP, whereas the UK has obtained the right to choose whether to do 
so under the general opt-in/opt-out regime created by the protocol.18 As a result, and 
in light of the Judgment of the Court of Justice in Parliament v. Council C-130/10,19 
in the area of countering terrorism through administrative measures, such as freezing 
capital and other types of smart sanctions, Article 215, TFEU will apply for sanctions 
founded upon a CFSP measure and will have all the member states participating. 
Measures based on Article 75, TFEU, however, will be adopted by all the member 
states minus the United Kingdom (but with an option to opt in) and Denmark. 
Lastly, Article 10 of Protocol No. 36 on temporary measures confers to the UK the 
faculty to opt out from the whole AFSJ acquis. This provision has the purpose of 
allowing the UK to withdraw from changes regarding the jurisdiction of the Court of 
Justice and the powers of the Commission in relation to acts of the AFSJ adopted 
prior to the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. In this respect, should such faculty 
be exercised20 by the UK, this could be understood as to apply not only to internal 
                                               
17 Council Decision 2000/365/EC OJ L 131, p. 43 and Council Decision 2002/192/EC OJ L 64, 
p. 20. 
18 See in this respect Declaration No. 65 on Article 75 TFEU made by the UK.  
19 Judgment 12.07.2012 in case C-130/10 Parliament v. Council, not yet reported. 
20 The UK has until June 2014 to decide. At the time of writing UK representatives have 
confirmed the intention to make use of this faculty, but the list of measures that would then 
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measures such as Framework Decisions, but also to agreements concluded before the 
entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, such as the MLA agreement with the USA. This 
is because the provision in question in Protocol 36 speaks of ‘acts’ so as to include, 
presumably, any act adopted before the Lisbon Treaty and founded upon any AFSJ 
legal basis. 
The position of Denmark is regulated in Protocol No 22. Since the entry into force of 
the Lisbon Treaty Denmark enjoys a general opt-out from Justice and Home Affairs 
law. However, contrary to the positions of Ireland and the UK, Denmark does not 
have an opt-in right, except in relation to measures building upon the Schengen 
acquis. Thus, in the latter case Denmark can decide within six months since adoption 
on measures building upon the Schengen acquis to implement unilaterally the EU 
measure in its national law. Moreover, Article 2a of the Protocol on Denmark affirms 
that Denmark is not bound by EU rules on processing and sharing personal data 
collected and shared in relation to Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal 
Affairs. Furthermore, by making reference to Articles 26(1), 42 and 43-46, TEU the 
Danish protocol affirms in Article 5 that Denmark does not participate in the 
elaboration and implementation of decisions and actions of the Union that have 
defence implications. Contrary to the positions of Ireland and the UK, Denmark does 
not take part in measures adopted under Article 75, TFEU, but does so in relation to 
Article 215, TFEU. 
A common trait of the different protocols containing the rules on the AFSJ’s opt-outs 
is the wording chosen to assert the actual opt-out. 21 The different provisions affirm:  
[N]one of the provisions of Title V of Part Three of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union, no measure adopted pursuant to that Title, no provision of 
any international agreement concluded by the Union pursuant to that Title, and no 
decision of the Court of Justice interpreting any such provision or measure shall be 
binding upon or applicable in the [United Kingdom / Ireland/ Denmark]; and no 
such provision, measure or decision shall in any way affect the competences, rights 
and obligations of those States; and no such provision, measure or decision shall in 
any way affect the Community or Union acquis nor form part of Union law as they 
apply to the [United Kingdom / Ireland/ Denmark].22 
Therefore, each protocol expressly includes in the opt-out international agreements 
concluded on the basis of a provision contained in Title V Part Three TFEU. As a 
consequence, the protocols could be understood to cover only external action in the 
AFSJ field and do not mention any other type of external action instrument. Thus, 
because of this silence one might wonder about the real scope of the opt-outs in 
relation to the external dimension of the AFSJ: should the opt-outs cover any clause 
(no matter how broadly phrased) of any agreement that is related to a policy of the 
AFSJ? Moreover, while this issue poses the question of the extent to which the three 
member states can benefit from their opt-out in the context of external relations, the 
                                                                                                                                                   
be ‘re-acceded to’ is still not known. However, international agreements pertaining to the 
AFSJ have not been the object of specific declarations yet (http://euobserver.com/ 
justice/120810). 
21 Article 2 of Protocol 22 on Denmark and Article 2 of Protocol 21 on the Ireland and the UK. 
22 Article 2 Protocol No 21 and similarly, Article 2 Protocol 22. 
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situation in relation to Ireland and the UK poses more questions. Indeed, because 
these countries have also obtained the right to opt in, one might wonder how the 
opting-in could work concretely in relation to external relations instruments. 
From a material perspective, the opt-in possibilities for the UK and Ireland cover 
internal and external police cooperation, judicial cooperation in criminal matters and 
judicial cooperation in civil matters, as well as migration policies and asylum. In 
relation to border controls, the position of the UK and Ireland has to be read in the 
light of the judgments delivered by the Court of Justice in the Frontex and Visa 
Information System (VIS) cases,23 in which the court indicated how to distinguish 
measures that constitute a development of Schengen and measures that do not 
constitute a development of Schengen. This is relevant because the UK and Ireland 
can opt in to a measure (including international agreements) that constitutes a 
development of the Schengen acquis only if the two countries already participate in 
the relevant pre-existing internal measure(s).24 An immediate consequence of this is 
that Ireland and the UK do not take part in any visa-related agreement such as visa-
facilitation agreements and visa-waiver agreements; whereas Denmark, in spite of its 
participation in the Schengen system has adhered only to minor instruments such as 
visa-waiver agreements for holders of diplomatic passports25 and maintains its 
independent approach to visa-related agreements. 
From a procedural perspective, Article 3(1) of Protocol 21 affirms that the opt-in 
declaration from either the UK or Ireland must be made within three months since 
the day on which a legislative proposal has been presented within the Council; 
moreover Article 4 of Protocol 21 affirms that Ireland and the UK can “any time after 
the adoption (…) notify the intention to accept a measure”. However, the opt-in 
mechanisms valid internally cannot be applied sic et simpliciter in relation to 
international agreements. For instance, even though the procedure for the conclusion 
of international agreements codified in Article 218 TFEU is composed of three main 
steps,26 reasons of legal certainty and public international law should not allow the 
two member states to manifest their intention to opt in at the moment of the 
conclusion without expressing their interest at the time of the opening of 
negotiations. Conversely, the two member states should not be able to withdraw 
from the ‘opt-in’ after the conclusion of the agreement. Moreover, reasons of legal 
certainty and good faith run against the interpretation provided by the British 
government and according to which, because of the distinct function of the three 
steps of Article 218 TFEU, the intention to participate can be manifested at any of the 
three stages, and with the last being ‘the binding one’.27 Although there is no 
                                               
23 Op. cit., note 4. 
24 For an in-depth analysis, see Garcia Andrade, op. cit., note 9, p. 100 et seq. and 
Vernimmen-Van Tiggelen, op. cit., note 9. 
25 See, for instance, the Agreement with Brazil on short-stay visa waiver for holders of 
diplomatic, service or official passports OJ 12.03.2011 L 66, p. 21. 
26 Opening of negotiations and definition of the mandate; decision authorising the signature 
of the agreement; decision concluding the agreement. 
27 The UK government however, thinks otherwise: “The UK notifies the Council of its opt-in 
to JHA elements of certain third country agreements (i.e. agreements between the EU and 
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consistent praxis on the matter28 it seems preferable to interpret the opt-in right of 
Ireland and the UK as having to be manifested at the time of the opening of the 
negotiation and definition of the mandate (so as to clarify the territorial application 
of the agreement ab initio) and subsequently confirmed (at the moment of signature). 
The observations of the previous paragraphs reflect the complexity of the regimes of 
variable geometry present in the AFSJ; and the complexities pertain not only to 
material aspects of the AFSJ, but also to procedural ones. While the external 
dimension of the AFSJ is almost absent from the different AFSJ protocols, it emerges 
nonetheless that there may be difficulties for the EU in preparing and conducting 
negotiations for agreements with third countries because the ambitions of the EU will 
have to be balanced with the intentions of the two countries benefiting from the opt-
in regime. Yet, recent examples in which the EU has managed to find procedural 
solutions respectful of the third countries involved as well as of the member states 
benefiting from differentiation exist:  for instance, the readmission agreement with 
Georgia29 contains a provision that allows the subsequent opt-in by Ireland and 
extends the agreement to Irish-Georgian relations by the means of a unilateral 
declaration that the EU would send to Georgian authorities.30 
All in all, while recent developments suggest that the material and procedural 
hurdles associated with variable geometry in the AFSJ can be overtaken by 
coordination in the spirit of the loyal cooperation principle,31 the effects of variable 
geometry may nonetheless hinder the global approach that the EU has chosen to 
fight transnational security threats. This is because even though the policy objective 
of enhancing security within the EU calls for the admixture of AFSJ elements into all 
the instruments available to the external action of the Union, variable geometry 
requires the EU to act on a case-by-case approach so as to accommodate all the 
different instances of the three member states benefiting from derogations. The next 
section will attempt to clarify the scope of the external dimension of the AFSJ and the 
role of the EU as a global security actor. 
8.3 The external dimension of the AFSJ as a tool to address new security 
threats 
Since the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty and the conclusions of the 
Tampere summit in 1999, the external dimension of the AFSJ has considerably 
                                                                                                                                                   
another non-EU country such as Korea). (…)For the purposes of this report such agreements 
are counted as a single opt-in decision, with the final decision on UK participation in such 
agreements being the one which counts toward the total”; from “Report to Parliament on the 
Application of Protocols 19 and 21” (http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/ 
cm80/8000/8000.pdf). 
28 For an analysis, see Martenczuk, op. cit., note 14, pp. 515-516 and Garcia Andrade, op. cit., 
note 9, pp. 108-111. 
29 Agreement between the European Union and Georgia on the readmission of persons 
residing without authorisation, OJ L 52 25.2.2011. 
30 Ibid., Articles 21(2) and 23(3). 
31 See the contribution by Herlin-Karnell and Konstadinides to this volume. 
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developed and, as recently observed, amounts to 19% of AFSJ output.32 The plurality 
of policies composing the AFSJ and the wording of most AFSJ provisions do not 
appear, prima facie, as vehicles for external action. Indeed, as has been observed 
elsewhere,33 the AFSJ is primarily concerned with the establishment and 
development of bridges, links and instruments to promote intra-EU cooperation for 
the purpose of developing and guaranteeing, parallel to the internal market, 
freedom, security and justice to EU citizens. In this respect, the external dimension of 
the AFSJ emerged as a corollary to internal objectives and measures and, as a 
consequence, has been developed by making use of the implied powers doctrine of 
the ERTA34 judgment, now codified in Article 216 (1) TFEU. On top of this, Title V 
Part III TFEU also contains a couple of provisions that confer an express external 
competence to the EU in the fields of partnership and cooperation agreements in 
relation to extraterritorial management of asylum applications (78(2)(g) TFEU) and 
on the conclusion of readmission agreements (article 79 (3) TFEU). In both cases not 
only the EU is conferred an express competence to conclude agreements, but the very 
conclusion of the envisaged instruments appears as the necessary (and only) means 
to attain the objective envisaged by the treaty provisions. However, the two 
provisions constitute an exception within Title V Pat III TFEU and do not explain or 
justify the growing importance of the AFSJ in the external relations of the Union. 
As has been argued in this contribution and more in detail elsewhere,35 the external 
dimension of the AFSJ results from the combination of ‘driving factors’36 with the 
existence of ‘internal enabling tools’.37 In this perspective the external dimension of 
the AFSJ has emerged as a reaction to external challenges38 that triggered the use of 
the EU’s implied powers in order to allow the EU to respond to its the security 
threats.39 Yet, the context in which the external dimension of the AFSJ has been 
developed is broader than the traditional ‘justice and home affairs’ perspective that, 
prima facie, one would assign to it. Indeed, it has been observed elsewhere40 that the 
security parcel embedded within the AFSJ is to be understood as belonging to the 
broader context of the European Security Strategy (ESS).41 Since 2003 and the 
                                               
32 J. Monar, “The EU’s Growing external role in the AFSJ domain: factors, framework and 
forms of action”, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 2013, p. 1.  
33 Among others Wessel, Marin and Matera, op. cit., note 5. 
34 Case 22/70 Commission v. Council (ERTA) [1971] ECR 263. 
35 See Wessel, Marin and Matera, op. cit., note 5 and J. Monar, “The EU’s Growing external 
role in the AFSJ domain: factors, framework and forms of action”, Cambridge Review of 
International Affairs, 2013, p. 1. 
36 See Monar, Ibid, p. 2. 
37 Idem. 
38 On this point see Wessel, Marin and Matera, op. cit., note 5, pp. 276-278. 
39 Idem. 
40 See Matera, op. cit., note 8, pp. 69-87. 
41 In relation to the inter-linkages between different policies in relation to the security of the 
EU, see F. Longo, “Justice and Home Affairs as a New Dimension of the European Security 
Concept”, European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 18, No. 1, 2013, pp. 29-46, as well as the 
special issue of the European Foreign Affairs Review, Issue 2/1, 2012. From a legal perspective, 
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adoption of the ESS42 the EU has emphasised how security threats have shifted from 
a traditionally military paradigm to a new one, in which factors such as 
(transnational) organised crime, terrorism and other humanitarian crises should also 
be considered as security threats. 
Since the adoption of the ESS the EU has promoted a holistic43 understanding of 
security that requires that the use of “[all] powers available to the Union, including 
external relations, should be used in an integrated way”44 so as to develop a single 
external policy in relation to the security of the Union. Thus, because of this shift in 
the notion of security threat, also the external dimension of the AFSJ is considered to 
be a vehicle to promote the fight against new security threats beyond the borders of 
the EU. As an example of the widening scope the external dimension of the AFSJ, 
suffice here to remember the emphasis placed on the relation between the AFSJ and 
the CSDP of the EU crystallised in the Stockholm Programme45 first, and second in a 
policy paper of 2011.46  
All in all, it follows from the foregoing that the external dimension of the AFSJ has 
two main components: the first is immediately linked to the internal establishment of 
the AFJS such as in the case of readmission agreements; the second is linked to the 
new notion of security threats as developed in the ESS47 and in this respect the 
provisions contained in Title V TFEU constitute only one element of a broader policy 
horizon that requires the use or the combination of a plurality of external action 
tools. Indeed, since the adoption of the Tampere conclusions in 1999 the scope of the 
external dimension of the AFSJ has been developed together with the evolution of 
other EU external policies and in the light of global events such as 9/11. Other than 
the CSDP nexus mentioned in the previous paragraph, there are other examples that 
testify to this expansion of the AFSJ into other external policies. One example could 
be the nexus with the CFSP in the context of the fight against international terrorism 
and in relation to the transatlantic relations of the Union with the USA: here the EU 
acts on the basis of an agreed global strategy to fight against a global security threat 
                                                                                                                                                   
see M. Cremona et al. (eds) (2011), The External Dimension of the European Union’s Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice, College of Europe Studies, Brussels: P.I.E. Peter Lang. 
42 A secure Europe in a better World. European Security Strategy, 12 December 2003. 
43 F. Longo, “Justice and Home Affairs as a New Dimension of the European Security 
Concept”, European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 18, No. 1, 2013, pp. 29-46. 
44 The Hague Programme: Strengthening freedom, security and justice in the European 
Union, 13.12.2004, Council Document 1605/04, p. 33. 
45 Op. cit., note 7. 
46 Joint Staff Working Paper, Strengthening Ties between CSDP and AFSJ Actors. Proposals 
for a Way Ahead, Sec (2011) 560 final, 05 May 2011. Infra, section V) ii) 
47 But also in other policy documents of other International Organisations such as In Larger 
Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All, Report of the 
Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/59/2005, 21 March 2005; for a commentary of the UN 
document, see D. Fischer (ed.), United Nations Reform and the New Collective Security, 
Cambridge, 2010. 
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that has triggered a number of controversies such as the PNR and SWIFT affairs.48 
Parallel to this, the external dimension of the AFSJ has been predominantly attached 
to the neighbouring policies of the EU: that is to say pre-accession mechanisms and 
the European Neighbourhood Policy. In this respect, suffice here to mention recent 
policy documents that aim to strengthen this dimension of the external AFSJ such as 
the “EU–Russia Cooperation in Criminal Matters” of October 201249 or the 
Communication by the Commission “On Cooperation in the Area of Justice and 
Home Affairs within the Eastern partnership” of September 2011.50 
The search for unity in the external action of the EU to attain its security objectives 
must be looked at while taking into account the constitutional complexities and 
hurdles that affect the external action of the EU.51 The main challenge for the AFSJ in 
this respect is represented by the choice of the proper legal basis; an issue linked to 
questions of distribution of competences between treaties (TEU/TFEU) and between 
policies (AFSJ legal basis or Association Agreement pursuant to Article 217 TEFU). 
While the criteria that should guide the choice are known52 and potentially allow the 
use of multiple legal bases,53 this is impossible when the procedural rules are 
absolutely incompatible: which could occur, for instance, in relation to the 
TEU/TFEU dichotomy.54 On top of these issues comes variable geometry. To what 
extent does or could variable geometry affect the international projection of the 
AFSJ? This largely depends on how we interpret the scope of the opt-out regimes in 
relation to external action, but it also depends on how we interpret the relationship 
between the AFSJ and the panoply of instruments at the disposal of the EU to carry 
out its external relations. In the following sections, the different dimensions of the 
external AFSJ will be taken into consideration in order to evaluate the impact of 
variable geometry on them. 
                                               
48 For an analysis of the EU–US relations in the fields of the AFSJ, see the contribution by 
Santos Vara and Fahey to this volume; for an appraisal of the EU policy on counter-
terrorism, see C. Eckes, “The legal framework of the European Union’s counter-terrorism 
policies: full of good intentions?”, in C. Eckes and T. Konstadinides (eds), Crime within the 
Area of Freedom, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, pp. 127-158. 
49 Council Doc 14316/1/12 of 3.10.2012. 
50 COM (2011) 564 final, 26.9.2011. 
51 In this respect, see B. De Witte, “Too Much Constitutional Law in the European Union’s 
Foreign Relations?”, in M. Cremona and B. De Witte, EU Foreign Relations Law. Constitutional 
Fundamentals, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2008, pp. 3-15 and G. de Baere, Constitutional 
Principles of EU External relations, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 10. 
52 Internally: Commission v. Council, Case 45/86, [1987] ECR 1493, para. 11 and externally, 
inter alia, Opinion 2/00 on the Cartagena Protocol, [2001] ECR I-9713. On external relations and 
legal basis, see P. Koutrakos, “Legal Basis and Delimitation of Competence”, in M. Cremona 
and B. De Witte (eds), EU Foreign Relations Law, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2008, p. 171. 
53 Commission v. Council (Rotterdam Convention), C-94/03 [2006] ECR I-22, para. 36. 
54 In this respect, the decision of the Court of Justice in Opinion 1/08 does not seem 
applicable in the TEU-TFEU case because the constitutional rationale at the basis of the 
different provisions are opposed, whereas the Opinion 1/08 only dealt with different 
decision-making procedures...belonging to the same policy (the Common Commercial 
Policy). For a short overview of this problem, see Matera, op. cit., note 8, p. 34. 
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8.4 The impact of variable geometry on AFSJ-based agreements 
As has been submitted elsewhere55 the AFSJ is a label that brings unity to a plurality 
of policies with distinctive features and, as a consequence, also the external 
dimension of the AFSJ follows different patterns for each type of policy. Moreover, 
the AFSJ has also emerged as a parcel of broader policies, such as the ENP, or as a 
single policy, such as the EU’s fight against terrorism. However, in a context 
dominated by the constitutional necessity to individuate the proper legal basis it 
becomes imperative to better individuate -a priori- the main policy rationales so as to 
avoid ex post conflicts such as the one currently pending between the European 
Parliament and the Council concerning the choice of the proper legal basis for the 
conclusion of extradition agreements of pirates arrested in the framework of 
operation ATALANTA.56 
Yet, the identification of international agreements that must be based on an AFSJ as 
opposed to international agreements that can be concluded on other provisions of the 
treaties is not only necessary for reasons pertaining to the rule of law, but is also 
necessary in order to understand whether Denmark, Ireland and the UK can benefit 
from their opt-out regimes and eventually participate or not in the conclusion of an 
international agreement. As it has been observed in a previous paragraph,57 the 
different protocols on variable geometry within the AFSJ contain a common 
provision that refers to measures adopted on the basis of Part Three, Title V, TFEU 
and on ‘international agreements’.58 It emerges that the opt-outs are envisaged so as 
to apply first and foremost to any measure based on Part Three, Title V, TFEU; i.e. 
agreements such as Mutual Legal Assistance and Extradition, Readmission 
agreements, VISA-facilitation, VISA-waiver agreements and so forth.59 The table 
                                               
55 See Wessel, Marin and Matera, op. cit., note 5. 
56 Case C-658/11, pending. Operation Atalanta was set up with Council Decision 
2008/918/CFSP, in OJ L 330/19, 9.12.2008. For a recent analysis of the different ways the UE 
is involved to fight piracy in Somalia, E. Petretto, “The EU, the Somalia Challenge, and 
Counter-piracy: Towards a Comprehensive Approach?”, European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 
17, 2012, pp. 261-284. 
57 See paragraph 2. 
58 Article 2, Protocol No. 21 on the UK and Ireland and similarly, Article 2 Protocol No. 22 on 
Denmark. 
59 AFSJ provisions have been used to conclude a relatively wide range of international 
agreements. In relation to border checks the EU has concluded by the means of its agency 
FRONTEX a number of agreements with a view to cooperate on border controls and has also 
authorized the conclusion of ‘Local border traffic agreements’ whereas in relation to 
migration the main (soft-law) instrument used is the one of ‘mobility partnerships’. In 
relation to criminal law and police measures the EU has conducted a number of bilateral 
agreements with a view to prevent and fight transnational organized crime and notably, 
international terrorism: these are the so–called ‘PNR agreements’; moreover the Union’s 
agencies Europol and Eurojust also conclude agreements with a view to fulfil their tasks. 
Lastly, in the field of private international law and judicial cooperation in civil matters, the 
Union has concluded agreements on conflicts of jurisdiction and recognition of judgments as 
well as other instruments pertaining to its participation to the Hague Conference on Private 
International Law. 
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below provides an overview of AFSJ-based agreements with a view to showing the 
extent to which member states benefiting from variable geometry take part in these 
initiatives. 
External 
instrument/
Member 
state 
MLA/ 
Extradition 
PNR 2012 & 
TFTP 2012 
Readmission 
agreements 
Visa 
facilitation 
VISA 
waiver 
Lugano 
Conven-
tion 
UK ✓ ✓ ✓ Except Cape 
Verde, Armenia 
X X ✓ 
IE ✓ ✓  ✓Except: 
Georgia, 
Ukraine, 
Pakistan, 
Armenia 
X ✓ ✓ 
DK ✓/USA 
(pre-Lisbon) 
X Japan 
X X X X X 
At the time of writing, the relationship between international agreements based on 
the AFSJ and the countries benefiting from variable geometry seems consistent with 
the purpose of the different opt-out regimes: the UK and Ireland do not participate in 
agreements related to border controls such as VISA issues, and Denmark does not 
participate (any longer) in any agreement, except those strictly linked to its 
membership in the Schengen club such as VISA–waiver agreements; but with the 
caveat that the participation of Denmark in relation to VISA agreements does takes 
place on the basis of public international law. Moreover, even though Denmark takes 
part in the acquis of Schengen, it is noteworthy that this country does not participate 
to readmission agreements concluded by the EU, because from a formal perspective 
readmission agreements and the return policy of the EU are solely connected to the 
Schengen system and do not constitute part of the Schengen acquis. However, most 
readmission agreements concluded in recent years contain a special clause inviting 
Denmark and a third country to conclude a bilateral agreement that mirrors the one 
concluded by the EU; thus, for instance the recent EU-Cape Verde60 readmission 
agreement includes the following joint declaration: 
Joint Declaration concerning the Kingdom of Denmark61 
The Contracting Parties take note that this Agreement does not apply to the 
territory of the Kingdom of Denmark, nor to nationals of the Kingdom of 
Denmark. In such circumstances it is appropriate that the Republic of Cape 
Verde and the Kingdom of Denmark conclude a readmission agreement in the 
same terms as this Agreement. 
                                               
60 Agreement signed on 18 April 2013 (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/ 
cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/jha/136840.pdf). 
61 The text of the agreement has not yet been published on the Official Journal. The text is 
available from the website of the Council (http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/ 
12/st14/st14759.en12.pdf), p. 48. 
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In relation to the joint declaration concerning Denmark and Cape Verde for the 
purpose of concluding a readmission agreement it should be added that this type of 
clause is also used in relation to the Schengen associated states, i.e. Iceland, 
Lichtenstein, Norway and Switzerland.62 Interestingly, this type of declaration is 
present only in relation to Denmark and not Ireland or the UK: this distinction is a 
good example of the different approaches and political choices that characterise the 
different regimes of variable geometry within the AFSJ. Thus, while Denmark does 
not take part in agreements because of its opposition to the supranational decision-
making applicable in the AFSJ, it nonetheless looks on favourably at the policy 
developments and wishes to be somehow included in the different actions, the 
position of the UK and Ireland reflects a different position. Indeed the approach of 
the UK and Ireland appears to reflect a utilitarian approach where the UK and Irish 
exercise of their opt-in/opt-out faculties is purely linked to reasons of national 
interest. In general, post-Lisbon agreements include either a territorial clause or a 
clause in the preamble so as to explicitly mention which EU member states are 
participating in the adoption of the texts. For instance, the short-stay visa waiver 
agreement with Brazil for holders of diplomatic, service or official passports includes 
a clause on the UK and Ireland in its preamble; conversely, the EU-Australia PNR 
agreement63 makes reference to the Danish, Irish and British situation in a specific 
provision on territorial application.64 However, there is no consistency in the use of 
these clauses and, in relation to Denmark, there is no information concerning the 
conclusion of separate bilateral agreements; thus the current situation can create legal 
uncertainties that should be remedied. 
The table above also shows clearly how the internal opt-out regimes are mirrored in 
their external projections. The table shows in the first column on the left the three 
member states that have obtained derogations from the AFSJ and in the top row the 
table considers the different types of agreements that the EU has concluded and that 
are directly or indirectly linked to AFSJ provisions. Yet the table also shows that 
member states benefiting from variable geometry use their opt-in/opt-out faculty 
depending on their national interest, an option that other member states cannot take 
advantage of. This is reflected, for instance, in the (shifting) British policy concerning 
readmission: while the UK has participated in all the pre-Lisbon readmission 
                                               
62 Ibid. 
63 OJ L186 14.07.2012, p. 4. 
64 Article 28: 1. Subject to paragraphs 2 to 4, this Agreement shall apply to the territory in 
which the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union are applicable and to the territory of Australia. 2. This Agreement will only apply to 
Denmark, the United Kingdom or Ireland, if the European Commission notifies Australia in 
writing that Denmark, the United Kingdom, or Ireland has chosen to be bound by this 
Agreement. 3. If the European Commission notifies Australia before the entry into force of 
this Agreement that it will apply to Denmark, the United Kingdom or Ireland, this 
Agreement shall apply to the territory of such State on the same day as for the other Member 
States of the European Union bound by this Agreement. 4. If the European Commission 
notifies Australia after the entry into force of this Agreement that it applies to Denmark, the 
United Kingdom, or Ireland, this Agreement shall apply to the territory of such State on the 
first day following receipt of the notification by Australia. 
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agreements, the UK is now using a more flexible approach and has decided to stay 
out of the agreement with Cape Verde,65 but decided to make use of the opt-in for the 
negotiations and conclusion of the agreement with Turkey.66 All in all, the data 
emerging from the table and an analysis of the different agreements in which the UK 
and Ireland participate suggest that the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty has 
reinforced an isolationist approach of these countries to the developments of the 
ASFJ, whereby their participation is not conditioned by issues such as human rights 
standards, accountability or preservation of the intergovernmental method; rather 
the position emerging from the behaviour of the UK and Ireland appears to be solely 
based on national priorities and interests. In this respect, the leeway left to these two 
countries, as well as their behaviour, seem to reflect a veritable ‘à la carte’ approach to 
their participation in EU initiatives.  
In relation to the expanding effect that the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty has 
had for variable geometry, the case of the Mutual Legal Assistance agreement with 
Japan reflects the different regimes of variable geometry: even though the agreement 
itself was negotiated before Lisbon, Denmark withdraw from it because the 
agreement came into force after the 1st of December 2009; conversely, the UK and 
Ireland could opt in and thus participate in this agreement. A similar conclusion can 
be made in relation to the thorny PNR and TFTP agreements concluded with the US: 
Ireland and the UK have decided to opt in to these texts and Denmark is not 
excluded from them because of the impact of its new, post-Lisbon regime. In relation 
to the participation of the UK and Ireland it is worth mentioning that while the UK 
has expressed its intention to participate ab initio pursuant to Article 3 of Protocol 21 
and thus took part in the Council’s work, Ireland made used of Article 4 of protocol 
21 and joined the international agreement ex post67 and as a consequence renounced 
its voting rights and its influence in the process.68 
All in all the analysis conducted shows that in spite of some procedural issues that 
require an effort so as to develop more consistent clauses concerning the position of 
the three member states in relation to each AFSJ-based agreement, the external 
projection of the AFSJ as in Title V, TFEU does not pose substantive problems in 
relation to the EU’s role as a security actor: this is because the UE has and still is 
managing to conclude agreements pertaining to most of its AFSJ priorities with most 
of targeted partners. Moreover, the insertion of clauses pertaining to the participation 
of, or to the conclusion of, separate agreements with the three member states 
benefiting from variable geometry suggests that in spite of their reluctance the three 
countries in question recognise that the added value and/or the power that the EU as 
a whole is capable of exercising in the AFSJ domain globally.   
                                               
65 https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/eu-readmission-agreement-with-cape-verde 
66 https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/eu-readmission-agreement-with-turkey 
67 On the position of Ireland, see B. Purcell, “Criminal justice cooperation and Ireland’s Opt-
in Protocol”, in E. Regan (ed.), European Criminal justice post Lisbon: An Irish perspective, 
Dublin: Institute of international and European Affairs, 2012, pp. 38-44. 
68 For a detailed analysis of the impact of variable geometry in the transatlantic relations of 
the EU, see the contribution by Santos Vara and Fahey to this volume. 
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The capacity of the EU to pursue and attain AFSJ-related objectives is strengthened if 
the EU can mix its security agenda into broader contexts. For this reason the next 
section analyses AFSJ clauses in the broader context of Association Agreements and 
other instruments of external action.  
8.5 The impact of variable geometry within the AFSJ on other international 
agreements  
The previous section looked at the interrelation between the external AFSJ and 
variable geometry and in that respect it could be argued that the previous section 
looked at the ‘autonomous’ side of the external AFSJ. Indeed, the present author 
submits that the external projection of the AFSJ can be broken down into a plurality 
of scenarios; the first scenario being the one in which the external dimension of the 
AFSJ is not mixed with other policies or instruments of EU external relations. Yet, 
this does not exclude the idea that AFSJ objectives could also be integrated and 
pursued within the context of other external policies. Indeed, this is what has been 
happening since the late 90s in the context of Partnership and Cooperation 
agreements, as well as Association Agreements. The first part of this section will look 
into international agreements with AFSJ clauses concluded on the basis of provisions 
belonging to the TFEU; the second part of this section will turn to agreements 
concluded in the framework of external actions based on the TEU. 
8.5.1 Variable geometry and the conclusion of international agreements based on the 
TFEU 
The table below provides an overview of different types of external contractual 
instruments that contain AFSJ clauses;69 the agreements have been selected to 
provide recent examples of the four types of instruments. However, not every recent 
agreement concluded by the EU contains AFSJ clauses: thus while the Free Trade 
Agreement with South Korea70 and the Partnership Agreement with the Pacific 
States71 do not contain AFSJ –related provisions, the recent Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement with Iraq does so.72 
 
                                               
69 The table and the analysis do not take into account the action plans and/or financial 
instruments adopted and pertaining to the selected agreements. 
70 OJ 14.05.2011 L 127, p. 6, Council Decision 2011/265/EU of 16 September 2010 on the 
signing of the Free trade Agreement with the Republic of Korea. 
71 Council Decision 2009/729/EC of 13 July 2009. 
72 Agreement signed in May 2012. The text is available via the website of the Council 
(http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2012/november/tradoc_150084.pdf).  
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Type of external 
instrument/Clauses 
Stabilisation 
and 
Association 
Agreement 
Albania 2009  
OJ  28.04.2009 
L107 p.166 
Euromed 
Agreement 
Algeria  
OJ 
10.10.2005 
L265, p. 2 
EU – Central 
America 
Political 
Dialogue and 
Cooperation 
Partnership 
and 
Cooperation 
Agreement 
Tajikistan  
OJ 29.12.2009 
L350, p.3 
Partnership 
and 
Cooperation 
Agreement 
with Iraq 
Signed on 
11 may 2012 
 
Readmission ✓Article 81 ✓Article 84 ✓ 
Article 49 
✓ 
Article 70 
✓ 
Article 105 
(3) 
 
Visa ✓Article 80 ✓Article 83 ✓ 
Article 49 
✓ 
Article 70 
✓ 
Article 105 
(2) (f) 
 
Criminal law matters 
(cooperation 
+substantive) 
✓Article 85, 82 ✓Article 86-
91 
✓ 
Articles 47-48 
on Drugs and 
money 
laundering 
✓  
Articles 67-69 
✓ 
Articles 7 
,103, 106 
and 
107 
 
Information exchange ✓Article 84 ✓Article Terrorism Terrorism Article 4 (in 
relation to 
terrorism) 
and data 
protection 
clause in 
Article 104 
 
Special clause 
concerning the States 
benefitting from 
Variable geometry in 
either the agreement 
or in the decision 
concerning the 
conclusion of the 
agreement. 
The Preamble 
refers to the 
different 
protocols 
The 
Preamble 
refers to the 
different 
protocols 
Special 
declaration 
annexed to the 
agreement, but 
without 
substantive 
innovations 
compared to 
clauses 
inserted in 
preambles. 
X The 
Preamble 
refers to the 
different 
protocols 
 
From a constitutional perspective the different agreements mentioned in the table are 
examples of mixed agreements concluded on a plurality of legal bases and signed by 
the EU as well as by the member states; moreover, most of them were negotiated 
before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, but at a time when variable geometry 
already existed and in the case of Tajikistan the agreement came into force after the 
1st December 2009.73 In this respect three elements appear noteworthy: first, if one 
takes into account the latest Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAAs) with 
Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia it is striking that these 
agreements do not merely mention the existence of variable geometry for those 
clauses related to the AFSJ; secondly, neither does the recent Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement with Iraq shape relations between the targeted third country 
                                               
73 Because the texts were adopted before the entry into force of Lisbon, this study has not 
taken into account the SAA with Serbia and Montenegro and has used the one with Albania 
as a recent example of SAA with western Balkan countries. 
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and the member states benefiting from variable geometry; lastly, recent 
developments such as the Korea agreement on trade or the Partnership Agreement 
with Pacific States seem to reinforce the idea that the EU is a prominent security actor 
regionally rather than globally. This observation would confirm the strength of the 
European Neighbourhood Policy context, which allows the EU to combine economic 
and commercial activities with security concerns. Conversely, in a geostrategic 
context where the leverage of the EU as an economic and security actor is not as 
strong (Pacific Countries and Asia), the inclusion of AFSJ clauses appears more 
difficult. Thus, if the success of the EU to insert AFSJ clauses is strictly linked to the 
geographical proximity of third countries, it comes as no surprise that the agreement 
with Iraq contains AFSJ clauses. 
Thus, the first impression emerging from the table suggests that the EU has 
developed a capacity to insert clauses pertaining to the AFSJ in different policy 
contexts. Parallel to this, three out of five agreements refer to the opt-out regimes so 
as to comply with the relevant protocols. However, and even though some of the 
texts were adopted before Lisbon, it must be emphasised that the most recent 
agreements should have contained a sounder discipline of the opt-out regimes: for 
instance, not only do the agreements fail to address the scope of possible bilateral 
instruments between the third countries involved and the countries benefiting from 
variable geometry, but they also fail to address issues pertaining to the (substantive) 
coherence and consistency between EU initiatives and bilateral initiatives of the three 
member states. Instead, while the agreement with Albania merely contains a 
reference to the opt-outs in its preamble, the most recent agreement with Tajikistan 
makes no mention of them. As argued in the previous section, and taking into 
consideration the interests at stake linked to the AFSJ, the lack of clarity and certainty 
should be remedied. Yet, one could argue the extent to which AFSJ clauses such as 
the ones contained in the four agreements above actually pose a problem in relation 
to the different opt-out regimes existing within the AFSJ.  
Indeed, a common trait of the different AFSJ clauses contained in non-AFSJ 
agreements is their broad formulation. For instance, clauses on readmission do not 
contain the discipline of readmissions and returns between the EU and the targeted 
country; rather, readmission clauses only affirm that the objective of readmission 
operates reciprocally and that in order to give execution to the common intent of 
fighting illegal migration, the parties agree to negotiate bilateral agreements in the 
future.  
For instance, Article 84(2) of the Association Agreement with Algeria affirms: 
Desirous of facilitating the movement and residence of their nationals whose 
status is regular, the Parties agree to negotiate, at the request of either Party, the 
conclusion of agreements on combating illegal immigration and on readmission. 
Parallel to this, the recent PCA agreement with Iraq affirms that in relation to illegal 
migration and readmissions, the Parties: 
agree to conclude, upon request by either Party as defined in the Article 122 and 
as soon as possible, an agreement on preventing and controlling illegal migration 
and regulating the specific procedures and obligations for readmission, covering 
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also, if deemed appropriate by both Parties, the readmission of nationals of other 
countries and stateless persons.74 
It emerges from the foregoing that in all the types of agreements examined for the 
purpose of this contribution the clauses pertain to the AFSJ are not self-executing 
clauses, but merely habilitating clauses, i.e. clauses that mark the first step towards 
the establishment of future means of cooperation. Moreover, while the examples 
mentioned here cover the Union’s readmission policy, a similar observation can be 
made in relation to judicial cooperation in criminal matters, i.e. MLAs and 
extradition agreements.75 Similar considerations could be put forward in relation to 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreements, such as the one concluded with Tajikistan 
in 2009. Again, taking as an example the clause on readmission cooperation,76 which 
is phrased exactly like the one on the EU-Central American Agreement on Dialogue 
and Cooperation, the reader cannot but observe that the applicability of any of the 
opt-out regimes would be, from a material perspective, disproportionate if not 
irrelevant.  
Therefore, it follows from the foregoing that external action tools such as association 
agreements provide a platform for future cooperation in the fields of the AFSJ, but do 
not constitute, strictly speaking, an external projection of the AFSJ itself. As a 
consequence, one might ask whether the common clause of the protocols is 
applicable to agreements such as those analysed here. Indeed, because the scope of 
the opt-out is to exclude the applicability of AFSJ-based measures to the three 
member states in question, one could argue that this exemption should only be valid 
in relation to substantive clauses and not to habilitating clauses because habilitating 
clauses do not, per se, affect sovereign prerogatives and could be formulated so as to 
expressly distinguish the position of Denmark, Ireland and the UK vis-à-vis the 
position of the other member states.  
The current praxis of mentioning the opt-outs in the preambles appears redundant if 
coupled with the actual content of the AFSJ clauses contained in the different 
agreements; the current praxis should be replaced by the insertion of sounder 
provisions in which, depending on the type of AFSJ policy at stake, the position of 
Denmark, Ireland and the UK is expressed. Alternatively, and again taking into 
consideration the scope of AFSJ clauses in existing agreements, one could even 
question the extent to which the toll for differentiation poses a threat to the 
attainment of EU objectives if the Union cannot even insert clauses on “the 
establishment of a comprehensive dialogue and cooperation on, inter alia, the return of 
persons residing illegally and their readmission on the basis of reciprocal rights and 
duties”77 without having to spell out the territorial and normative force of such 
intentions.  
                                               
74 Article 105 (5). 
75 See for instance Article 85 on judicial cooperation of the Association Agreement with 
Algeria or Article 103 (3) of the Partnership cooperation with Iraq. 
76 Article 70 (e). 
77 Article 49 of the EU-Central American Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement; emphasis 
added. 
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Because clauses such the one just mentioned do not create any operative or 
institutional obligation on readmission between any of the contracting parties, the 
application of the opt-out regimes for this type of clauses would go beyond a 
reasonable understanding of the scope of the opt-outs. Therefore, whenever an 
international agreement is not capable of actually hindering the sovereign 
prerogatives protected by the opt-outs, there should be no room for their application. 
In this respect it is submitted that EU-based agreements such as the one with Central 
American states only creates the political and legal premise for (a possible) future 
collaboration in the field of returns and readmissions; the clause itself does not 
constitute a readmission agreement and is therefore not operational. Consequently, it 
does not constitute any attempt against the sovereignty that according to the opt-outs 
regimes, Denmark, Ireland and the UK have sought to preserve. 
Contrary to what has emerged from the agreements analysed thus far, the 
Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) with Albania contains a provision on 
readmission that denotes a more detailed discipline, because after having affirmed 
the general commitment that “the Parties agree that, upon request and without 
formalities, Albania and the member States (…) shall readmit nationals”,78 Article 81 
of the SAA with Albania can make express reference to the separate Readmission 
agreement concluded between the parties in 2005.79 Contrary to the other clauses 
thus far analysed, Article 81 of the agreement with Albania would justify the 
applicability of the opt-outs regimes because, for instance, imposes the readmission 
of third country nationals whereas this issue is normally treated as an item for future 
cooperation and discussion, like in the case of Article 84 of the agreement with 
Algeria where it is held that if either Party considers it necessary the readmission 
agreement should also cover third country nationals’ repatriation. 
However, the differences between the SAA with Albania from other agreements is 
very likely due to the fact that the SAA was concluded after the readmission 
agreement80 and the incisiveness of the readmission clauses within the SAA are 
probably a mere result of the ‘ad hoc’ agreement. Moreover, other AFSJ clauses 
present in the SAA with Albania such as the one in relation to illicit drugs confirm 
the non-executing nature of AFSJ clauses in SAA agreements.81 Nonetheless, the SAA 
with Albania seems to differ from other agreements analysed in this section and 
appears to contain deeper AFSJ clauses that would justify the use of the opt-out 
regimes by Denmark, Ireland and the UK. However, also in this case the current 
                                               
78 Article 81 of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement with Albania, OJ 28.4 2009, L 107, 
p. 188 
79 Agreement between the Union and Albania on the readmission of persons residing 
without authorisation, OJ 17.05.2005, L124, p. 2 
80 EU-Albania readmission agreement OJ 17.5.2005 L 124, p. 22 
81 1. Within their respective powers and competences, the Parties shall cooperate to ensure a 
balanced and integrated approach towards drug issues. Drug policies and actions shall be 
aimed at reducing the supply of, trafficking in and the demand for illicit drugs as well as at a 
more effective control of precursors. 2. The Parties shall agree on the necessary methods of 
co-operation to attain these objectives. Actions shall be based on commonly agreed principles 
along the lines of the EU Drug Control Strategy. 
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praxis of merely referring to the different Protocols does not provide a clear 
discipline for the relations between the associated country and the member states 
benefiting from opt-outs.  
All in all, from the analysis conducted in this section it is possible to affirm that the 
relevance of variable geometry depends on the scope of the different agreements. 
Thus, while deeper commitments such as the SAA with Albania probably justifies 
the presence of derogatory clauses based on the different opt-out regimes, this is not 
equally valid in relation to other agreements where AFSJ clauses would not affect the 
prerogatives that the opt-out regimes are meant to protect. Moreover, it also emerged 
that there is no consistency in opt-out clauses; while this could be explained by the 
fact that the agreements were concluded before Lisbon, future agreements should 
pay more attention to the relationship between the opt-out regimes and the parties 
involved. Unfortunately, recent agreements such as the one with Iraq or the one 
currently under negotiation with Ukraine do not provide a satisfactory solution to 
this issue. 
Moreover, even though the different agreements analysed in this section reflect 
different political, geographical, economic and societal considerations, one could ask 
whether having to accommodate the positions of the member states benefiting from 
the opt-out regimes jeopardises the attainment of deeper and more effective clauses 
in the framework of association agreements. In this perspective, the need to 
accommodate variable geometry could be seen as a factor that prevents the EU from 
obtaining more at the negotiating table. Yet, variable geometry works the other way 
round too: thus, it also allows for the EU to insert deeper clauses connected to the 
AFSJ without having to compromise for less in order to keep Denmark, Ireland and 
the UK on board. 
8.5.2 Variable geometry and the interactions between the AFSJ with the CFSP and 
the CSDP 
Section III of this contribution highlighted the emphasis with which the external 
dimension of the AFSJ is presented not only as a projection of Title V, Part III, TFEU, 
but also as an essential parcel of the broader Security Strategy of the Union. As a 
consequence of this, AFSJ objectives may also be sought and attained by the means of 
instruments belonging to the CFSP/CSDP pillar. With the entry into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty the rule of precedence between external actions pursued on the basis 
of the CFSP/CSDP and external actions based on TFEU instruments previously 
codified in Article 47 TEU (ante-Lisbon) has been abrogated and, as observed 
elsewhere,82 the combined reading of Article 40 TEU with Article 218 TFEU does not 
clarify the extent to which TEU and TFEU elements can be combined in the external 
relations of the Union.83 However, other than questions pertaining to the proper legal 
basis and the decision-making process, the combination of AFSJ objectives with CFSP 
                                               
82 See van Elsuwege, op. cit., note 8. 
83 For a recent analysis see S. Blockmans and M. Spernbauer, “Legal obstacles to 
comprehensive EU External security action”, European Foreign Affairs Review, 2013, Special 
Issue, pp. 7-24. 
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and CSDP instruments leaves open the question of the impact that variable geometry 
may have on CFSP and CSDP actions. Moreover, it should be borne in mind that the 
combination of CSDP actions with the AFSJ is characterised by a double degree of 
differentiation: this is because Denmark does not participate in either policy. 84 
In light of the ongoing initiatives and on the basis of the Stockholm Programme85 and 
the working paper on ‘Strengthening ties between CSDP and FSJ Actors – Proposals 
for a New Way Ahead’86 it is possible to individuate a number of initiatives that fall 
simultaneously under the objectives of the AFSJ and of the CFSP. For instance, the 
thematic priorities of the Stockholm Programme identify three themes that can fall 
within the scope of actions carried out in either the CFSP/CSDP context or the TFEU 
one. These priorities are: security87, information exchange,88 justice89 and disaster 
management.90 The thematic priorities identified by the Stockholm Programme are 
reflected in the CSDP/FSJ working paper of 2011 whereby the rule of law, the fight 
against transnational crime, operational cooperation in the JHA fields as well as crisis 
management figure among the ‘suggestions’ for further cooperation between AFSJ 
and CSDP actors.91 Lastly, the specific context of the fight against international 
terrorism has played a prominent role in the definition of the spheres of competence 
between the CFSP and the AFSJ; a saga that from the institutional perspective has 
recently been brought to an end by the Court of Justice with its decision on the case 
Parliament v. Council C-130/11. 92 
  
                                               
84 See Article 5 of Protocol 22 on Denmark: “(…)Denmark does not participate in the 
elaboration and the implementation of decisions and actions of the Union which have 
defence implications(…)”. 
85 The Stockholm Programme – An Open and Secure Europe Serving and Protecting Citizens, 
in OJ C 115/1, 4.5.2010. 
86 Joint Staff Working Paper, Strengthening Ties between CSDP and AFSJ Actors. Proposals 
for a Way Ahead, Sec (2011) 560 final, 05 May 2011. 
87 Defined as “engaging with third countries to combat serious and organised crime, 
terrorism, drugs, trafficking in human beings and smuggling of persons, inter alia, by 
focusing the Union’s counter-terrorism activities primarily on prevention and by protecting 
critical infrastructures, internal and external security are inseparable. Addressing threats, 
even far away from our continent, is essential to protecting Europe and its citizens”, The 
Stockholm Programme – An Open and Secure Europe Serving and Protecting Citizens, in OJ 
C 115/1, 4.5.2010, p. 35. 
88 I.e. the exchange of data in a secure, efficient and with an adequate data protection 
standard between the EU and third countries, idem, p. 35. 
89 I.e. the promotion of “the rule of law and human rights, good governance, fight against 
corruption, the civil law dimension, promote security and stability and create a safe and 
solid environment for business, trade and investment”, idem, p. 35. 
90 I.e., “to develop capacities of prevention and answers to major technological and natural 
catastrophes as well as to meet threats from terrorists”, idem, p. 35. 
91 Joint Staff Working Paper, Strengthening Ties between CSDP and AFSJ Actors., supra note 
100, p. 9. 
92 In relation to the implications of the judgment for variable geometry, Ibid., p. 5. 
MUCH ADO ABOUT OPT-OUTS?   97 
 
C
ou
nc
il 
Jo
in
t A
ct
io
n 
20
08
/1
24
/C
FS
P 
es
ta
bl
is
hi
ng
 E
U
LE
X 
K
os
ov
o 
O
J 1
6.
02
.2
00
8,
 L
 4
2,
 
p.
 9
2 
A
rt
ic
le
 3
 (d
)-(
g)
 
A
rt
ic
le
 1
8 
re
fe
rs
 to
 
C
la
ss
ifi
ed
 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
on
ly
 
A
rt
ic
le
 3
 (a
)-(
c)
, (
h)
 
X D
K
 IE
 U
K
 
C
ou
nc
il 
D
ec
is
io
n 
20
12
/3
92
/C
FS
P 
on
 
th
e 
EU
 m
is
si
on
 in
 
N
ig
er
  
EU
C
A
P 
N
ig
er
 
O
J 1
7.
7.
20
12
, L
 
18
7,
p.
 4
8 
A
rt
ic
le
 3
 (a
) a
nd
 (b
) 
Po
ss
ib
le
 re
le
as
e 
of
 
cl
as
si
fie
d 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
by
 th
e 
he
ad
 o
f m
is
si
on
 
af
te
r d
el
eg
at
io
n 
by
 
th
e 
H
ig
h 
re
pr
es
en
ta
tiv
e 
of
 
th
e 
EU
 (a
rt
ic
le
15
) 
A
rt
ic
le
 3
 (c
) 
X IE
 U
K
 
A
rt
ic
le
 5
 p
ro
to
co
l 
22
 o
n 
D
en
m
ar
k 
co
ul
d 
ap
pl
y9
3  
C
ou
nc
il 
D
ec
is
io
n 
 
20
11
/6
40
/C
FS
P 
O
n 
th
e 
si
gn
in
g 
of
 th
e 
EU
-
M
au
ri
tiu
s A
gr
ee
m
en
t o
n 
th
e 
tr
an
sf
er
 o
f s
us
pe
ct
ed
 
pi
ra
te
s o
n 
th
e 
ba
si
s o
f 
ar
tic
le
 
✓
 
X X ✓
  
A
gr
ee
m
en
t w
as
 
co
nc
lu
de
d 
on
 th
e 
ba
si
s 
of
 
ar
tic
le
 3
7 
TE
U
 
IE
 U
K
 
A
rt
ic
le
 5
 p
ro
to
co
l 2
2 
on
 
D
en
m
ar
k 
A
pp
lie
s 
C
ou
nc
il 
Jo
in
t A
ct
io
n 
20
04
/5
23
/C
FS
P 
EU
JU
ST
 T
he
m
is
  
O
J 2
9.
06
.2
00
4 
L2
28
, 
p.
 2
1 
A
rt
ic
le
 2
 (a
), 
(c
) &
 (d
) 
A
rt
ic
le
 1
2 
on
ly
 re
fe
rs
 
to
 th
e 
po
ss
ib
le
 
ex
ch
an
ge
 o
f 
cl
as
si
fie
d 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n,
 n
o 
m
en
tio
n 
of
 o
th
er
 
ty
pe
s 
of
 d
at
a.
 
A
rt
ic
le
 2
 (b
) 
X IE
 U
K
 D
K
 
C
ou
nc
il 
Jo
in
t A
ct
io
n 
20
09
/4
75
/C
FS
P 
EU
JU
ST
 L
EX
 Ir
aq
 
O
J L
15
6,
 1
9.
06
.2
00
9,
 
p.
 5
7 
A
rt
ic
le
 2
(2
) 
Po
ss
ib
le
 re
le
as
e 
of
 
cl
as
si
fie
d 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
ex
 a
rt
ic
le
 
13
, b
ut
 n
o 
m
en
tio
n 
of
 
ot
he
r d
at
a 
ex
ch
an
ge
 
m
ec
ha
ni
sm
s. 
A
rt
ic
le
 2
 (1
) 
X IE
 U
K
 D
K
 
C
la
ss
ifi
ed
 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
(M
on
te
ne
gr
o,
 U
SA
, 
FY
RO
M
 A
us
tr
al
ia
) 
24
TE
U
a.
L 
or
 3
7 
TE
U
 
✓
 
X X X D
K
 IE
 U
K
 
In
st
ru
m
en
t/
 
Sp
ec
ifi
c 
po
lic
y 
ob
je
ct
iv
e 
Se
cu
ri
ty
 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
ex
ch
an
ge
 
Ju
st
ic
e 
Tr
an
sf
er
 o
r 
su
rr
en
de
r o
f 
su
sp
ec
te
d 
cr
im
in
al
s 
Pa
rt
ic
ip
at
io
n 
of
 M
Ss
 
be
ne
fit
tin
g 
fr
om
 o
pt
-o
ut
 
re
gi
m
es
 
                                               
93 No official data was retrieved.  
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The identification of common strategic goals for the CSDP and the AFSJ shows that 
the development of a single, coherent external policy for the EU is possible. 
However, also in this case the policy goals have to coexist in a highly complex 
constitutional context.94 The table that follows provides an overview of recent CSDP 
and CFSP actions that contain AFSJ elements. More precisely, the table aims to show 
how different CSDP and CFSP actions (top row) implement parcels of the Stockholm 
Programme (left column); the bottom row, on the other hand indicates which opt-out 
is participating in the different actions or agreements. The table take into 
consideration four CSDP missions and two different types of agreements: the first 
type on classified information and the second on the transfer of suspected pirates 
arrested in the framework of operation Atalanta.  
What the different CSDP missions have in common is that they exemplify capacity-
building and aim to improve the application of the rule of law, reform the judicial 
system with and fight serious criminality in order to strengthen security.95 As such, 
these objectives clearly fall within the scope of activities mandated to the Union by 
the Stockholm Programme; the similarities between the CSDP missions and the scope 
of the Stockholm Programme mandate in relation to the external AFSJ beg the 
question for individuating the separating line between actions legitimately based on 
the TEU and actions legitimately based on the AFSJ. One way to proceed is to find 
the objectives pursued by the action and then determine whether such action belongs 
to either the TEU or the TFEU in a manner similar to what was argued by A.G. Bot in 
his opinion in the case Parliament v. Council C-130/10.96 In that case A.G. Bot held 
that while Article 21 (2) TEU codifies objectives common to the whole EU external 
action, some of those can be understood as traditionally belonging to the CFSP: 
namely, letter (a) to (c) of paragraph (2) or that article.97 For the purpose of this 
contribution, the argument of the Advocate General would confirm the choice of the 
CSDP legal basis because Article 21(2) (b) TEU confers the EU a mandate to 
“consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the 
principles of international law” and, in this respect, the relationship between the 
CSDP and the AFSJ competence is one of complementarity, whereby the technical 
expertise of the EU in the AFSJ fields should be made available for the execution of 
                                               
94 Ibid., p. 9. 
95 For an analysis, see P. Koutrakos, “The external Dimension of the AFSJ and other external 
policies, An Osmotic Relationship”, in M. Cremona, J. Monar and S. Poli (eds), The External 
Dimension of the European Union’s Area of Freedom Security and Justice, Brussels: Peter Lang, 
2011, pp. 139-162. 
96 Paragraph 60 et seq. 
97 Article 21 (2) TEU: (a) safeguard its values, fundamental interests, security, independence 
and integrity; (b) consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the 
principles of international law; (c) preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen 
international security, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations 
Charter, with the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and with the aims of the Charter of 
Paris, including those relating to external borders(…) See paragraph 63 of the Opinion. 
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the CSDP missions.98Moreover, these missions are either based on UN Security 
Council Resolutions and initiatives or stem from crises whereby the local political 
authorities call for the support of the EU; these external political elements reinforce 
the choice of a TEU anchorage.99 Yet, while the combination of AFSJ with CSDP 
objectives triggers a number of constitutional questions that go beyond the scope of 
this contribution,100 the combination of the two policy domains also raises questions 
in relation to variable geometry. 
The TEU anchorage of these missions has significant repercussions in relation to the 
scope of the opt-out regimes of Denmark, Ireland and the UK. Indeed, the TEU 
anchorage of these actions brings the different activities outside the scope of the 
protocols with the result that, even though the different actions pertain substantially 
to the AFSJ, variable geometry does not apply – but with the caveat that Denmark 
would not participate in case of military-related missions.101 The possibility for the 
EU to act in these domains without having to insert specific clauses in relation to 
variable geometry solidifies the position of the EU on the one side, but also confirms 
that the three member states have obtained their opt-out regimes so as to maintain 
their sovereign prerogatives. In this last respect, one might question the extent to 
which the CSDP missions can benefit from the synergies with AFSJ institutions and 
tools without raising tensions related to variable geometry. For instance, it is difficult 
to imagine the participation of institutions and the use of data gathered in the 
framework of the AFSJ if the member states not participating to the internal 
instruments are involved.102  
As with the observations presented in relation to the different missions with a ‘rule 
of law’ objective, the EU-Mauritius agreement 103 is also anchored to the CSDP and, 
more precisely, the existing legal framework of Operation Atalanta.104 As a 
consequence of this the AFSJ element of these agreements could be read as being 
complementary and, as such, should not raise issues of compatibility with the ‘opt-
out’ protocols and the participation of Denmark, Ireland and the UK; however, 
because of the military nature of Operation Atalanta, Denmark is in fact out of this 
Agreement by virtue of Article 5, Protocol 22. Contrary to the other CSDP actions 
                                               
98 See the “General Suggestions” section of the Joint Staff Working Paper, Strengthening Ties 
between CSDP and AFSJ Actors, supra note, 100, p. 9. 
99 EUJUST Lex Iraq Stems from United Nations Security Council Resolution 1546 of 8 June 
2004; EULEX Kosovo stems from United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 of 1999, 
whereas the missions to Georgia and to Niger do not. 
100 For a recent analysis see Blockmans and Spernbauer, op. cit., note 83. 
101 Article 5, Protocol 22 on Denmark. 
102 See, for example, the interoperability of data, personnel and know-how as envisaged by 
the Joint Staff Working Paper, Strengthening Ties between CSDP and AFSJ Actors, supra 
note 100, pp. 11-14. 
103 Two other such agreements have been concluded: one with Seychelles (OJ L315, 
02/12/2009, p. 37) and one with Kenya (OJ L79, 25/03/2009, p. 49); they all have been 
concluded using a TEU legal basis. 
104 Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP, OJ 12.11.2008 L301, p. 33. 
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considered in this contribution, however, the choice of a CSDP legal basis to 
conclude agreements pertaining to the transfer and trial of suspected pirates appears 
to go beyond a reasonable understanding of the scope of TEU-based external 
activities in as much as these agreements directly affect the fundamental rights of 
individuals in the framework of criminal trials; a sphere that is traditionally 
anchored to the realm of democratically elected instances.  
While the question pertaining to the choice of the right legal basis is still pending 
before the Court of Justice,105 the external activities based on CSFP/CSDP provisions 
suggest once more that the EU is capable of acting as a global security actor in spite 
of variable geometry and in spite of the constitutional constraints that affect its 
actions. This finding is also valid in relation to the last type of agreements mentioned 
in the table and analysed here: agreements concluded by the EU with third countries 
with a view to sharing classified information.  The definition and use of classified 
information in the EU have been recently addressed by Council Decision 
2011/292/EU,106 in this document the EU has adopted a very broad definition of 
what constitutes ‘classified information’ so as to cover  
any information or material designated by an EU security classification, the 
unauthorised disclosure of which could cause varying degrees of prejudice to the 
interests of the European Union or of one or more of the Member States.107  
In spite of this definition provided by the Council, it is possible to argue that the 
Decision wishes to cover any type of information stemming from any agency or 
office within the EU and its member states: thus including military, police and 
judicial information.108 Prior to the entry into force of Council Decision 
2011/292/EU, the EU had concluded a number of agreements with a view to 
exchange classified information with third countries. For instance the EU concluded 
in 2005 an agreement with the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia109 and it did 
so by means of articles 24 and 38 TEU (before Lisbon); i.e. on the basis of the express 
competence conferred to the Union for the conclusion of agreements pertaining to 
police and criminal law; and because the agreement was concluded before the entry 
into force of Lisbon, Denmark, Ireland and the UK took part in the conclusion.110 
Since the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, however, the praxis of the Council has 
shifted and agreements on classified information have been concluded on the sole 
basis of Article 24 TEU, i.e. on the basis of the CFSP pillar.111 Because the content of 
the agreements has not substantially changed, it is difficult to pinpoint a legal reason 
for this shift. While the ambivalent nature of these agreements could warrant the 
                                               
105 Case Parliament v. Council C-658/11. 
106 OJ 27.05.2011 L141, p. 17. 
107 Idem, Article 2(1). 
108 This reading is confirmed, a contrario, by looking at the list of authorities taken into 
consideration by the Decision. 
109 OJ 13.04.2005 L94, p. 39. 
110 Other agreements pertaining to the exchange of classified information were also 
concluded on the basis of articles 24 and 38 TEU (before Lisbon). 
111 See, e.g., agreement on classified information with Australia (OJ 30.01.2010 L 26, p. 31).  
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shift, it is equally true that the ambivalent nature of these agreements provided a 
material subterfuge to circumvent not only the constitutional hurdles connected with 
the new Article 40 TEU, but also to circumvent the applicability of the different opt-
out regimes. 
8.6 Conclusion 
This paper aimed to evaluate whether the external dimension of the AFSJ and the 
global security agenda of the EU could be jeopardised by the existence of variable 
geometry and the derogatory regimes of Denmark, Ireland, and the UK. While the 
paper has confirmed that variable geometry poses procedural hurdles in relation to 
the external dimension of the AFSJ, the substantive impact of variable geometry does 
not appear to be significant. 
This contribution has shown that in relation to agreements concluded on the sole 
basis of AFSJ provisions, the clauses and references to the different opt-out regimes 
are inconsistent and this may create legal uncertainties. Moreover, this section has 
highlighted that the some member states benefiting from variable geometry take full 
advantage of the ‘à la carte’ opportunities that the Lisbon Treaty has conferred on 
them. Yet, in spite of these observations, the section on AFSJ-based agreements 
affirmed that the EU has become a security actor – albeit regionally rather than 
globally, thanks to the conclusion of a growing number of agreements.  
However, the development of the EU as a security actor also benefits from the 
conclusion of other types of international agreements such as AAs, SAAs and PCAs. 
In this respect, two main findings must be emphasised. First, AFSJ clauses in broad 
external action instruments are mostly ‘habilitating clauses’ and not executive 
provisions; AFSJ clauses in these types of instruments could therefore be interpreted 
as the first step before the conclusion of sector-specific agreements. Secondly, also in 
this case it was noted that from a procedural perspective the member states involved 
and the institutions have not developed a consistent and clear regulation of the opt-
outs in the context of AFSJ clauses in other external action instruments. It was also 
noted that, taking into consideration the non-executive nature of AFSJ clauses, the 
actual applicability of the various protocols on variable geometry should depend on 
the scope of the different AFSJ clauses in each agreement and should not necessarily 
constitute an automatism.  
Lastly, the analysis turned to the relationship between the AFSJ and the CSFP/CSDP 
pillar. Again, also in this case the EU appears to have successfully concluded 
agreements and executed actions without being negatively affected by variable 
geometry. However, it was also argued that the recent calls for strengthening the ties 
and synergies between actors and instruments of the AFSJ with the CSDP could, in 
the future, raise issues about the participation of Denmark Ireland and the UK in 
missions with a strong AFSJ connotation. 
All in all, the analysis confirms that the different opt-out regimes create more 
procedural, internal difficulties than substantive external ones. Yet, it should also be 
remembered that variable geometry has contributed to the difficulties encountered in 
relation to the of the United Nations Conventions against Transnational Organised 
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Crime (UNTOC) and its two protocols against people trafficking and against the 
smuggling of migrants. At the time of concluding the different instruments the EU 
had to dissect the different parts of the texts so as to adopt decisions on the 
conclusions for the agreements on the basis of Development cooperation, Economic, 
Financial and Technical Cooperation and separate decisions in relation to the parts 
on migration.112 However, if one looks at the wording of the different provisions of 
UNTOC and of its protocols, also this example – together with the ones mentioned in 
this contribution, appears more linked to the excessive weight that constitutional law 
has in the field of external relations113 rather than a matter of substance of variable 
geometry. 
 
                                               
112 See Council Decision 2004/579/EC of 29.4.2004 on the conclusion of UNTOC, OJ 6.08.2004 
L261, p. 69, Council Decision 2006/616/EC of 24.07.2006 on the conclusion of the Protocol 
against the smuggling of migrants, OJ 22.09.2006 L262, p. 24 and Council Decision 
2006/618/EC of 24 July 2006 on the conclusion of the protocol to prevent, suppress and 
punish trafficking in persons, OJ 22.09.2006 L 262, p. 44. 
113 B. de Witte, Too much constitutional law in the European Union’s Foreign Relations?, op. cit., 
note 51. 
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9. TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS AND THE 
OPERATION OF AFSJ FLEXIBILITY 
JUAN SANTOS VARA AND ELAINE FAHEY 
9.1 Introduction 
The Stockholm Programme placed much emphasis on ensuring that its external 
dimension would be fully coherent with all other aspects of EU foreign policy.1 It 
should come as no surprise that the Stockholm Programme emphasised the relevance 
of the external dimension given the ever-greater importance of the external 
dimension of the AFSJ to the global actions of the EU. The Union and the member 
states increasingly work in partnership with third countries and international 
organisations in ways that directly and indirectly affect the external dimension of the 
AFSJ.2 One of the programme’s key objectives was the coherence and the unity of EU 
law, yet the last major Treaty revision at Lisbon appeared to deepen and widen the 
nature of variable geometry in the EU. 
                                               
 Senior Lecturer in Public International Law and International Relations, Director of the 
Master in European Studies, University of Salamanca. The present paper has benefited from 
the support of the research Project DER2011-28459, financed by the Spanish Ministry of 
Economy and Competitiveness. 
 Senior Researcher and Lecturer, Amsterdam Centre for European Law and Governance 
(ACELG), University of Amsterdam. 
1 Stockholm Programme Mid-term review, Council Doc. 15921/12; Stockholm Programme 
Towards a Citizens Europe in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, O.J. 2010, L 115/1. See 
“Delivering an area of freedom, security and justice for the Europe’s Citizen Action plan 
implementing the Stockholm Programme”, COM (2010)171.  
2 On the external dimension of the AFSJ, see, inter alia, M. Cremona, “EU External Action in 
the JHA Domain: A Legal Perspective”, European University Institute Working Paper No. 
2008/24, EUI, Florence, 2008; J. Monar, “The EU as an international actor in the domain of 
justice and home affairs”, European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 9, 2004; P. Pawlak, “The 
External Dimension of Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: Hijacker or Hostage of Cross-
pillarization?”, Journal of European Integration, Vol. 31, 2009 and “The EU’s Externalization of 
Internal Security Objectives: Perspectives after Lisbon and Stockholm”, The International 
Spectator, Vol. 45, 2010; J. Santos Vara, “The External Dimension of the Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice in the Lisbon Treaty”, European Journal of Law Reform, Vol. 10, 2008; and 
S. Wolff, N. Wichmann and G. Mounier (eds), “Special Issue: The External Dimension of 
Justice and Home Affairs? A Different Security Agenda for the EU”, Journal of European 
Integration, Vol. 31, 2009. 
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Variable geometry may constitute an entity that appears to be constantly evolving 
through the Treaties, but the UK and Ireland, together with Denmark, appear to be 
its principal beneficiaries, having obtained positions that new accession states are 
unable to achieve and thus generating lopsided contours to the phenomenon. The 
opt-out/in provisions ostensibly indicate an outward constitutional stance of 
isolation towards further and deeper integration and seem to have generated much 
legal and even political incoherence. The increased variable geometry accorded to 
them in the Treaty of Lisbon seemed disproportionate to its effectiveness as a matter 
of EU constitutional law. The limited case law of the Court of Justice on the 
provisions for Ireland and the UK as to the Schengen Protocol, delivered close to the 
entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, appeared hostile to the objective of variable 
geometry.3 As explained below in detail, the Court of Justice laid down clear 
limitations to the right to opt-in in the AFSJ. 
According to the Protocol on the Position of the UK and Ireland in respect of the 
AFSJ, these countries do not take part in the adoption of measures pursuant to Title 
V of Part Three of the TFEU. This phenomenon of exclusion is not new. The UK and 
Ireland also did not take part in the measures adopted within the framework of Title 
IV of the former EC Treaty on visas, asylum, migration and other policies related to 
the free movement of persons. However, the Treaty of Lisbon complicated this 
situation by extending the exclusion of these two countries to police and judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters.4 At the same time, according to the Protocol on the 
Position of Denmark, this country will remain completely removed from the 
measures regarding the AFSJ, with no possibility of opting in.5 The sphere of 
territorial application of acts adopted by the EU in the area of police and judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters has actually been reduced in comparison with the 
                                               
3 Cases C-77/05, UK v. Council of the European Union, [2007] ECR I-11459; Case C-137/05, UK 
v. Council of the European Union, [2007] ECR I-11593. See J. Rijpma, annotation of Case C-
77/05, UK v. Council and Case C-137/05, UK v. Council, Common Market Law Review, Vol. 45, 
2008, p. 835; Select Committee on European Union, UK Participation in the Schengen Acquis, 
5th Report, Session 1999-2000, HL Paper 34; M. Fletcher, “Schengen, the European Court of 
Justice and Variable geometry under the Lisbon Treaty: Balancing the UK’s ‘Ins’ and ‘Outs’”, 
The European Constitutional Law Review, Vol. 5, 2009, p. 71; E. Fahey, “Swimming in a sea of 
law: Reflections on water borders, Irish(-British)-Euro Relations and opting-out and opting-in 
after the Treaty of Lisbon”, Common Market Law Review, Vol. 47, No. 3, 2010, p. 645; S. Peers, 
“Statewatch Analysis EU Lisbon Treaty, (No. 4) UK and Irish opt-outs from European Union 
Justice and Home Affairs Law” (www.statewatch.org/news/2009/jun/uk-ireland-analysis-
no-4-lisbon-opt-outs.pdf). 
4 According to Article 9 of the Protocol, the opting-out of Ireland would not apply to the 
freezing of financial assets or funds of entities or individuals suspected of having links with 
terrorism (see Article 75 TFEU). 
5 The Protocol on the Position of Denmark applies former opting-out of Denmark regarding 
Title IV of the TCE on “Visas, asylum, migration and other policies related to the free 
movement of persons” to the whole AFSJ. The application to Denmark of any measure 
adopted pursuant to the new Title V of the TFEU will depend on the conclusion of an 
international agreement between this country and the other member states.  
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situation before the Lisbon Treaty.6 In spite of the troublesome appearance of 
variable geometry for EU integration through law, especially in the AFSJ, this paper 
will consider how Ireland and the UK have opted-in in the vast majority of 
circumstances where they had the benefit of variable geometry since the entry into 
force of the Treaty of Lisbon. Thus, it appears that the operation of variable geometry 
has proceeded without much formal legal ‘fallout’. One specific manifestation of 
variable geometry in the AFSJ is in the area of the international relations of the EU, 
constituting an important case study. Accordingly, it provides a specific insight into 
the understanding of flexibility in this domain as well as the nature of coherence in 
the practices of the AFSJ. 
This contribution assesses the practical effects to date of the British, Irish and to a 
much lesser extent, the Danish Protocols, whereby variable geometry in the AFSJ is 
examined on the basis of the practice that has developed since the entry into force of 
the Treaty of Lisbon. The paper also considers in detail the impact of the Protocols on 
the international relations agreements of the EU, particularly their operation in the 
specific case of EU-US relations. The paper examines firstly, the key legal provisions 
shaping variable geometry in the AFSJ (section 1), followed by an analysis of the 
provisions for parliamentary scrutiny of these provisions in a domestic context in the 
UK and Ireland (section 2). Then, the operation of scrutiny provisions in the area of 
transatlantic relations is considered in Ireland and the UK (section 3), followed by an 
assessment of the external implications of variable geometry for the negotiation of 
international agreements (section 4) and the practical consequences for pre-Lisbon 
agreements of a UK ‘mass’ opt-out (section 5). 
9.2 Key legal provisions shaping variable geometry in the AFSJ 
According to Protocol 21 on the Position of the UK and Ireland in respect of the 
entire AFSJ, these countries will not take part in the adoption of measures pursuant 
to Title V of Part Three of the TFEU. Given its esoteric nature, Protocol 21 is perhaps 
not the epitome of variable geometry in contemporary EU law. The reasons 
commonly asserted for the need for a striking provision relate firstly, to the Common 
Travel Area shared by Ireland with the UK and secondly, the common law tradition 
also shared by both countries, a tradition that is asserted to require special treatment 
in this regard.7 Consequently, its effect is that “no measure adopted pursuant to that 
Title, no provision of any international agreement concluded by the Union pursuant 
to that Title and no decision of the Court of Justice interpreting any such provision or 
measure shall be binding upon or applicable to the UK or Ireland”.8 
The provisions of Articles 3 and 4 of Protocol 21 provide for the practical operation of 
the opt-in procedure, while Article 4a provides for penalties for the financial 
                                               
6 See the contribution by Matera to this volume. 
7 See J. Donoghue and C. Heinl (eds), Making sense of European Justice and Home Affairs Policy: 
Ireland and the Lisbon Treaty, Institute of International and European Affairs, Dublin, March 
2009; Fahey, op. cit. 
8 Article 2, Protocol 21, A similar provision is included on Article 2 of Protocol 22 on the 
Position of Denmark. 
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consequences of non-participation, to the detriment of the states seeking to avail 
themselves of constitutional variable geometry. Article 3 of Protocol 21 accepts that 
these countries may notify the Council, within three months after a proposal or 
initiative has been presented to the Council that they wish to opt into the adoption 
and application of the proposed measures. Furthermore, the British-Irish Protocol not 
only allows an opt-in ex ante, but also ex post, as either the UK or Ireland may notify 
to the Council and the Commission at any time after the adoption of an act that it 
wishes to accept it.9 The ex post opt-out has to be approved by the Commission and 
the Council and the Commission can impose conditions. In that case, the procedure 
provided for in Article 331(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU) shall apply mutatis mutandis. 
On the other hand, according to the Protocol on the Position of Denmark, this 
country will remain completely removed from the measures regarding the AFSJ, 
with no possibility of opting in.10 The application to Denmark of any measure 
adopted pursuant to the new Title V of the TFEU will depend on the conclusion of an 
international agreement between this country and the other member states. The 
Danish Protocol provides that this country may decline to avail itself of all or part of 
this Protocol. A novelty introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon is the possibility that 
Denmark could have an opt-in mechanism similar to the one that applies to the UK 
and Ireland. Denmark has only to notify the other member states in accordance with 
its constitutional requirements.11 
Notably, the Council may urge the UK or Ireland to participate in areas where they 
are not participating, which, as Peers suggests, may operate as an incentive to opt-in 
and also co-extensively giving Ireland or the UK an opportunity to free themselves of 
obligations.12 However, when viewed overall, the opt-in mechanism in the Protocol 
does not necessarily balance out or neutralise the impact of the extensive opt-outs 
obtained, given the practical difficulties involved in opting out or, alternatively, in 
not being part of the decision-making process generally. Pursuant to Article 8 of the 
Protocol, Ireland may notify the Council that it no longer wishes to be covered by the 
terms of the Protocol, in which case, the normal Treaty provisions will apply to 
Ireland by way of parliamentary ratification only and not by referendum. Article 8, 
however, has to be construed along with the Declaration (No. 56) annexed to the 
Treaty of Lisbon such that in three years’ time, the position of Ireland was to be 
subject to review, i.e. in late 2012 prior to the Irish presidency of the Council in 2013, 
a review that does not appear to have yielded any formal outcome yet.13 The other 
                                               
9 Article 8, Protocol 21. 
10 The Protocol on the Position of Denmark applies to the opting-out of Denmark regarding 
Title IV of the former EC Treaty on “Visas, asylum, migration and other policies related to 
the free movement of persons” to the whole AFSJ.  
11 Article 4, Protocol 21. 
12 See Peers, op. cit. 
13 See Declaration (No. 56) by Ireland, annexed to the Lisbon Treaty on Article 3 of the 
Protocol on the position of the UK and Ireland in respect of the Area of Freedom, Security 
and Justice, CIG 3/1/07 Rev 1; see the account in Fahey, op. cit. 
TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS AND THE OPERATION OF AFSJ FLEXIBILITY  107 
 
significant feature of Declaration No. 56 is its provision that Ireland would seek to 
participate as much as possible in the AFSJ, perhaps borne out in practice, as detailed 
below. More significantly, it must be construed alongside Protocol 36, the UK’s mass 
opt-out from the AFSJ, considered below. 
The situation of the UK, Ireland and Denmark overtly introduces great complexity 
and diversity into the development of these policies.14 Ostensibly, this was the price 
that had to be paid in order to achieve the ‘communitarisation’ of the third pillar. As 
some have stated, “allowing the possibility of too many ‘speeds’ going in too many 
different directions might have helped to end the pillarisation but [might have 
created] an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice too prone to ‘differentiation’ and 
‘exceptionalism’”.15 Accordingly, Title V of the TFEU continues to reflect the tension 
between Community and intergovernmental approaches, which has been a feature of 
the third pillar since it was introduced and throughout the successive reforms of the 
Treaties. However, practice may suggest otherwise. Ireland and the UK may be said 
to have participated in a majority of AFSJ measures since the entry into force of the 
Treaty of Lisbon..16 
The high rate of participation has been said to demonstrate Ireland’s commitment to 
advancing all forms of criminal justice cooperation within the EU, approaching all as 
an opt-in scenario unless a countervailing reason of merit pertains.17 Statistics on 
Council voting in civil liberties, justice and home affairs from 2009 to 2013 indicate, 
out of a total of 24 votes cast, that the UK had voted for measures on 22 occasions out 
                                               
14 Ireland may notify the Council that it no longer wishes to be covered by the Protocol on 
the Position of the UK and Ireland in respect of the AFSJ (Article 9 of the Protocol) and 
Denmark may decide to adopt an opt-out position similar to that of the UK and Ireland 
(Article 8 of the Position of Denmark).  
15 S. Carrera and G. Florian, “The Reform Treaty & Justice and Home Affairs. Implications for 
the Common Area of Freedom, Security & Justice”, CEPS Policy Brief No. 141, Centre for 
European Policy Studies, Brussels, 2007, p. 8. 
16 The UK maintains a comprehensive listing of all JHA opt-ins and Schengen decisions since 
1 December 2009, which at 83 items is considerably more detailed than the equivalent 
published by Purcell in May 2012 (see www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/about-
us/legislation/jha-decisions). By May 2012, Ireland was said to have opted into 18 out of 22 
AFSJ proposals: B. Purcell, “Criminal Justice Cooperation and Ireland’s Opt-In Protocol”, in 
E. Regan (ed.), European Criminal Justice Post Lisbon: An Irish perspective, Dublin: Institute of 
International and European Affairs, October 2012, pp. 35-47 (http://www.iiea.com/ 
publications/european-criminal-justice-post-lisbon-an-irish-perspective) and when this list 
of measures is cross-referenced (by the present authors) against the official UK database, 
similarly opted out of the European Protection Order and the Access to a Lawyer Directive. 
By contrast, Ireland had opted into the Justice Programme and Internal Security Fund unlike 
the UK, whereas the UK opted into the European Investigation Order, unlike Ireland. See 
also HM Government, Report to Parliament on the Application of Protocols 19 and 21 TEU 
and TFEU in Relation to EU JHA Matters (1 December 2009–30 November 2010), January 
2011 (Cm 8000) and Report to Parliament on the Application of Protocols 19 and 21 TEU and 
TFEU in Relation to EU JHA Matters (1 December 2010–30 November 2011), January 2012 
(Cm 8265).  
17 See Purcell, Ibid. 
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of a total of 25 votes cast, had voted against measures on two occasions and 
abstained once.18 Similarly, Ireland had voted for measures in 23 occasions, voted 
against measures on zero occasions and abstained on one occasion. Thus the two 
states behaved similarly, both politically and legally, in this domain since the entry 
into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. While on balance it is said that from a legal and 
administrative perspective the opt-in experience has benefited both Ireland and other 
EU member states,19 the amount of legislative measures has been modest, rendering a 
definitive judgment more difficult.  
9.3 Provisions for parliamentary scrutiny of variable geometry in the AFSJ 
in the UK and Ireland 
The UK’s European Union Act 2011 is a controversial and far-reaching effort to 
increase UK parliamentary control over EU decision-making. It creates a dramatic 
series of ‘dual locks’ and referenda requirements supposedly inspired by provisions 
found in German Constitutional Law. The Act introduces many new scenarios which 
may trigger a referendum, many of which relate to the AFSJ and are listed in s. 6(5), 
including the UK’s participation in a European Public Prosecutors office, the 
extension of its powers in the case of participation and a decision to remove any 
border control of the UK in respect of the Schengen Protocol.20 The provisions on 
parliamentary control of the ASFJ in the UK are considerably more stringent than 
those existing under Irish law. However, as Craig states,21 it is entirely possible that 
similar measures would be adopted in any other member state, despite its impact 
upon the EU decision-making process through its generation of a pause mechanism 
for national approval. 
The Act of 2011 makes specific provision in S. 9 thereof for parliamentary approval of 
many aspects of the UK’s involvement in measures relating to the shift from the 
special legislative procedure to the ordinary legislative procedure pursuant to Article 
81(3) TFEU concerning family law; the identification of further aspects of criminal 
procedure to which directives adopted under the ordinary legislative procedure may 
relate pursuant to Article 82(2(d) TFEU; and the identification of further areas of 
crime to which directives adopted under the ordinary legislative procedure may 
relate pursuant to Article 83(1) TFEU. It is perceived to be a particularly tough set of 
executive controls accorded to parliament and it purports to empower an already 
well-equipped Parliament. A minister cannot give notification under Article 4 of the 
AFSJ Protocol that the UK wishes to accept a measure unless the notification has 
been approved by an Act of Parliament. Prior to this, Parliament must approve the 
                                               
18 UK, Ireland: voting in minority in the Council of Ministers from 14 July 2009 to 11 March 
2013. See Votewatch Europe, How often the UK voted in the minority in the Council of 
Ministers of the EU (www.votewatch.eu). 
19 See Purcell, op. cit. 
20 P. Craig, “The European Union Act 2011: Locks, Limits and Legality”, Common Market Law 
Review, Vol. 48, 2011, p. 1811; M. Gordon and M. Dougan, “The European Union Act 2011: 
three questions”, European Law Review, Vol. 37, No. 1, 2012, p. 3.  
21 Craig, Ibid. 
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Government’s intent to give notification in respect of a specific measure. It is a 
considerably more stringent regime than its Irish counterpart, considered next.22 
The 28th Amendment to the (Irish) Constitution (Treaty of Lisbon) Act 2009 was 
enacted to amend domestic constitutional provisions relating to EU affairs and to 
ratify the Treaty of Lisbon. The revised Article 29.4.7 of the Constitution is an 
enabling provision that permits the state with the approval of Parliament to engage 
in enhanced cooperation and to take part in the Schengen Area and the Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice. It provides: 
…under Protocol 21 on the position of the UK and Ireland in respect of the area 
of freedom, security and justice, so annexed, including the option that the said 
Protocol 21 shall, in whole or in part, cease to apply to the State, but any such 
exercise shall be subject to the prior approval of both Houses of the Oireachtas…. 
Thus mere parliamentary approval is needed to opt in pursuant to Article 8 of 
Protocol 21. This is a unique constitutional provision in so far as a split of divided 
Supreme Court decision from the 1980s governs the relationship between Ireland and 
the European Union and mandates a test of “transfer of sovereignty” to warrant a 
referendum.23 The decision is much criticised in legal and political circles, given that 
it has been liberally interpreted and applied to all EU treaties since the Single 
European Act so as to warrant a referendum, despite the costs, financially and even 
politically.24 These specific provisions, in Article 29, have their origins in the Treaty 
of Amsterdam ratification and opt for a stronger parliament role in this specific 
policy domain. The nature of the scrutiny taking effect to date may be said to be 
haphazard or less than rigorous in the manner in which the Government is held to 
account.25 Nonetheless, procedures have been adopted where the Joint Committee of 
the Houses of the Oireachtas discuss the proposals with the minister prior to 
approval, which while similar to the UK provisions perhaps as regards ‘locks’ alone, 
fall short of a similar form of review. 
The account next considers the practical operation of the above provisions in the 
context of EU-US relations, in the two specific countries.  
                                               
22 The first use of the European Union Act 2011 was in October 2011, in respect of the 
amendment of the EU treaties and the European Stability Mechanism, where it was 
concluded that no referendum was warranted (see www.gov.uk/government/news/ 
minister-for-europe-comments-on-first-use-of-the-european-union-act-2011). 
23 Crotty v. An Taoiseach [1987] IR 713; See E. Fahey, EU Law in Ireland, Clarus Press, 2010, chs. 
1 and 5. 
24 See G. Barrett, “Building a Swiss Chalet in an Irish Legal Landscape? Referendums on 
European Union Treaties in Ireland and the Impact of Supreme Court Jurisprudence”, 
European Constitutional Law Review, Vol. 5, 2009, p. 32. 
25 E. Fahey, “Reflections on the Legal Role of the Irish Parliament (Oireachtas) in EU Affairs 
After Lisbon”, EUI Max Weber Working Paper No. 2010/20. 
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9.4 Parliamentary scrutiny of transatlantic relations in the UK and Ireland 
since the Treaty of Lisbon 
Cooperation with the US in the fight against terrorism and other serious crimes in the 
post 9/11 decade led to the conclusion of several agreements in the area of justice 
and home affairs.26 The table below provides an overview of agreements concluded 
between the US and the EU. 
Table 1. Agreements between the US and the EU in the JHA area, 2004-2012 
Agreement Reference 
EU-US Agreement on Extradition  OJ 2006, 
L 181/27  
EU-US Agreement on Mutual Legal Assistance OJ 2006, 
L 181/34 
Agreements between the United States of America and the European Police 
Office of 6.12.2001 and 22.12.2001 
 
Agreement on intensifying and broadening the Agreement on customs 
cooperation and mutual assistance in customs matters to include cooperation 
on container security and related matters 
OJ 2004, 
L 304/34 
Agreement between the United States and Eurojust 6.11.2006 
Agreement on the security of classified information OJ 2007, 
L 115/30 
EU-US Passenger Name Records (EU-US PNR) Agreement OJ 2012 
L 215/5  
EU-US Terrorist Finance Tracking Programme (EU-US TFTP) Agreement OJ 2010 
L 195/5 
 
The place of variable geometry within EU-US relations remains particularly curious 
and constitutionally ambiguous, in so far as it undermines the ostensible unity or 
coherence of EU foreign policy post-Lisbon. EU-US relations may lack much legal 
coherence potentially but the legal and political options to opt-out have never been 
exercised, with the UK and Ireland opting-in instead, “acting” thus in legal terms 
“coherently” as a matter of EU policy. There are many EU security policies still being 
pursued that have clear imprints of EU-US policies: for example, an EU PNR and an 
EU Terrorist Finance Tracking Programme (TFTP), mirroring EU-US PNR and EU-
US TFTP, although the precise future of the latter is uncertain.  
Stronger EU-US cooperation is presently under consideration in the UK as part of its 
‘balance of competences review’ to assess the exercise of EU competences and their 
impact and application in the internal legal order of the UK.27 It is stated that the UK 
                                               
26 See J. Santos Vara, “The role of the European Parliament in the conclusion of Transatlantic 
Agreements on the transfer of personal data after Lisbon”, CLEER Working Paper No. 
2013/2, The Centre for the Law of EU External Relations. 
27 Review of the Balance of Competences between the UK and the European Union presented 
to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs by Command 
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is sometimes concerned that stronger EU-US cooperation will come at the expense of 
Britain’s bilateral dealings with Washington.28 The ability to negotiate with the US on 
the principle of equality is one of the central benefits of EU-US relations but this only 
takes place on those issues where the EU has full competence. The Obama 
Administration made a forceful attempt to intervene in the UK’s recent deliberations 
over its referendum on its future in the European Union.29 By contrast, the Irish 
perspective on transatlantic relations is a more singular vision of partnership.30 For 
example, the Irish Presidency of the EU in 2013 made great play on the advancement 
of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTTP).31 
We next examine three specific instruments in non-legislative and legislative areas – 
two bilateral EU-US Agreements in security and one internal EU Directive, the latter 
of which was largely inspired by one of the former, perhaps indicating the stance of 
the member states generally on the content of transatlantic relations as applied 
internally within the EU.32 
9.4.1 EU-US Terrorist Finance Tracking Programme 
As is known, the EU-US TFTP Agreement arose out of a controversy whereby the US 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was revealed to be running a secret programme 
from which it obtained financial messaging data, in order to track terrorist 
financing.33 An EU-US TFTP Agreement was entered into so as to meet legal 
concerns surrounding the US extraction, use and transfer of financial messaging data 
without a warrant. The Council Decisions on the Terrorist Finance Tracking 
Programme (TFTP) were adopted in the summer of 201034 and the UK opted into 
                                                                                                                                                   
of Her Majesty July 2012 (www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/ 
attachment_data/file/35431/eu-balance-of-competences-review.pdf). See “David Cameron 
snubbed as Germany and France ignore UK survey on Europe” The Guardian, 1 April 2013. 
28 R. Korteweg, “The EU and transatlantic relations”, Centre for European Reform, March 
2013 (www.cer.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/pdf/2013/bal_ 
comp_rk_eu_trans_15march13-7087.pdf). 
29 “Britain should stay in European Union, says Obama administration”, The Guardian, 10 
January 2013. This view was echoed by Ireland, which held the Presidency of the EU at the 
time of the most recent public controversy and discourse (www.guardian.co.uk/ 
world/2013/jan/09/us-warns-uk-european-union).  
30 See J. Carroll and J. Travers (eds), An Indispensable Partnership: EU-US Relations from an Irish 
Perspective, Institute of International and European Affairs, Dublin, 2004. 
31 See for example, “Agreement of draft mandate for EU-US trade talks will be a key step - 
Minister Bruton”, 12 March 2013 (www.eu2013.ie/news/news-items/20130312eu-
ustradetalks). 
32 See Irish Presidency Council agendas and Trio Presidency Council agendas, in legislative 
and non-legislative areas. 
33 “Bank data is sifted by US in Secret to Block Terror”, New York Times, 23 June 2006. 
34 Council Decision of 28 June 2010 on the signing on behalf of the Union of the agreement 
between the European Union and the United States of America on the processing and 
Transfer of Financial Messaging data from the European Union to the United States for the 
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them immediately, thus becoming bound by the agreement. The Financial Secretary 
to the Treasury emphasised the significance of UK involvement from the outset.35 
The UK opted in to the Agreement with the US pursuant to Article 3 of Protocol 21 
from the outset, whereas Ireland exercised its opt-in pursuant to Article 4 of Protocol 
21, becoming the country’s first opt-in under this article to date. Ireland informed the 
Presidency that it was prepared to waive its three-month opt-in period and instead 
would opt-in post-adoption.36 The Article 4 opt-in is stated to have arisen because 
Ireland had, in the interests of facilitating early Council approval for the Agreement, 
waived the right to exercise its option under Article 3, demonstrating perhaps rather 
curiously the underlying coherence and unity at the heart of the operation of these 
provisions. Recently, however, Article 4 has been deployed by Ireland in its opt-in to 
the EU-US PNR Agreement, which is considered next. Finally, on a practical note, 
usual practice in draft AFSJ directives is to include a recital stating that either the UK 
and/or Ireland have notified their intention to participate or will not participate/be 
subject to or bound by the instrument.37 The practice is otherwise in international 
agreements that do not envisage anything other than legal coherence, or only 
minimally reflect actual practice. Thus, for example, Article 22 of the Terrorist 
Finance Tracking Programme Agreement provides:38 
2. This Agreement will only apply to Denmark, the UK, or Ireland if the 
European Commission notifies the United States in writing that Denmark, the 
UK, or Ireland has chosen to be bound by this Agreement. 3. If the European 
Commission notifies the United States before the entry into force of this 
Agreement that it will apply to Denmark, the UK, or Ireland, this Agreement 
shall apply to the territory of such State on the same day as for the other EU 
Member States bound by this Agreement… 
Accordingly, this indicates a very particular vision of coherence in EU international 
relations, whereby all member states will participate, arguably rather top-down in its 
vision of coherence. It is a formula that does not appear to capture the reality of the 
legal provisions operating as a backdrop to the EU’s international relations. 
                                                                                                                                                   
purposes of the Terrorist Finance Tracking Programme (TFTP) 2010 /411/EU 2010 OJ L 195 
1.  
35 See House of Commons, Terrorist Finance Tracking Program Session 2010-11 European 
Committee, 8 February 2011, Column 7 (www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/ 
cmgeneral/euro/110208/110208s01.htm. 
36 See Purcell, op. cit. 
37 See e.g. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and Council on attacks against 
information systems and repealing Council Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA, COM 
(2010)517 final, recital 17.  
38 Agreement between the European Union and the United States of America on the 
processing and Transfer of Financial Messaging data from the European Union to the United 
States for the purposes of the Terrorist Finance Tracking Programme, 2010 OJ L 195/5. For 
background, see K. Archick, “EU-US Cooperation Against Terrorism”, Congressional 
Research Service 7-5700, 21 May 2012; M. Cremona, “Justice and Home Affairs in a 
Globalised World: Ambitions and Reality in the tale of the EU-US SWIFT Agreement”, 
Institute for European Integration Research Working Paper No. 2011/4, Institute for 
European Integration Research, Austrian Academy of Sciences. 
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9.4.2 The EU-US PNR Agreement, 2011 
Another high profile example worth considering here is the EU-US PNR Agreement 
which has its origins in US legislation passed in the wake of the 9/11 atrocities, 
requiring airline carriers flying into the US to provide US authorities with passenger 
data. An agreement was eventually reached in 2004 between the EU and US 
requiring EU airlines flying into the US to provide US authorities with PNR data and 
was struck down by the Court of Justice in 2006 and replaced by an interim 
agreement. The most recent EU-US PRN Agreement replaces the EU-US PNR 
Agreement provisionally applied from July 2007.39 The Council Decisions to sign and 
conclude the Agreement were deposited on 28 November 2012. The UK opted into 
the Negotiating Mandates of the Council to authorise the Commission to open 
negotiations with Australia, Canada and the US in December 2010, decisions which 
were also announced to the UK Parliament at this time.40 The minutes of the Justice 
and Home Affairs meeting on 2-3 December 2010 simply indicated that the Council 
of Ministers had agreed a negotiation mandate with the US without noting any 
specificities regarding the UK or Ireland.41 This mandate was said not to be capable 
of being deposited before Parliament on account of the possibility of the EU 
negotiating position being prejudiced or restricted.42 
The UK opted into the Agreement initially through its negotiation with the President 
of the Council on 9 February 2012. However, on 15 December 2011, the European 
Scrutiny Committee of the House of Commons had expressed considerable 
reservations over the haste with which an early opt-in decision necessitated and 
suggested that compliance with an eight-week scrutiny period for an opt-in would 
not prejudice UK participation in the new EU-US Agreement, reflected itself in the 
Agreement in Article 27.43 Instead, the Committee drew attention to the earlier 
dissatisfaction expressed by the Committee in its 35th report, regarding the 20 days 
between the publication of the earlier EU-Australia PNR Agreement and the date 
proposed by the Presidency for the adoption of the draft Council decision to provide 
                                               
39 Agreement between the United States of America and the European Union on the use and 
transfer of Passenger Name Record Data to the United States Department of Homeland 
Security 2012 OJ L215/5. 
40 See “Report to Parliament on the Application of Protocols 19 and 21 to the Treaty on 
European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) (‘the 
Treaties’) in Relation to EU Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Matters”, 1 December 2009 - 30 
November 2010) Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for the Home Department 
by Command of Her Majesty, January 2011, Cm 8000. 
41 By contrast, opt-ins and -outs of the European Investigation Order were expressed in the 
same document (UK was opting in, Ireland and Denmark opting out: Council Doc. 
16918/10). 
42 See the detailed Written Ministerial Statement (Mr. Damian Green MP), Hansard, 20 
December 2010, Column 157WS, (www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/ 
cmhansrd/cm101220/wmstext/101220m0001.htm).  
43 48th Report of Session 2010-12 European Scrutiny Committee EU PNR Agreement with the 
USA, 15 December 2011 (www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/ 
cmeuleg/428-xliii/42806.htm). 
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its signature, whereby the Committee agreed to waive its scrutiny reserve in return 
for assurances on fundamental rights. Of significance then is the fact that the EU-US 
PNR Agreement contained provisions that were arguably more far-reaching than the 
Australia Agreement as regards data retention limits and effective judicial redress. 
The subsequent UK Ministerial statement on the decision of the UK Government to 
opt-in to the EU-US PNR Agreement was laid before the House of Commons and 
House of Lords on 27 February 2012.44 The statement emphasised the importance of 
working with partners outside the EU, also noting the added value of the collection 
and analysis of PNR data.  
Ireland has more recently also sought to invoke Article 4 so as to participate in the 
EU-US PNR Agreement, again in contrast to the approach of the UK. The Houses of 
the Oireachtas adopted a procedure whereby the option proposal was first referred 
to the Joint Committee of the Oireachtas, which considered the proposals at a public 
meeting with the Minister thereafter. Similar concerns to those expressed in the UK 
Parliament were expressed in the Irish Parliament as to fundamental rights, to lesser 
avail.45 Thereafter, on 24 May 2012, the Irish Minister for Justice proposed that 
Ireland would exercise its option pursuant to Article 4 of Protocol 21, seeking the 
prior approval of both Houses of the Oireachtas pursuant to Article 29.4.7° thereof 
for Ireland to participate, motions which were passed.46 
The third instrument considered is a legislative one, namely the Passenger Name 
Records Directive.  
9.4.3 The Passenger Name Records Directive47 
An EU Directive on the use of Passenger Name Record (PNR) Data for the 
prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of Terrorist Offences and 
serious crime was proposed in 2011. The Directive explicitly shares the nomenclature 
and form of EU-US PNR rules and its controversy given its implications for 
fundamental rights. The Directive would apply to air carriers flying into and out of 
EU member states. The possibility of monitoring of EU internal flights had been 
proposed by the UK as part of its Olympic Games security strategy and did not meet 
with opposition, but instead evolved into the text that would be adopted by the 
                                               
44 Damian Green MP, Written statement to Parliament: the UK’s opt-in to the EU PNR 
Agreement with the US, 27 February 2012 (www.gov.uk/government/speeches/uks-opt-in-
to-the-eu-pnr-agreement-with-the-us). 
45 Statement by Alan Shatter T.D. Minister for Justice and Equality - Joint Committee on 
Justice, Defence and Equality, 16 May 2012 (www.justice.ie/en/JELR/Pages/SP12000133). 
46 Statement by Alan Shatter T. D. Minister for Justice and Equality DáilÉireann, having 
sought the approval of the Seanad the previous day (lower house), 24 May 2012 
(www.justice.ie/en/JELR/Pages/SP12000147). 
47 Proposal for a Directive on the use of Passenger Name Record data for the prevention, 
detection investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crime (COM) 2011 
32; EU-PNR Commission Staff Working Paper Impact Assessment COM(2011) 32 final. 
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Council.48 The EU PNR Directive provides that all passengers flying in and out of the 
EU will have to provide key data which can be checked against national watch lists. 
Article 17 makes express provision for the possibility of including internal flights 
within the scope of the Directive to be considered by the Commission, demonstrating 
the extent to which the UK’s position became EU policy.  
Accordingly, the House of Lords European Union Committee recommended that the 
UK should opt-in to the Directive on 7 March 2011 so as to be in a position to play a 
role in extending the Directive to intra-EU flights and to benefit from the data 
collected by other member states.49 Notably, they expressed some dissatisfaction at 
the lack of guidance from Government, on the basis of a desire to respect the eight-
week scrutiny period prevailing. What is striking about the parliamentary debate in 
the House of Lords on this legislative instrument is the fulsome support of 
parliament for the goals of the EU, their reflection on the long-standing objective of 
the EU to achieve this and the manner in which the UK policy position is promoted 
centrally within the context of the EU instrument.  
On 19 April 2011, the Irish Parliament debated whether Ireland should exercise its 
options in Article 3 of Protocol 21 to participate in the Directive, stating that any 
measure assisting the police in their fight against terrorism was to be welcomed and 
noting that the 3-month period to opt-in expired in May, 2013.50 Additionally, the 
Minister indicated to Parliament Ireland’s support for the inclusion of intra-EU 
flights within the scope of the measure. Since then, Ireland has now exercised its opt-
in and in early 2013, the Irish Presidency of the Council sought to advance the 
Directive on the Justice and Home Affairs Agenda.51 The broad tendency for Ireland 
to adopt its position temporally after that of the UK is replicated in its actions in 
respect of the Schengen Protocol also.52 Substantively, the UK and Ireland have 
exercised largely similar preferences in transatlantic relations and also in similar 
‘spillover’ internal EU legislation. These represent significant practices of coherence 
and consistency on the part of the countries enjoying considerable flexibility.  
9.5 External implications of AFSJ variable geometry for the negotiation of 
international agreements 
The stance adopted by the UK, Ireland and Denmark has a direct bearing on the 
external dimension of the AFSJ, as the international agreements concluded by the EU 
                                               
48 Note from UK Delegation to Delegations: Council doc. 6359/11. See “Countries rally 
behind UK on EU Flight data collection”, Euractiv, 12 April 2011 (www.euractiv.com/ 
infosociety/countries-rally-uk-eu-flight-dat-news-504007 ). 
49 European Union Committee 11th Report, UK opt-into the Passenger Name Records Directive, 7 
March 2011 (www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201011/ldselect/ldeucom/113/ 
11303.htm). 
50 Vol. 730, No. 3, DáilÉireann Debate (http://debates.oireachtas.ie/dail/2011/04/19/ 
00020.asp). 
51 See “Minister Shatter presents Presidency priorities in the JHA area to European 
Parliament” (http://justice.ie/en/JELR/Pages/PR13000021). 
52 See Fahey, op. cit. 
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on these issues might not be binding upon the three countries.53 As noted above, the 
territorial application of this kind of agreement is thus limited to the other member 
states, constituting an exception to the general rule that the agreements concluded by 
the EU will become binding on the institutions and the member states as laid down 
in Article 216.2 TFEU. According to Article 29 of the Vienna Convention on Law of 
Treaties, “unless a different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise 
established, a treaty is binding upon each party in respect of its entire territory”. 
Therefore, it should be explicitly described in the text of agreements concluded by 
the EU within the framework of Title V of the TFEU the territory to which they shall 
apply. If an international agreement does not include explicit territorial exclusions 
despite the existence of an internal opt-out, it is possible that other contracting 
parties might argue that non-application to the entire territory of the member states 
amounts to a breach of the agreement.54 While previous third-pillar agreements still 
in force are binding upon all member states, including the UK, Ireland and Denmark, 
the position of these countries may give rise in practice to a wide range of different 
situations.55 
When either the UK or Ireland notifies the Council of their willingness to take part in 
any proposed internal measure, they are also accepting the external competence to 
conclude international agreements on the same issue. Otherwise, the effects of the 
Protocol will extend beyond the framework of the AFSJ, also including opting out of 
Article 216 TFEU, which reflects Court case law on external competences. In contrast, 
if the EU concludes an agreement affecting an internal act into which the UK or 
Ireland have chosen not to opt in, neither country will not be bound by the 
international instrument.  
Protocols 21 and 22 also affect the application of TFEU provisions in which the 
procedure for concluding international agreements is regulated. Article 218 TFEU, 
which lays down the procedure for negotiating and concluding international 
agreements, is affected as regards the voting rules applicable in the Council for the 
adoption of the negotiating mandate, the signature of the draft agreement and 
                                               
53 The present contribution does not intend to deal in detail with the external implications of 
variable geometry within the AFSJ. The analysis of the implications of AFSJ variable 
geometry for the negotiation of international agreements is the basis for the examination of 
the consequences of the UK ‘mass’ opt-out in the next section. For a detailed of the external 
implications of variable geometry within the AFSJ, see the contribution by Matera to the 
volume, “Much ado about ‘opt-outs’? The impact of ‘variable geometry’ in the AFSJ on the 
EU as a Global Security Actor”. 
54 See B. Martenczuk, “Variable Geometry and the External Relations of the EU”, in B. 
Martenczuk and S. van Thiel (eds), Justice, Liberty and Security: New Challenges for EU External 
Relations, Brussels: VUB Press, 2008, p. 508. 
55 According to Article 9 of the transitional provisions, “the legal effects of the acts of the 
institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union adopted on the basis of the Treaty on 
European Union prior to the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon shall be preserved until 
those acts are repealed, annulled or amended in implementation of the Treaties. The same 
shall apply to agreements concluded between Member States on the basis of the Treaty on 
European Union”. 
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conclusion of such agreements.56As provided for in the Protocols, decisions adopted 
by unanimity will require the unanimity of the members of the Council with the 
exception of those member states opting out.57 A qualified majority will be 
interpreted in accordance with Article 238 (3) TFEU, which refers to those cases in 
which not all member states participate in the decision-making. 
It is important to consider whether the UK and Ireland have an unlimited right to 
opt-in to any international agreement concluded by the EU under the aegis of the 
AFSJ. As was stated earlier, in the case of Denmark, the possibility of opting in is not 
foreseen. A distinction should be made, however, between the Schengen Protocol 
and Protocol 21 on the position of the UK and Ireland in respect of the AFSJ. The UK 
and Ireland take part in some aspects of Schengen (in relation to police and judicial 
cooperation), but they do not accept the border control system.58 Article 4 of the 
Schengen Protocol provides that Ireland and the UK may request to take part in 
some or all the provisions of the Schengen acquis, and according to Article 5, either 
the UK or Ireland is considered to be participating in any measures that build on 
those parts of the Schengen acquis in which they already take part, unless they notify 
the Council that they do not wish to be involved in the measure. The judgments of 
the Court of Justice in the appeals lodged by the UK against Regulation 2007/2004 
establishing FRONTEX and Regulation No. 2252/2004 on standards for security 
features and biometrics in passports and travel documents issued by member states 
help to provide an answer to this issue.59  
The Court of Justice held that Article 5 of the Schengen Protocol is not independent 
from Article 4, but that the former is subordinated to the latter.60 Consequently, the 
UK or Ireland cannot opt in to the measures developing the Schengen acquis if they 
are not bound by those parts of the acquis to which those measures constitute a 
development according to Article 4. Because of this, when the UK or Ireland wishes 
to take part in an international agreement that the EU plans to conclude, it should be 
determined whether or not the agreement at stake is a measure that builds upon the 
Schengen acquis. If not, the UK and Ireland may notify the Council that they wish to 
take part in the international agreement on the basis of Article 3 of Protocol 21. 
Conversely, if the agreement is a measure that builds upon the Schengen acquis, both 
                                               
56 See P. García Andrade, “La geometría variable y la dimensión exterior del espacio de 
libertad, seguridad y justicia”, in J. Martín y Pérez de Nanclares (ed.), La dimensión exterior del 
Espacio de libertad, seguridad y justicia de la Unión Europea, Madrid: Tecnos, 2012. 
57 Article 3.1, Protocol 21 and Article 1, Protocol 22. 
58 See Council Decision of 29 May 2000 concerning the request of the UK of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland to take part in some of the provisions of the Schengen acquis, OJ 2000, L 
131/43 and Council Decision of 28 February 2002 concerning Ireland's request to take part in 
some of the provisions of the Schengen acquis, OJ 2002, L 64/20. 
59 Council Regulation No. 2007/2004 of 26 October 2004 establishing a European Agency for 
the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of 
the European Union, OJ 2004, L 341/1 and Council Regulation No. 2252/2004 of 13 
December 2004 on standards for security features and biometrics in passports and travel 
documents issued by Member States, OJ 2004, L 385/1. 
60 Judgments of 18 December 2007, C-77/05 and C-137/05. 
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countries will only be entitled to opt in if they have been previously authorised to 
participate in those parts of the acquis to which the international agreement constitute 
a development according to Article 4.61 
The most prominent examples of this are the international agreements on visa 
facilitation. Since Ireland and the UK do not participate in the common visa system, 
equally they cannot take part in any of the visa facilitation agreements concluded by 
the EU. In the agreements concluded thus far it is clearly stated that these constitute a 
development of the provisions of the Schengen acquis in which the UK and Ireland 
do not take part.62 The same argument may be applied to the agreements on visa 
waivers that the EU has concluded with third countries, such as the agreement with 
Brazil on short-stay visa waivers for holders of diplomatic, service or official 
passports.63 
The Danish position as regards this kind of agreements is arguably more complex. 
Since Denmark is part of the Schengen area, it has a strong incentive to participate in 
the visa facilitation agreements, and accordingly, every time a new act is adopted 
that builds upon the Schengen acquis, Denmark has to decide within a period of six 
months whether or not it will implement the new measure. Should it decide to do so, 
the new act “will create an obligation under international law between Denmark and 
the other member states bound by the measure”.64 However, since the Schengen 
acquis is not binding on Denmark under EU law, international agreements concluded 
by the EU do not create obligations between Denmark and third states. 
Consequently, the visa facilitation agreements concluded by the EU are not binding 
on Denmark and a separate agreement with the respective third country must be 
signed. In the EU visa facilitation agreements, a declaration is annexed recognising 
the desirability of Denmark and the third country to conclude a bilateral agreement 
with similar provisions on visa facilitation.65 
The fragmentation in the external dimension of the AFSJ may become quite severe, 
given that the EU may conclude international agreements whose material purpose 
goes beyond the AFSJ, and also covers other matters falling under EU competencies 
in which the UK and Ireland fully take part. These kinds of agreements perhaps 
cause one to recall the former ‘inter-pillar agreements’.66 Agreements of this nature 
                                               
61 See García Andrade, (note 55 above), 102. 
62 See Council Decision of 18 January 2011 on the conclusion of the Agreement between the 
European Union and Georgia on the facilitation of the issuance of visas, OJ 2011, L 52/33. 
63 OJ 2011, L 273/2. 
64 Article 4, Protocol 22 on the Position of Denmark. If this country decides not to implement 
a measure building upon the Schengen acquis, “the Member States bound by that measure 
and Denmark will consider appropriate measures to be taken”. 
65 See the agreement concluded with Georgia, which holds that “it is desirable that the 
authorities of Denmark and of Georgia conclude, without delay, a bilateral agreement on the 
facilitation of the issuance of short-stay visas in similar terms as the Agreement between the 
European Union and Georgia”.  
66 The conclusion of the agreement between the European Union, the European Community 
and Switzerland on the Schengen acquis required two separate Decisions by the EU and EC, 
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required constant coordination between the EU and the EC throughout the 
negotiation process and on the part of the EU consent to be bound had to be 
expressed in two separate legal instruments. As occurred with the ‘inter-pillar 
agreements’, the conclusion of these kinds of agreements requires the adoption of 
two separate decisions, one based on Title V of the TFEU and another based on 
provisions outside Title V which are not binding on all member states. An example 
of this can be found in the two protocols to the UN Convention against Transnational 
Organised Crime on the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air and the 
Prevention, Suppression and Punishment of Trafficking in Persons.67 The need to 
have recourse to two separate acts in the conclusion of international agreements is 
another consequence of the variable geometry. 
The Protocol on the accession of Liechtenstein to the Agreement between the EU and 
Switzerland on the Swiss Confederation’s association with the implementation, 
application and development of the Schengen acquis bears a certain similarity to the 
situation discussed below as to the US. This agreement has allowed Liechtenstein to 
associate itself with the implementation, application and development of the 
Schengen acquis under similar terms to Switzerland, a possibility that was foreseen in 
the Schengen agreement concluded with Switzerland. Since the UK and Ireland 
participate in certain provisions of the Schengen acquis as regards police and judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters, but are not bound by the provisions on the abolition 
of controls at the internal borders and on the movement of persons, it was therefore 
necessary to adopt two separate decisions to conclude the Liechtenstein Protocol.68 
An examination of the practice that has developed in the last years reveals that the 
UK has notified it wishes to take part in the adoption and application of all 
international agreements concluded by the EU as regards police and criminal 
cooperation in criminal matters, namely: the Agreements on the use and transfer of 
Passenger Name Records to the US and Australia, considered above;69 the TFTP 
Agreement concluded with the US, considered below; the Mutual Assistance Treaty 
with Japan;70 the Agreement with Iceland and Norway on the stepping up of cross-
                                                                                                                                                   
respectively. On behalf of the EU, Council Decision 2008/149/JHA, OJ L 53, 27.2.2008, p. 50, 
and on behalf of the EC, Council Decision 2008/149/JHA, p. 50. See G. De Kerchove, 
“Relations extérieures et élargissement”, in G. De Kerchove and A. Weyembergh (eds), 
L’espace pénal européenne: enjeux et perspectives, Brussels: VUB Press, 2002, p. 272. 
67 The conclusion of the Smuggling Protocol was based on the former Title IV of the EC 
Treaty, OJ 2006, L 262/24 and 34 and the Trafficking Protocol on the former Articles 177 and 
181a EC, OJ 2006, L 262/44 and 51. 
68 OJ 2011, L 160/1 and 19, In both decisions, it is stated that he conclusion of the Protocol 
“does not prejudice the position of Denmark under the Protocol on the Position of Denmark, 
annexed to the Treaty on European Union and to the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union”. 
69 Agreement between the European Union and Australia on the processing and transfer of 
Passenger Name Record (PNR) data by air carriers to the Australian Customs and Border 
Protection Service, OJ 2012, L 186/3.  
70 Council Decision of 7 October 2010 on the conclusion of the Agreement between the 
European Union and Japan on mutual legal assistance in criminal matters, OJ 2010, L 2010/3. 
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border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism and cross-border crime;71 the 
Protocol on the accession of Liechtenstein to the Schengen acquis; and the Agreement 
with Iceland and Norway on the application of certain provisions of the Convention 
of 29 May 2000 on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the member 
states.72 The UK Government has decided also to opt-in to the negotiation mandate 
to the Proposal for the conclusion of an agreement for a simplified extradition 
arrangement between member states of the European Union and Iceland and 
Norway.73 Similarly, Ireland has also decided to take part in all international 
agreements mentioned and also discussed below. The ex-post opting-out of 
international agreements is, in any case, to be avoided, because the EU may need to 
renegotiate the agreements if the territory to which they apply is changed. 
Accordingly, the TFTP Agreement provides that it will apply to countries that have 
opted out once they notify their wish to be bound by the Agreement.74 
Variable geometry in the AFSJ has also consequences for the EU readmission 
agreements. Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the UK has continued its 
traditional policy of taking part in readmission agreements for immigrants. The UK 
has opted into EU readmission agreements with Georgia,75 Turkey76 and Pakistan,77 
although it decided not to opt into the EU readmission agreement with Cape Verde,78 
and it has opted into most of the negotiating mandates for new EU readmission 
agreements, with the exception of the cases of Armenia and Belarus. Ireland has so 
far chosen not to participate in the readmission agreements concluded by the EU, 
                                               
71 Council Decision of 26 July 2010 on the conclusion of the Agreement between the 
European Union and Iceland and Norway on the application of certain provisions of Council 
Decision 2008/615/JHA on the stepping up of cross-border cooperation, particularly in 
combating terrorism and cross-border crime and Council Decision 2008/616/JHA on the 
implementation of Decision 2008/615/JHA on the stepping up of cross-border cooperation, 
particularly in combating terrorism and cross-border crime, and the Annex thereto, OJ 2010, 
L 238/1. 
72 Council Decision of 7 June 2012 on the conclusion of the Agreement between the European 
Union, the Republic of Iceland and the Kingdom of Norway on the application of certain 
provisions of the Convention of 29 May 2000 on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters 
between the Member States of the European Union and the 2001 Protocol thereto, OJ 2012, L 
135/1. 
73 Proposal for a Council Decision on the conclusion of the Agreement between the European 
Union and the Republic of Iceland and the Kingdom of Norway on the surrender procedure 
between the Member States of the European Union and Iceland and Norway, COM (2009) 
0705 final. 
74 Article 22.2 of the 2010 SWIFT Agreement. 
75 Council Decision of 18 January 2011 on the conclusion of the Agreement between the 
European Union and Georgia on the readmission of persons residing without authorisation, 
OJ 2011, L 52/47. 
76 European Union Document No. 11743/12, COM (12) 239. 
77 Council Decision of 7 October 2010 on the conclusion of the Agreement between the 
European Community and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on the readmission of persons 
residing without authorisation, OJ 2010, L 287/50. 
78 See COM (2012) 557. 
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with the sole exception of the agreements with Hong Kong and Ukraine. Denmark, 
on the other hand, is excluded from readmission agreements, even though all these 
agreements include a Joint Declaration stating that it is appropriate that both parties 
should conclude a readmission agreement on the same terms as the EU agreement. 
9.6 The practical consequences for pre-Lisbon international agreements of 
the exercise of the UK ‘mass’ opt-out 
Protocol 36 on Transitional Provisions gives the UK the option to opt out from “the 
acts of the Union in the field of police co-operation and judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters which have been adopted before the entry into force of the Treaty of 
Lisbon”.79 The UK may notify the Council that it does not accept the new powers of 
the Commission and the Court of Justice arising from the communitarisation of the 
former third pillar up to six months before the end of the transitional period. Should 
the UK provide this notification, the pre-Lisbon acts will “cease to apply to it as from 
the date of the expiry of the transitional period” (1 December 2014). If the UK does 
choose to opt out, which seems increasingly likely, the decisions on the conclusion of 
international agreements will inevitably be affected. It is, however, important to 
point out that if the acts in question have already been amended after the entry into 
force of the Treaty of Lisbon, there is no possibility to opt out. This situation has not 
arisen to date in the case of international agreements. 
On the one hand, “this opt-out is in principle an all or nothing matter”,80 and 
consequently the exercise of this right entails that the acts adopted by the EU in the 
AFSJ before the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon will cease to apply in the UK. 
It will clearly be necessary to renegotiate international agreements concluded with 
third countries in order to free the UK from its territorial application. The UK may, 
however, notify at any moment its wish to take part in measures that have already 
ceased to be binding on it. In that case, the relevant provisions of Protocols 19 and 21 
shall apply,81 and in either case, the Union institutions and the UK “shall seek to re-
establish the widest possible measure of participation of the UK in the acquis of the 
Union in the area of freedom, security and justice without seriously affecting the 
practical operability of the various parts thereof, while respecting their coherence”.82 
Should the UK exercise its right to opt back into agreements it has previously opted 
out of this may have a negative effect on EU external action, undermining its ability 
to act as a serious and significant international actor. After all, it might be difficult to 
understand the need to take part in specific agreements, after receiving the 
communication that they will cease to apply to the UK. 
On other hand, the political debate taking place in the UK on this question does not 
appear to be giving serious consideration to the negative consequences that obtain 
from no longer being party to the important measures adopted before December 
                                               
79 Article 10.1 and 5, Protocol 36. 
80 A. Hinarejos, J.R. Spencer and S. Peers, “Opting out of EU Criminal law: What is actually 
involved?”, CELS Working Paper Series, 2012/1, p. 3. 
81 Article 10.5, Protocol 36. 
82 Ibid.  
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2009, such as the European Arrest Warrant.83 As was recently argued, “the debate 
has until now developed on the basis of a misunderstanding, both as to what the opt-
out would achieve, and as to the consequences that would follow from its exercise”.84 
The block opt-out by the UK is viewed by other member states as a precursor to an 
attempt to renegotiate the country’s EU membership.85 
Similarly, it does not seem that the negative consequences this decision would entail 
for the international cooperation with third countries in police and criminal matters, 
and above all for transatlantic cooperation, have been taken seriously into account. 
The announcement made by Britain’s Home Secretary, Theresa May, in October 2012, 
to consider relinquishing most forms of police cooperation and judicial cooperation 
did not appear to be accompanied by any reflection on these issues.86 Instead, she 
stated that the British Government is considering opting out of all pre-Lisbon acts 
and negotiating opting back into individual measures that would be in the national 
interest to rejoin.87 
The block opt-out would undoubtedly also have negative consequences for relations 
with other partners. EU agencies, in particular Europol, have intensified their 
international relations in recent years in order to achieve its foundational objectives. 
The international relations of Europol are based on Council Decision 2009/934/JHA 
adopting the implementing rules governing Europol’s relations with partners, 
including the exchange of personal data and classified information and Council 
Decision 2009/935, which determines the list of third countries with which Europol 
is to conclude agreements.88 Both acts would cease to apply to the UK, and since the 
opt-out means that the UK would no longer be a member of Europol, the country 
would not therefore benefit from the international agreements concluded by the 
Agency.89 The immediate consequence of this would be that the UK would no longer 
benefit from police cooperation with third countries harbouring threats to the 
                                               
83 This debate has intensified after the publication of a paper by the think-tank Open Europe 
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84 See Hinarejos, Spencer and Peers, op. cit., p. 3. 
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88 OJ 2009, L 325/6 and 12. 
89 A list of strategic and operational agreements concluded by Europol is available on its web 
site (www.europol.europa.eu/content/page/external-cooperation-31). 
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internal security of the UK.90 However, if a Europol regulation is adopted to 
substitute the 2009 Council Decision, as has already been planned, the UK may opt 
into the new Europol legislation, which also includes international agreements 
concluded by Europol.91 
Similarly, another consequence of the block-out would be that the UK would cease to 
be a member of Eurojust, which is one of the most important agencies the EU has 
developed to fight organised crime. The agreements thus far concluded by Eurojust 
would cease to apply to the UK.92 Given the importance of the external actions of 
Eurojust, the reform of the agency carried out by way of Decision 2009/426 seeks, 
among other things, to strengthen Eurojust’s capacity to cooperate with third 
countries and international organisations.93 Another practical consequence of 
exercising the opt-out would be that the UK would cease to participate in CEPOL 
(European Police College), whose secretariat in fact is headquartered in the UK at 
Bramshill. Since the aim of CEPOL is to help train the senior police officers of the 
member states, leaving this agency would have a less significant impact than opting 
out of Europol and Eurojust.94 
In conclusion, the UK’s legal status in relation to former third-pillar agencies would 
be similar to the current situation as regards Frontex. The creation of Frontex was a 
development of provisions of the Schengen acquis in which the UK did not take part, 
and the working arrangements concluded so far by Frontex are not binding on the 
UK.95 It is certainly possible to envisage practical arrangements that would allow the 
                                               
90 On the external relations of Europol, see C. Kaunert, “Europol and EU Counterterrorism: 
International Security Actorness in the External Dimension”, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 
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94 The Commission proposed in the new Europol Regulation to merger Europol and Cepol, 
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the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of 
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UK to continue to benefit from the external action of the former ‘third pillar’ 
agencies, but this course of action in no way contributes to the strengthening of the 
external action of the EU in the AFSJ. 
There is, however, a third key group of international agreements that would be 
affected if the UK were to exercise its opt-out. The EU has concluded agreements 
with many countries on security procedures for the exchange of classified 
information and such treaties deal not only with police and judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters, but also with CFSP matters.96 Obviously, only the provisions of 
these agreements that cover criminal and police cooperation would cease to apply in 
the UK.97 
9.7 Conclusions 
The aspiration to unify EU external action perhaps is an unrealistic legal and policy 
goal that the Stockholm Programme could not resolve or remedy in a limited time 
period. The variable geometry accorded to the UK and Ireland as regards the AFSJ 
may yet generate negative consequences for the unity and coherence of EU external 
action. The provisions of Protocol 21 are difficult to comprehend in the context of the 
aspiration for coherence in international relations. In order to avoid incoherence, the 
ex-post opt-in should ostensibly be avoided in the case of international agreements, 
and the opt-in for the negotiating mandate should be followed by an opt-in for the 
final decision concluding the agreement. If the territorial application of an 
international agreement is altered, the EU may need to renegotiate the agreement, 
and such variable geometry might have negative consequences even for third 
countries. However, the specific case of Ireland in the area of transatlantic relations 
indicates different individual intentions and policies so as to facilitate speedy 
agreement. The case study of the Passenger Name Record Directive, a spillover 
provision into EU law of an EU-US Agreement, indicates another curiosity in which 
countries with the benefit of variable geometry may perhaps seek more far-reaching 
measures that might not be expected from those perceived to be excluded from or 
operating on a remote basis within the AFSJ.  
Nevertheless, this variable geometry does not appear to have complicated in recent 
years the negotiation of international agreements dealing with criminal justice and 
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policing measures. Although it is perhaps too early to establish a definite picture on 
the UK’s implications in the external dimension of the AFSJ, it seems clear that the 
UK is committed to intensify international cooperation in matters dealing with 
criminal justice and policing measures. The UK has opted into all agreements dealing 
with police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters that have been concluded 
since the Lisbon Treaty. Similarly, Ireland has decided to take part in all agreements 
dealing with criminal justice and policing measures, confirming the relevance of 
practice-based accounts of flexibility for their theorisation.  
While variable geometry has functionally formed part of several agreements between 
the EU and US to date, it has not impacted on the legal coherence of EU external 
action in transatlantic relations and does not appear to have complicated the 
negotiation of transatlantic agreements nor stalled the evolution of the EU’s global 
rule-making objectives. Looking to the future, the matters considered here operate in 
the context of the negotiations on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership, bringing transatlantic relations to a new level of cooperation but also 
parallel negotiations on data protection, privacy and intelligence,98 issues that have 
assumed increased prominence in recent times. It seems that opting out of legal 
instruments considered essential to address the challenges faced by the EU and the 
US in the AFSJ will pose intricate problems in the transatlantic relationship. As the 
account here has demonstrated, the non-application of Mutual Legal Assistance and 
Extradition treaties between the UK and US will require the application of classic 
judicial cooperation instruments in relations between the UK and US, but these are 
not necessarily suitable instruments of the desired level of legal coherence in EU 
Justice and Home Affairs. 
 
                                               
98 Statement by President Barroso on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, 3 
July 2013 (http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-660_en.htm). 
  
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS  
 
AAs Association Agreements 
AFSJ Area of Freedom, Security and Justice 
CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy 
CJEU Court of Justice of the European Union 
CSDP Common Security and Defence Policy 
EEA European Economic Area 
EEC European Economic Community 
EFTA European Free Trade Association 
ENP European Neighbourhood Policy 
EUROCORPS A force for the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance 
EUROGENDFOR European Gendarmerie Force 
MoU Memorandum of Understanding 
PCAs Partnership and Cooperation Agreements 
PESCO Permanent Structured Co-operation 
SAAs Stabilisation Association Agreements 
TSCG Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance (‘Fiscal Compact’) 
